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Journal of Chinese Computer Systems

Construction of m-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer

Zhide Chen

Published Jan 1, 2006• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Oblivious transfer(OT)is used as a key component in many applications of cryptography. In this paper, a1-out-of-n oblivious transfer is constructed based on the sub protocol 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer;an m-out-of-n oblivious transfer is constructed based on the sub protocol 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer. Finally,a1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer is constructed based on public key system. By this way,any existed public key system can be used to construct m-out-of-n oblivious transfer.

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International Journal of Communication Systems•May 29, 2013•5 citations
Oblivious transfer(OT)is used as a key component in many applications of cryptography. In this paper, a1-out-of-n oblivious transfer is constructed based on the sub protocol 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer;an m-out-of-n oblivious transfer is constructed based on the sub protocol 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer. Finally,a1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer is constructed based on public key system. By this way,any existed public key system can be used to construct m-out-of-n oblivious transfer.
Oblivious transfer (OT) protocol is an essential tool in cryptography that provides a wide range of applications such as secure multi-party computation, private information retrieval, private set intersection, contract signing, and privacy-preserving location-based services. The OT protocol has different variants such as one-out-of-2, one-out-of- n , k -out-of- n , and OT extension. In the OT (one-out-of-2, one-out-of- n , and OT extension) protocol, the sender has a set of messages, whereas the receiver has a key. The receiver sends that key to the sender in a secure way; the sender cannot get any information about the received key. The sender encrypts every message by operating on every message using the received key and sends all the encrypted messages to the receiver. The receiver is able to extract only the required message using his key. However, in the k -out-of- n OT protocol, the receiver sends a set of k keys to the sender, and in replay, the sender sends all the encrypted messages. The receiver uses his keys and extracts the required messages, but it cannot gain any information about the messages that it has not requested. Generally, the OT protocol requires high communication and computation cost if we transfer millions of oblivious messages. The OT extension protocol provides a solution for this, where the receiver transfers a set of keys to the sender by executing a few numbers of OT protocols. Then, the sender encrypts all the messages using cheap symmetric key cryptography with the help of a received set of keys and transfers millions of oblivious messages to the receiver. In this work, we present different variants of OT protocols such as one-out-of-2, one-out-of- n , k -out-of- n , and OT extension. Furthermore, we cover various aspects of theoretical security guarantees such as semi-honest and malicious adversaries, universally composable, used techniques, computation, and communication efficiency aspects. From the analysis, we found that the semi-honest adversary-based OT protocols required low communication and computation costs as compared to malicious adversary-based OT protocols.
Oblivious transfer (OT) is one of the keystones of secure multi-party computation. It is generally believed that unconditionally secure OT is impossible. In this article, we propose a practical and secure quantum all-or-nothing oblivious transfer protocol based on the quantum one-way function. The protocol is built upon a quantum public-key encryption construction, and its security relies on the no-cloning theorem and no-communication theorem. Practical security is reflected in limitations on non-demolition measurements.
We use interactive hashing to achieve the most efficient OT protocol to date based solely on the assumption that trapdoor permutations (TDP) exist. Our protocol can be seen as the following (simple) modification of either of the two famous OT constructions: 1) In the one by Even et al (1985), a receiver must send a random domain element to a sender through IH; 2) In the one by Ostrovsky et al (1993), the players should use TDP instead of one-way permutation. A similar approach is employed to achieve oblivious transfer based on the security of the McEliece cryptosystem. In this second protocol, the receiver inputs a public key into IH, while privately keeping the corresponding secret key. Two different versions of IH are used: the computationally secure one in the first protocol, and the information-theoretically secure one in the second.
Key-exchange protocols have been overlooked as a possible means for implementing oblivious transfer (OT). In this article, we present protocols for mutual exchange of secrets, 1-out-of-2 OT and coin-flipping similar to the Diffie-Hellman protocol using the idea of obliviously exchanging encryption keys. Since the Diffie-Hellman scheme is widely used, our protocol may provide a useful alternative to the conventional methods for implementation of oblivious transfer and a useful primitive in building larger cryptographic schemes.
SUMMARY In t‐out‐of‐n oblivious transfer (OT), the receiver can only receive t messages out of n messages sent by the sender, and the sender has no idea about which ones have been received. Majority of the existence of previous efficient OT schemes require t calls of 1‐out‐of‐n OT to construct the t‐out‐of‐n OT. Its computational requirements and bandwidth consumption are quite demanding. On the basis of the elliptic curves cryptography, we propose a new t‐out‐of‐n OT protocol for private information retrieval in this article. It is more suitable for the smart cards or mobile units. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.