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Jisuanji gongcheng

Identity-based Conference Key Agreement Algorithm

Yali Wang

Published Jan 1, 2006• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Most of conference key agreement algorithms operate only when all participants are honest,but do not work when some participants are malicious and attempt to delay or destruct the conference.This paper presents a new conference key agreement algorithm based on the identity-based signature scheme given by Cha and Cheon.Under the Gap Diffie-Hellman assumption,honest participants can agree on a common conference key no matter how many participants are malicious,and passive adversaries get no information about the conference key established by honest participants.Furthermore,the algorithm is efficient,and has flexible structure and high adaptability.

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Jisuanji gongcheng yu sheji•Jan 1, 2004•0 citations
Most of conference key agreement algorithms operate only when all participants are honest,but do not work when some participants are malicious and attempt to delay or destruct the conference.This paper presents a new conference key agreement algorithm based on the identity-based signature scheme given by Cha and Cheon.Under the Gap Diffie-Hellman assumption,honest participants can agree on a common conference key no matter how many participants are malicious,and passive adversaries get no information about the conference key established by honest participants.Furthermore,the algorithm is efficient,and has flexible structure and high adaptability.
Conference key agreement is one of the important issues in cryptography. In this paper, we propose a novel conference key agreement scheme. Without adopting the authenticated broadcasting channel model, we use an intermediary node to ensure the correctness of the transmitted messages. A passive adversary or an active adversary obtains zero knowledge about the common conference key established by the all honest participants who follow the proposed scheme. Keywords: conference key, Diffie-Hellman, passive adversary, active adversary, cryptography
Lots of conference key agreement protocols have been suggested to secure computer network conference. Most of them operate only when all conferees are honest, but do not work when some conferees are malicious and attempt to delay or destruct the conference. Recently, Tzeng proposed a conference key agreement protocol with fault tolerance in terms that a common secret conference key among honest conferees can be established even if malicious conferees exist. In the case where a conferee can broadcast different messages in different subnetworks, Tzeng's protocol is vulnerable to a "different key attack" from malicious conferees. In addition, Tzeng's protocol requires each conferee to broadcast to the rest of the group and receive n - 1 message in a single round (where n stands for the number of conferees). Moreover, it has to handle n simultaneous broadcasts in one round. In this paper, we propose a fault-tolerant conference key agreement protocol, in which each conferee only needs to send one message to a "semitrusted" conference bridge and receive one broadcast message. Our protocol is an identity-based key agreement, built on elliptic curve cryptography. It is resistant to the different key attack from malicious conferees and needs less communication cost than Tzeng's protocol.
When a group of people want to communicate securely over an open network, they run a conference-key protocol to establish a common conference key K such that all their communications thereafter are encrypted with the key K. In this paper, we propose a provably secure fault-tolerant conference-key agreement protocol under the authenticated broadcast channel model. We show that a passive adversary gets zero knowledge about the conference key established by the honest participants under the assumption of a variant Diffie-Hellman (1976) decision problem. We also show that the honest participants can agree on a common conference key no matter how many participants are malicious. Furthermore, we show that even if the broadcast channel is not authenticated, our protocol is secure against impersonators under the random oracle model.
In order to ensure authenticity of the information for conference key negotiation, the information which each party sends should be authenticated. Digital signature and share secret are two methods for authentication. Identity-based public key cryptosystems from the Weil pairing on elliptic curve are introduced. Two authenticated conference key agreement protocols are designed using identitybased signature scheme and identity-based Diffie-Hellman shared key. The protocols are secure and efficient. They can be applied to all kinds of environment in which multi-parties negotiate session keys.