The interpretation of quantum mechanics expands quantum theory,and it embodies quantum theory's consistence semantically.Copenhagen interpretation,the minimal ensemble interpretation,ontological interpretation,many-worlds interpretation,modal interpretation and decoherence interpretation have different additional requirements and force.Comparing the six interpretations from between the tension of additional requirement and force is not only the need of the whole scientific knowledge,but also the need of consistence semantically.
The interpretation of quantum mechanics expands quantum theory,and it embodies quantum theory's consistence semantically.Copenhagen interpretation,the minimal ensemble interpretation,ontological interpretation,many-worlds interpretation,modal interpretation and decoherence interpretation have different additional requirements and force.Comparing the six interpretations from between the tension of additional requirement and force is not only the need of the whole scientific knowledge,but also the need of consistence semantically.
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is criticized for its semantic inconsistence.The minimal ensemble interpretation,ontological interpretation,many-worlds interpretation,modal interpretation and decoherence interpretation reconstruct quantum mechanics interpretation.They have different additional requirements and explanation force.Comparing the six interpretations from additional requirements and explanation force can deepen our understandings,which is not only the need of whole science knowledge,but also the need of semantic consistence.
In the present paper I describe a general formal semantic scheme for the interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM) , and on the basis of this scheme I examine the modal interpretation of QM — both the Copenhagen and the anti-Copenhagen variants — proposed by van Fraassen [19, 20, 21], This is intended to be a fragment of a larger work [12] which additionally investigates a number of closely related interpretations, including ones proposed by Bub and Demopoulos [1, 2, 3, 4], Fine [5, 6], and Krips [16, 17]. Formal semantically speaking (see, e.g., Thomason [18]), a logic L may be characterized as an ordered pair <SYN,SEM>, where SYN is the underlying syntax (language) of L, and SEM is the semantics of L, which consists of a class of semantic assignments on SYN.
The interpretation of measurements in quantum mechanics is still under discussion (Healey [84], Bell [9], Redhead [136]). Besides the Copenhagen interpretation we have the many-worlds interpretations (Everett interpretations), the modal interpretations, the decoherence interpretations, the interpretations in terms of (nonlocal) hidden variables, the quantum logical interpretations. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This paper presents a philosophical analysis of quantum mechanics, the measurement problem, the observer problem, decoherence, and quantum interpretation. It argues that the central difficulty in quantum mechanics is not only technical but interpretive: the theory has extraordinary predictive power without a single settled account of what is happening physically or ontologically. The paper frames this as an answerability problem, asking how interpretations should be judged when formal success outruns explanatory closure. It separates several meanings of observation—interaction, coupling, record formation, information update, and conscious awareness—and shows how collapsing these layers creates confusion in both physics and philosophy. It then compares major interpretations including Copenhagen, Many-Worlds, Bohmian mechanics, objective collapse, QBism, relational quantum mechanics, and consistent histories, treating them as different ways of stabilizing explanatory burden around an underconstrained formal core. The paper also argues that decoherence is crucial for understanding record stability and the appearance of classicality, but does not by itself solve the single-outcome problem. Overall, the paper offers a clear framework for thinking about quantum foundations, scientific explanation, ontology, observation, and philosophy of science without overstating what current theory can responsibly claim.
The interpretation of quantum mechanics has been disputed ever since the advent of the theory in the 1920’s. Famous are the discussions over long time between Einstein and Bohr. Einstein refused to accept the so‐called Copenhagen interpretation, where the wave function collapses at a measurement and where the outcome of the measurement is essentially accidental (“God does not play dice”). Alternative interpretations have appeared, but the Copenhagen school has dominated the thoughts throughout the decades. One interesting interpretation was formulated in 1957 by Hugh Everett at Princeton, a student of John Wheeler, which abandons the wave‐function collapse. In this model the universe is governed entirely by the Schrödinger equation, which does not allow for any collapse. In Everett’s model after a measurement the wave function is separated into different branches that do not interact. This model was left unnoticed for long time until Bryce DeWitt took it up in 1970 and termed it “Many‐Worlds Interpretation”, a term that in some sense is misleading. Everett’s model is incomplete, and it was later supplemented by the theory of decoherence, which explains how the different branches decouple as a result of the interaction with the environment. This extended model has in recent years gained increased respect, and some believe that it is the only model made available so far that is fully consistent with quantum mechanics. This interpretation can also shed some light on the development of the universe and, in particular, on the so‐called Anthropic principle, which puts human beings at the center of the development.
Recognizing that syntactic and semantic structures of classical logic are not sufficient to understand the meaning of quantum phenomena, we propose in this paper a new interpretation of quantum mechanics based on evidence theory. The connection between these two theories is obtained through a new language, quantum set theory, built on a suggestion by J. Bell. Further, we give a modal logic interpretation of quantum mechanics and quantum set theory by using Kripke's semantics of modal logic based on the concept of possible worlds. This is grounded on previous work of a number of researchers (Resconi, Klir, Harmanec) who showed how to represent evidence theory and other uncertainty theories in terms of modal logic. Moreover, we also propose a reformulation of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics in terms of Kripke's semantics. We thus show how three different theories — quantum mechanics, evidence theory, and modal logic — are interrelated. This opens, on one hand, the way to new applications of quantum mechanics within domains different from the traditional ones, and, on the other hand, the possibility of building new generalizations of quantum mechanics itself.