We remark that the schemes [PhysRevLett.98.020503, PhysRevA.74.012315, PhysRevA.71.022321, PhysRevA.72.012304, PhysRevA.69.052307, PhysRevA.59.1829] are not secret sharing schemes as claimed.
A secret-sharing scheme is a cryptographic protocol to distribute a secret state in an encoded form among a group of players such that only authorized subsets of the players can reconstruct the secret. Classically, efficient secret-sharing schemes have been shown to be induced by matroids. Furthermore, access structures of such schemes can be characterized by an excluded minor relation. No such relations are known for quantum secret-sharing schemes. In this paper we take the first steps toward a matroidal characterization of quantum-secret-sharing schemes. In addition to providing a new perspective on quantum-secret-sharing schemes, this characterization has important benefits. While previous work has shown how to construct quantum-secret-sharing schemes for general access structures, these schemes are not claimed to be efficient. In this context the present results prove to be useful; they enable us to construct efficient quantum-secret-sharing schemes for many general access structures. More precisely, we show that an identically self-dual matroid that is representable over a finite field induces a pure-state quantum-secret-sharing scheme with information rate 1.
Recently, Yang et al. proposed a kind of quantum cryptographic schemes based on secret sharing. The main idea is drawn from the case, where any n participants who share a secret K can co-operate as K does. This process can be applied to encryption, authentication, signature and so on. Unfortunately, since there is no identity authentication of the share’s holder, these schemes inherit the limitation of secret sharing in practice. If some participants do not follow the protocol, the protocol would be a failure at last. Moreover, these schemes encounter another serious attack. Any two participants can co-operate to defeat the schemes by sending different shares to the parties unknown to the distributor of the secret K, such that these parties can execute the protocol as well. The attack proves that it is not enough for quantum cryptographic schemes that only the secret key is secure.