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Italian Conference on Theoretical Computer Science

Belief-invariant Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information

Vincenzo Auletta, Diodato Ferraioli, Ashutosh Rai, Giannicola Scarpa, Andreas Winter

Published Jan 1, 2016• 2 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Drawing on ideas from game theory and quantum physics, we investigate nonlocal correlations from the point of view of equilibria in games of incomplete information. These equilibria can be classified in decreasing power as general communication equilibria, belief-invariant equilibria and correlated equilibria, all of which contain the familiar Nash equilibria. The notion of belief-invariant equilibrium has appeared in game theory before, in the 1990s. However, the class of non-signalling correlations associated to belief-invariance arose naturally already in the 1980s in the foundations of quantum mechanics. In the present work, we explain and unify these two origins of the idea and study the above classes of equilibria, and furthermore quantum correlated equilibria, using tools from quantum information but the language of game theory. We present a general framework of belief-invariant communication equilibria, which contains (quantum) correlated equilibria as special cases. Our framework also contains the theory of Bell inequalities, a question of intense interest in quantum mechanics and the original motivation for the above-mentioned studies. We then use our framework to show new results related to social welfare. Namely, we exhibit a game where belief-invariance is socially better than correlated equilibria, and one where all non-belief-invariant equilibria are socially suboptimal. Then, we show that in some cases optimal social welfare is achieved by quantum correlations, which do not need an informed mediator to be implemented. Furthermore, we illustrate potential practical applications: for instance, situations where competing companies can correlate without exposing their trade secrets, or where privacy-preserving advice reduces congestion in a network. Along the way, we highlight open questions on the interplay between quantum information, cryptography, and game theory.

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Drawing on ideas from game theory and quantum physics, we investigate nonlocal correlations from the point of view of equilibria in games of incomplete information. These equilibria can be classified in decreasing power as general communication equilibria, belief-invariant equilibria and correlated equilibria, all of which contain the familiar Nash equilibria. The notion of belief-invariant equilibrium has appeared in game theory before, in the 1990s. However, the class of non-signalling correlations associated to belief-invariance arose naturally already in the 1980s in the foundations of quantum mechanics.
In the present work, we explain and unify these two origins of the idea and study the above classes of equilibria, and furthermore quantum correlated equilibria, using tools from quantum information but the language of game theory. We present a general framework of belief-invariant communication equilibria, which contains (quantum) correlated equilibria as special cases. Our framework also contains the theory of Bell inequalities, a question of intense interest in quantum mechanics and the original motivation for the above-mentioned studies.
We then use our framework to show new results related to social welfare. Namely, we exhibit a game where belief-invariance is socially better than correlated equilibria, and one where all non-belief-invariant equilibria are socially suboptimal. Then, we show that in some cases optimal social welfare is achieved by quantum correlations, which do not need an informed mediator to be implemented. Furthermore, we illustrate potential practical applications: for instance, situations where competing companies can correlate without exposing their trade secrets, or where privacy-preserving advice reduces congestion in a network. Along the way, we highlight open questions on the interplay between quantum information, cryptography, and game theory.
Bell nonlocality is a cornerstone of quantum theory with applications in information processing ranging from cryptography to distributed computing and game theory. Indeed, it is known that Bell's theorem can be formally linked to Bayesian games, allowing the use of nonlocal correlations to advise players and thereby achieve new points of equilibrium that are unavailable classically. Here we generalize this link, proving the connection between multistage games of incomplete information with Bell scenarios involving the communication of measurement outcomes between the parties. We apply the general framework for a few cases of interest and analyze the equilibrium reached by quantum nonlocal correlations.
An interesting connection has been established between two apparently unrelated concepts, namely, quantum nonlocality and Bayesian game theory. It has been shown that nonlocal correlations in the form of advice can outperform classical equilibrium strategies in common-interest Bayesian games and also in conflicting-interest Bayesian games. Classical equilibrium strategies can be of two types, fair and unfair. Whereas in fair equilibrium payoffs of different players are equal, in the unfair case they differ. An advantage of nonlocal correlation has been demonstrated over fair strategies only. We show that quantum strategies can outperform even the unfair classical equilibrium strategies. For this purpose we consider a class of two-player Bayesian games. It becomes that such games can have only fair equilibria, both fair and unfair equilibria, or only unfair ones. We provide a simple analytic method to characterize the nonlocal correlations that are advantageous over the classical equilibrium strategies in these games. We also show that quantum advice provides a better social optimality solution (a relevant notion of equilibrium for the unfair case) over the classical one.
We outline the general construction of three-player games with incomplete information which fulfil the following conditions: (i) symmetry with respect to the permutations of players; (ii) the existence of an upper bound for total payoff resulting from Bell inequalities; (iii) the existence of both fair and unfair Nash equilibria saturating this bound. Conditions (i)–(iii) imply that we are dealing with conflicting interest games. An explicit example of such a game is given. A quantum counterpart of this game is considered. It is obtained by keeping the same utilities but replacing classical advisor by a quantum one. It is shown that the quantum game possesses only fair equilibria with strictly higher payoffs than in the classical case. This implies that quantum nonlocality can be used to resolve the conflict between the players.
We investigate what quantum advantages can be obtained in multipartite non-cooperative games by studying how different types of quantum resources can lead to new Nash equilibria and improve social welfare — a measure of the quality of an equilibrium. Two different quantum settings are analysed: a first, in which players are given direct access to an entangled quantum state, and a second, which we introduce here, in which they are only given classical advice obtained from quantum devices. For a given game G , these two settings give rise to different equilibria characterised by the sets of equilibrium correlations Qcorr(G) and Q(G) , respectively. We show that Q(G)⊆Qcorr(G) , and by exploiting the self-testing property of some correlations, that the inclusion is strict for some games G . We make use of SDP optimisation techniques to study how these quantum resources can improve social welfare, obtaining upper and lower bounds on the social welfare reachable in each setting. We investigate, for several games involving conflicting interests, how the social welfare depends on the bias of the game and improve upon a separation that was previously obtained using pseudo-telepathic solutions.
We present a quantum approach to a signaling game; a special kind of extensive game of incomplete information. Our model is based on quantum schemes for games in strategic form where players perform unitary operators on their own qubits of some fixed initial state and the payoff function is given by a measurement on the resulting final state. We show that the quantum game induced by our scheme coincides with a signaling game as a special case and outputs nonclassical results in general. As an example, we consider a quantum extension of the signaling game in which the chance move is a three-parameter unitary operator whereas the players' actions are equivalent to classical ones. In this case, we study the game in terms of Nash equilibria and refine the pure Nash equilibria adapting to the quantum game the notion of a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Claude Shannon's zero-error communication paradigm reshaped our understanding of fault-tolerant information transfer. Here, we adapt this notion into game theory with incomplete information. We ask: can players with private information coordinate on a Nash equilibrium with zero probability of error? We identify Bayesian games in which such coordination is impossible classically, yet achievable by harnessing Bell nonlocal correlations. We formalize this requirement as zero-error Nash equilibrium coordination, establishing a new bridge between information theory, game theory, and quantum nonlocality. Furthermore, we construct a tripartite Bayesian game that admits zero-error Nash equilibrium coordination with genuine entanglement, and a two-player game where a stronger notion of coordination can be achieved using every two-qubit pure entangled state except the maximally one. Crucially, the advantage persists under experimentally relevant noise, demonstrating nonlocality as a robust resource for near-zero error decision-making under uncertainty.