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Construction of Authentication Codes with Arbitration from Pseudo-symplectic Geometry

Xinmei Wang

Published Jan 1, 2000• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

A construction of authentication codes with arbitration form pseudo-symplectic geometry is given, the parameters are computed. Assuming that the probability distribution of source state and encoding rules are uniform, the probabilities of successful attacks are also computed.

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The authentication codes with arbitration protect against deceptions from the transmitters and receivers as well as those from the opponents.It can solve the problem that transmitters and receivers dispute in communication.A new construction of authentication codes with arbitration from symplectic geometry is given by new method in this paper.The parameters of the codes are computed.Assuming that the probability distribution of source state and encoding rules are uniform,the probabilities of successful attacks are also computed.
Letv1,v2be a 2-dimensional totally isotropic subspace, P0 be a fixed subspace of type(m0,s0) with v1 , v2 C P0 c v1 , v2 in 2 v -dimensional symplectic space. The set of source states S is the set of subspaces of type (2s + 1 , s -1) containing v1 ,v2 and contained in P0. The set of encoding rules E is the set of the subspaces of type(3 ,l) which contain v1 ,v2 and are not orthogonal toy2. The set of massages X is the set of the subspaces of type (2s +2,s) which contain v1 ,v2 intersect P0 at a subspace of type (2s + 1 ,s -1) and are not orthogonal to v2. We construct a class of Cartesian authentication code by defining s + e as the message for any s S and e E. Its size parameters are computed. Moreover, assume that the encoding rules are chosen according to a uniform probability distribution, the probability of a successful impersonation attack PI and that of a successful substitution attack Ps are computed.
The authentication code (A-code) is the one of the most fundamental cryptographic protocols in information-theoretic cryptography, and it provides information-theoretic integrity or authenticity, i.e., preventing information from being altered or substituted by the adversary having unbounded computational powers. In addition, it has a wide range of applications such as multiparty compu-tations and quantum key distribution protocols. The traditional A-code theory states that a good A-code is characterized as an A-code which satises equality of a lower bound on size of secret-keys, i.e., an A-code satisfying |K | = ϵ−2, where |K | is cardinality of the set of secret-keys and ϵ is the success probability of attacks of the adversary. However, good A-codes imply that secret-keys must be uniformly distributed. Therefore, if a non-uniformly random key is given, we cannot realize a good A-code by using it as a secret-key. Then, a natural question about this is: what is a good A-code having non-uniformly random keys? And, how can we design such a good A-code having non-uniformly random keys? To answer the questions, in this paper, we perform analysis of A-codes having non-uniformly random keys, and show the principle that guides the design for such good A-codes.
This paper presents a simple, but efficient class of non-interactive protocols for quantum authentication of mmm-length clas sical messages. The message is encoded using a classical linear algebraic code C[n,m,t]C[n,m,t]C[n,m,t]. We assume that Alice and Bob share a classical secret key, xABx_{AB}xAB​, of nnn bits. Alice creates nnn qubits based on the code word and the key, that indicates the bases used to create each qubit. The quantum states are sent to Bob through a noiseless quantum channel. We calculate the failure probability of the protocol considering several types of attacks.