Fine-grained definitions of freshness are presented,and both freshness and secrecy are combined to improve the security analysis of cryptographic protocols.Trusted freshness of the nonces generated by different principals are explicitly distinguished.More exact explanations on the private secrecy and shared secrecy are given.The improved method can analyze and find out some existing subtle weaknesses in the Helsinki protocol.
Fine-grained definitions of freshness are presented,and both freshness and secrecy are combined to improve the security analysis of cryptographic protocols.Trusted freshness of the nonces generated by different principals are explicitly distinguished.More exact explanations on the private secrecy and shared secrecy are given.The improved method can analyze and find out some existing subtle weaknesses in the Helsinki protocol.
Aimed at the problems in analyzing the security properties of cryptographic protocols,on security,guess attacks,strong security,perfect forward security,known-key attacks,freshness and integrity based on protocol trace is researched,which denotes the run of the protocol.The implications of the properties are studied,then the formal definitions are given,which point out the conditions that the protocol trace must satisfy,and the relations between different notions of secrecy are analyzed.In the end,examples are given to validate the correctness and effectiveness of the definitions.
We develop an approach to deriving concrete engineering advice for cryptographic protocols from provable-security-style proofs of security. The approach is illustrated with a simple, yet useful protocol. Our main result provides the first published proof of an exact probabilistic relationship betwe en a high-level protocol and multiple cryptographic primitives. This exact relationship enables us to rigorously derive concrete recommendations on the bitlengths of cryptographic keys and on how often principals should rekey. As an additional benefit of our approach, the process of developing our theorem and proof lead us to identify and implement an improvement in our example protocol.
Authenticated Group Key Agreement Protocols are protocols allowing\na group of principals to contributively generate a key by the\nexchange of messages on a network possibly controlled by an\nattacker. Furthermore, their execution also guarantees all group\nmembers that the key they obtained can only be known by the other\nintended protocol participants. These protocols can be exploited\nin many applications such as audio or videoconferencing,\nreplicated servers (such as database, web, time servers), chat or\nnetwork games for instance. \n AGKAP's present several particularities that make them interesting\ncase studies for research in the theory of security. At first, the\nconsideration of the number of protocol participants as a\nparameter raises several complexity problems that are not present\nin the classical two or three-party frameworks. Furthermore, up to\nnow, the security properties of group protocols have roughly been\nconsidered as direct extensions of two-party properties, what does\nnot capture several plausible attack scenarios. A second\ninteresting aspect of the analysis of AGKAP's is the consideration\nof Diffie-Hellman-type primitives, that present properties out\nof the scope of most classical models. \n We started our study with the construction of a simple model for\nthe analysis of a classical family of protocols: the Cliques\nAGKAP's. This allowed us to discover several attacks and define\ndifferent flavors of group security properties. We then tried to\nfix these protocols, what led us to extend our model in order to\nprove that it is in fact impossible to build a secure AGKAP based\non the same design assumptions as the Cliques protocols. Finally,\nwe designed a new AGKAP based on different cryptographic\nprimitives (signature and hash functions) for which we proved\nauthentication, freshness and secrecy properties. A comparison\nwith a similar AGKAP developed in parallel to ours is also\nproposed.
Nowadays it is widely accepted to formulate the security of a protocol carrying out a given task via the "trusted-party paradigm," where the protocol execution is compared with an ideal process where the outputs are computed by a trusted party that sees all the inputs. A protocol is said to securely carry out a given task if running the protocol with a realistic adversary amounts to "emulating" the ideal process with the appropriate trusted party. In the Universal Composability (UC) framework the program run by the trusted party is called an ideal functionality. While this simulation-based security formulation provides strong security guarantees, its usefulness is contingent on the properties and correct specification of the ideal functionality, which, as demonstrated in recent years by the coexistence of complex, multiple functionalities for the same task as well as by their "unstable" nature, does not seem to be an easy task. In this paper we address this problem, by introducing a general methodology for the sound specification of ideal functionalities. First, we introduce the class of canonical ideal functionalities for a cryptographic task, which unifies the syntactic specification of a large class of cryptographic tasks under the same basic template functionality. Furthermore, this representation enables the isolation of the individual properties of a cryptographic task as separate members of the corresponding class. By endowing the class of canonical functionalities with an algebraic structure we are able to combine basic functionalities to a single final canonical functionality for a given task. Effectively, this puts forth a bottom-up approach for the specification of ideal functionalities: first one defines a set of basic constituent functionalities for the task at hand, and then combines them into a single ideal functionality taking advantage of the algebraic structure. In our framework, the constituent functionalities of a task can be derived either directly or, following a translation strategy we introduce, from existing game-based definitions; such definitions have in many cases captured desired individual properties of cryptographic tasks, albeit in less adversarial settings than universal composition. Our translation methodology entails a sequence of steps that derive a corresponding canonical functionality given a game-based definition. In this way, we obtain a well-defined mapping of game-based security properties to their corresponding UC counterparts. Finally, we demonstrate the power of our approach by applying our methodology to a variety of basic cryptographic tasks, including commitments, digital signatures, zero-knowledge proofs, and oblivious transfer. While in some cases our derived canonical functionalities are equivalent to existing formulations, thus attesting to the validity of our approach, in others they differ, enabling us to "debug" previous definitions and pinpoint their shortcomings.
The security attributes of three provable secure ID-based authenticated key agreement protocols are analyzed,and an enhanced ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol is presented based on the previous work.The new scheme achieves most of the known security attributes,such as known-key secrecy,key-compromise impersonation resilience,unknown key-share resilience,no-key control and message independence,especially the PKG-forward secrecy and known session-specific temporary information secrecy attributes,meanwhile keeping with the nice efficiency.