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A New Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol with DoS Resilience

Chuangui Ma

Published Jan 1, 2010• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

This paper proposes the extension of meCK model for the design and analysis of authenticated key exchange(AKE) protocols.In the new model,the authors add the DoS resilience and present a new AKE protocol,which can reach DoS resilience and others fundamental security attributes.Compared with DoS-CMQV protocol,the new protocol with stronger security keeps the same efficiency.

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IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics Communications and Computer Sciences•Jan 1, 2010•6 citations
This paper proposes the extension of meCK model for the design and analysis of authenticated key exchange(AKE) protocols.In the new model,the authors add the DoS resilience and present a new AKE protocol,which can reach DoS resilience and others fundamental security attributes.Compared with DoS-CMQV protocol,the new protocol with stronger security keeps the same efficiency.
Secure channels, indispensable to many applications, can be established by using an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol where the involving parties authenticate one another and then share authenticated session keys over insecure networks. In this paper, we introduce a new type of AKE protocols that are especially designed to minimize the damages caused by leakages of stored secrets. Such protocols are called Leakage-Resilient AKE (LR-AKE) protocols, whose motivation, design principles, several constructions, security analysis and applications are explained in detail.
Currently there are few tripartite Authenticated Key Exchange(AKE) protocols which have a formal security proof.Aiming at this problem,this paper investigates the security model for the tripartite AKE protocols.A strong security model named enhanced CanettiKrawczyk(eCK) model for two-party AKE protocols is proposed.A strong security model for three-party AKE protocols is introduced which generalizes the eCK model for two-party setting,and the insider attack is taken into account.It presents a new tripartite AKE protocol and shows that the protocol is provably secure in the strong security model.
In 2007, LaMacchia et al.proposed the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model for authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols. In this paper, we first modify the eCK model by adding a new query to make the adversary can reveal all ephemeral secret information. Then we propose a new efficient and strongly secure AKE protocol in the asymmetric setting, called E-NETS (enhanced NETS) protocol, and prove its security in the modified eCK (meCK) model under the random oracle assumption and the gap Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Authenticated key exchange (AKE) is a crucial cryptographic primitive used for establishing an authenticated and confidential communication channel between parties, which has been widely used in our daily life when we surf on the Internet. However, in past decades mutual AKE protocols have been studied extensively in theory, while in many practical environments such as in the Tor anonymity network the mutual authentication property is undesirable. Meanwhile, considering privacy protection is getting more and more attention and one-way AKE protocols play an important role in privacy protection, so no matter in theory or in practice, it is quite meaningful to conduct research on the one-way AKE protocols. In this article, we present a new efficient anonymous one-way AKE protocol, which has strong anonymity and security properties guarantee, and efficiency advantages. Moreover, our new scheme has tight security reduction and is formally proved secure in the random oracle model under the Gap-DH and XCR signature security assumptions.
Secure channels can be realized by an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol that generates authenticated session keys between the involving parties. In [32], Shin et al., proposed a new kind of AKE (RSA-AKE) protocol whose goal is to provide high efficiency and security against leakage of stored secrets as much as possible. Let us consider more powerful attacks where an adversary completely controls the communications and the stored secrets (the latter is denoted by “replacement” attacks). In this paper, we first show that the RSA-AKE protocol [32] is no longer secure against such an adversary. The main contributions of this paper are as follows: (1) we propose an RSA-based leakage-resilient AKE (RSA-AKE2) protocol that is secure against active attacks as well as replacement attacks; (2) we prove that the RSA-AKE2 protocol is secure against replacement attacks based on the number theory results; (3) we show that it is provably secure in the random oracle model, by showing the reduction to the RSA one-wayness, under an extended model that covers active attacks and replacement attacks; (4) in terms of efficiency, the RSA-AKE2 protocol is comparable to [32] in the sense that the client needs to compute only one modular multiplication with pre-computation; and (5) we also discuss about extensions of the RSA-AKE2 protocol for several security properties (i.e., synchronization of stored secrets, privacy of client and solution to server compromise-impersonation attacks).