We propose a quantum identification scheme.The scheme uses one-time random strings to hide the key shared by both sides,and the verification algorithm is independent of the random strings.So it protects the key.The scheme is secure even if the adversary has unlimited resource of computation.
Assuming there is a shared string between the users, we present a novel scheme, the lengthened string scheme (LSS), where the shared string is lengthened firstly by a specially designed algorithm, then some special treatments are applied on the lengthened one before it is used to authenticate. Based on the lengthened string scheme (LSS) we propose a quantum authentication protocol using entanglements. And the robustness of our protocol is discussed. In fact all the quantum key distribution protocols can do identification simultaneously based on the LSS.
We need secure identification schemes because many situations exist in which a person must be identified. In this paper, we propose three quantum identification schemes with entanglements. First, we propose a quantum one-time pad password scheme. In this scheme, entanglements play the role of a one-time pad password. Next, we propose a quantum identification scheme that requires a trusted authority. Finally, we propose a quantum message authentication scheme that is constructed by combining a different quantum cryptosystem with an ordinary authentication tag.
Currently many symmetric key cryptographic tools which are known to be quantum-safe. They all share Secret symmetric keys through an untrusted medium which is usually done with public key methods which are prone to quantum attacks. One among the recommended solutions to the key distribution problem is Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). QKD utilizes an authenticated Communication channel along with a quantum communication channel so that a secret key is generated. Whatever may be the protocol to implement proposed QKD, they all need both a quantum channel, and an authenticated classical. OTP (One Time Pad) is used when two parties wish to communications have to share a key called pad. This pad is a randomly generated key and the length of the key should be equal to the message so it can be sent. The proposed QKD parameters that result in almost 35.67% smaller keys for quantum security and an implementation of QKD in network which is publicly available and usable in practice.
We consider the problem of secure identification: user U proves to server S that he knows an agreed (possibly low-entropy) password w, while giving away as little information on w as possible, namely the adversary can exclude at most one possible password for each execution of the scheme. We propose a solution in the bounded-quantum-storage model, where U and S may exchange qubits, and a dishonest party is assumed to have limited quantum memory. No other restriction is posed upon the adversary. An improved version of the proposed identification scheme is also secure against a man-in-the-middle attack, but requires U and S to additionally share a high-entropy key k. However, security is still guaranteed if one party loses k to the attacker but notices the loss. In both versions of the scheme, the honest participants need no quantum memory, and noise and imperfect quantum sources can be tolerated. The schemes compose sequentially, and w and k can securely be re-used. A small modification to the identification scheme results in a quantum-key-distribution (QKD) scheme, secure in the bounded-quantum-storage model, with the same re-usability properties of the keys, and without assuming authenticated channels. This is in sharp contrast to known QKD schemes (with unbounded adversary) without authenticated channels, where authentication keys must be updated, and unsuccessful executions can cause the parties to run out of keys.
We consider the problem of secure identification: user U proves to server S that he knows an agreed (possibly low-entropy) password w, while giving away as little information on w as possible, namely the adversary can exclude at most one possible password for each execution of the scheme. We propose a solution in the bounded-quantum-storage model, where U and S may exchange qubits, and a dishonest party is assumed to have limited quantum memory. No other restriction is posed upon the adversary. An improved version of the proposed identification scheme is also secure against a man-in-the-middle attack, but requires U and S to additionally share a high-entropy key k. However, security is still guaranteed if one party loses k to the attacker but notices the loss. In both versions of the scheme, the honest participants need no quantum memory, and noise and imperfect quantum sources can be tolerated. The schemes compose sequentially, and w and k can securely be re-used. A small modification to the identification scheme results in a quantum-key-distribution (QKD) scheme, secure in the bounded-quantum-storage model, with the same re-usability properties of the keys, and without assuming authenticated channels. This is in sharp contrast to known QKD schemes (with unbounded adversary) without authenticated channels, where authentication keys must be updated, and unsuccessful executions can cause the parties to run out of keys.
In the bounded-storage model for information-theoretically secure encryption and key-agreement one can prove the security of a cipher based on the sole assumption that the adversary's storage capacity is bounded, say by s bits, even if her computational power is unlimited. Assume that a random t-bit string R is either publicly available (e.g. the signal of a deep space radio source) or broadcast by one of the legitimate parties. If s < t, the adversary can store only partial information about R. The legitimate sender Alice and receiver Bob, sharing a short secret key K initially, can therefore potentially generate a very long n-bit one-time pad X with n jKj about which the adversary has essentially no information, thus at rst glance apparently contradicting Shannon's bound on the key size of a perfect cipher.