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Escrowable Identity-Based Authenticated Key Agreement in the Standard Model

Min Chen

Published Jan 1, 2015• 2 citations

Abstract

In recent years,a few escrowable ID-AKA protocols have been proposed,but none of them are provably secure in the standard model while simultaneously having strong security.The main issue is how a simulator is able to deal with reveal-queries without the help of random oracles.In this paper,we presented a method incorporating a built-in security trapdoor function in an escrowable ID-AKA protocol.The security of our protocol relied on the hardness of the decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion problem.Meanwhile,we extended the security game of ID-AKA protocols to resist stronger adversarial powers,which allowed our security game to capture additional security properties such as perfect forward secrecy,ephemeral secrets reveal resistance and so on.Assuming that no adversary can obtain the master secret key and each party in the protocol has at least one uncornprornised secret,our scheme is secure.

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