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Journal of Huaiyin Teachers College

Analysis of Popper's "Physical Indeterminism"—Comparison of Several famous views on the "Causality and Chance, Determinism and Probability

Qi Gui

Published Jan 1, 2003• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

This paper compares the view of Popper with the Interpretation of Copenhagen and the thoughts of D·Bohm, in this way, it illustrates the instructive value of Popper's thoughts of Indeterminism.

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INTRODUCTION In his essay ‘Quantum Mechanics Without “the Observer”’ (in [20], 7–44), Popper criticizes the Copenhagen Interpretation and suggests construing the quantum theory as a ‘generalization of classical statistical mechanics’ ([20], 16). The uncertainty relations, he says, set ‘limits to the statistical dispersion … of the results of sequences of experiments’ ([20], 20) and not to what can be said about individual systems. Some strange features of orthodox microphysics are due either to a misinterpretation of probability, involving some ‘very simple mistakes’ ([20], 42); or else they are a straightforward consequence of the fact that the quantum theory is a statistical theory. For example, ‘the reduction of the wave packet … has nothing to do with quantum theory: it is a trivial feature of probability theory’ ([20], 37). The idea of probability that is presupposed in all these arguments, however, is Popper's propensity interpretation. Adopting this interpretation suffices for making clear what the quantum theory really is: a ‘generalization of classical statistical mechanics’ ([20], 16). This is Popper's position as I understand it. This position, it seems to me, is attractive enough as long as one does not carry the analysis too far. But it breaks down when confronted with all the facts which Bohr wanted to take into account. Altogether Popper's criticism and his alternative proposals once more reveal the strong points of the Copenhagen philosophy, and especially of the ideas of Niels Bohr. Today it is very difficult to find a satisfactory account of these ideas.

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M.Born's notions on causality are that Quantum World is governed by causality and chance jointly;that quantum particle has the intrinsic property of uncertainty,and the law of chance is the last law of nature;and that the concepts of probability and chance are more elementary than causality.While D.Bohm's notions of potential causality are that there is no last law of nuture at all,and each level manifests unique rules;that causality is just relative necessity and contingency always appears on the cross point of many different factors or probable tendencies;that the potential causality interpretation is some kind of integration of causal determination and probability statistics,which has clear intuitive model in physics,and has definite ontological base in philosophy.
A thought experiment, proposed by Karl Popper, which has been experimentally realized recently, is critically examined. A basic flaw in Popper's argument which has also been prevailing in subsequent debates, is pointed out. It is shown that Popper's experiment can be understood easily within the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. An alternate experiment, based on discrete variables, is proposed, which constitutes Popper's test in a clearer way. It refutes the argument of absence of nonlocality in quantum mechanics.
A thought experiment, proposed by Karl Popper, which has been experimentally realized recently, is critically examined. A basic flaw in Popper's argument which has also been prevailing in subsequent debates, is pointed out. It is shown that Popper's experiment can be understood easily within the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. An alternate experiment, based on discrete variables, is proposed, which constitutes Popper's test in a clearer way. It refutes the argument of absence of nonlocality in quantum mechanics.
In previous chapters we presented and discussed the standard, generally accepted Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics according to which there exists in nature at the most fundamental level an irreducible and ineliminable indeterminism. Although we saw that what historically constituted the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is difficult to specify with precision, three central commitments do characterize it. (1) In general, no particle trajectories can exist in a space–time background. (2) No deterministic description of fundamental physical phenomena is possible. (3) There exists in the laws of the fundamental physical phenomena of nature an essential and ineliminable indeterminism or probability (unlike the probability of classical physics, that there reflects our ignorance of the finer details of complex physical phenomena). A flavor of these features of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics can be gotten from the quotations at the beginning of Part VIII ( Some philosophical lessons from quantum mechanics ). On this view, it is in principle impossible to predict, say, the exact future behavior of an electron (that is, to give its position and velocity as functions of the time). According to the Copenhagen school, there can be no causal description of microphenomena in terms of a continuous space–time background (as there is in classical physics). It is generally believed that a causal interpretation of quantum mechanics is impossible, although no proof of this exists.
INTRODUCTION In his essay ‘Quantum Mechanics Without “the Observer”’ (in [20], 7–44), Popper criticizes the Copenhagen Interpretation and suggests construing the quantum theory as a ‘generalization of classical statistical mechanics’ ([20], 16). The uncertainty relations, he says, set ‘limits to the statistical dispersion … of the results of sequences of experiments’ ([20], 20) and not to what can be said about individual systems. Some strange features of orthodox microphysics are due either to a misinterpretation of probability, involving some ‘very simple mistakes’ ([20], 42); or else they are a straightforward consequence of the fact that the quantum theory is a statistical theory. For example, ‘the reduction of the wave packet … has nothing to do with quantum theory: it is a trivial feature of probability theory’ ([20], 37). The idea of probability that is presupposed in all these arguments, however, is Popper's propensity interpretation. Adopting this interpretation suffices for making clear what the quantum theory really is: a ‘generalization of classical statistical mechanics’ ([20], 16). This is Popper's position as I understand it. This position, it seems to me, is attractive enough as long as one does not carry the analysis too far. But it breaks down when confronted with all the facts which Bohr wanted to take into account. Altogether Popper's criticism and his alternative proposals once more reveal the strong points of the Copenhagen philosophy, and especially of the ideas of Niels Bohr. Today it is very difficult to find a satisfactory account of these ideas.