An Improved Key Agreement Protocol on Braid Groups

Tang Xue

Published Jan 1, 2006• 0 citations

Abstract

Shor,Boneh,Liptonon et al. present some remarkable quantum algorithms which can solve integer factoring problem, discrete logarithm problem and discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curves in quantum polynomial time. These quantum algorithms are great challenges to classical public key cryptographies based on the above-described hard problems. It seems that braid group is a kind of considerable public key cryptography platform, but current key agreement protocols, such as AAG,AAFG and BDH, all have different degrees of security weaknesses.This paper takes advantage of random braids and non-conjugate transformations to present an improved braid key agreement protocol related to AAG and AAFG, which can make the two communication parties securely share a common key over any insecure channel. This protocol can resists current length-based attacks, linear representation attacks and other conjugacy search attacks.

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