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Dianzi xuebao

Universally Composable Authentication and Key Exchange Protocol for Access Control in Spatial Information Networks

Wang Liang-min

Published Jan 1, 2010• 2 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

To assure the security of the spatial information network,security control mechanics will be implemented whenever,wherever,and whoever an information terminal or an aircraft accesses the spatial network.In this paper,a bidirectional authentication and key negotiation protocol with signature based authentication model by using Diffie-Hellman key exchange technique is presented between the access points and the aircrafts when the aircrafts access into the spatial information network or roam between the different sub-networks.Analysis shows that the proposed protocol is universally composable secure under DDH assumption.

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To assure the security of the spatial information network,security control mechanics will be implemented whenever,wherever,and whoever an information terminal or an aircraft accesses the spatial network.In this paper,a bidirectional authentication and key negotiation protocol with signature based authentication model by using Diffie-Hellman key exchange technique is presented between the access points and the aircrafts when the aircrafts access into the spatial information network or roam between the different sub-networks.Analysis shows that the proposed protocol is universally composable secure under DDH assumption.
Internet of Things consists of sensor subnet and transmission network.For sensor subnet,it usually collects information by sensor node which has bad ability of computing,communication and storage implemented by combining mobile nodes and static nodes.But for transmission network,it commonly provides strong service of computing,communication and storage by making use of the existing internet infrastructure.To assure security control mechanics when the mobile sensors move from one cluster to another,whenever,to take into account both the security and feasibility of practical application,this paper presented an authentication and key exchange protocol based on Physical Unclonable Function(PUF).This protocol can achieve bidirectional authentication and key negotiation between mobile sensor and transmission network base station when the mobile sensor roams to other cluster.Analysis shows that the proposed protocol is universally composable secure.
The new Internet key exchange protocol(IKEv2) is analyzed,and it is found that the protocol can not achieve active identity protection to the initiator and has the security flaw of authentication failure in its initial exchange.However,it is necessary to protect the identity information to the initiator under the environment of a wireless access network.In this paper,a novel key exchange protocol for the wireless network based on IKEv2 initial exchange is proposed,which realizes active identity protection to the initiator by the responder explicitly proving his true identity,and achieves successful authentication by reconstructing the authentication payload.With the Universally Composable(UC) security model,this new protocol is analyzed in detail,with the analytical results showing that it affords provably UC security.Performance analysis and simulation results show that the proposed protocol has less computation and communication overhead.
In this article, we propose an improvement on the universally composable password-based key exchange protocol. We replace one-time signature with message authentication codes which reduce the bandwidth consumption. For typical security parameters our improvement saves as much as 12 Kbytes of bandwidth in a protocol execution. Our protocol can be efficiently instantiated using either the DDH or the N-residuosity Assumption. A complete security proof of the proposed protocol is given in the universally composable framework under common reference string model.
Asymmetric group key agreement protocol is to negotiate a shared group encryption key. Each member can calculate a decryption key corresponding to the encryption key. With the rapid development of network and system technology, secure information exchange has been one of the foci. In this paper, we propose an authenticated hierarchical asymmetric group key agreement protocol based on identity. Based on the realisation of a round of asymmetric group key agreement, the protocol carries out a second round of agreement. Different levels of secrets exchange information between a group of players with different permissions as the number of rounds increases, which can achieve anonymity and authentication and support dynamic group key updating of nodes to achieve forward and backward security of group key. The protocol proved to be secure under the assumption of bilinear computational Diffie-Hellman problem. The performance analysis shows that the proposed scheme is efficient.
Message authentication and key exchange are two of the most basic tasks of cryptography. Solutions based on public-key infrastructure (PKI) are prevalent. Still, the state of the art in composable security analysis of PKI-based authentication and key exchange is somewhat unsatisfactory. Specifically, existing treatments either (a) make the unrealistic assumption that the PKI is accessible only within the confines of the protocol itself, thus failing to capture real-world PKI-based authentication, or (b) impose oftenunnecessary requirements—such as strong on-line non-transferability—on candidate protocols, thus ruling out natural candidates. We give a modular and universally composable analytical framework for PKI-based message authentication and key exchange protocols. This framework guarantees security even when the PKI is pre-existing and globally available, without being unnecessarily restrictive. Specifically, we model PKI as a global set-up functionality within the Global UC security model [Canetti et al., TCC 2007] and relax the ideal authentication and key exchange functionalities accordingly. We then demonstrate the security of basic signature-based authentication and key exchange protocols. Our modeling makes minimal security assumptions on the PKI in use; in particular, “knowledge of the secret key” is not needed.
We present a general framework for constructing and analyzing authentication protocols in realistic models of communication networks. This framework provides a sound formalization for the authentication problem and suggests simple and attractive design principles for general authentication and key exchange protocols. The key element in our approach is a modular treatment of the authentication problem in cryptographic protocols; this applies to the definition of security, to the design of the protocols, and to their analysis. In particular, following this modular approach, we show how to systematically transform solutions that work in a model of idealized authenticated communications into solutions that are secure in the realistic setting of communication channels controlled by an active adversary. Using these principles we construct and prove the security of simple and practical authentication and key-exchange protocols. In particular, we provide a security analysis of some well-known key exchange protocols (e.g. authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange), and of some of the techniques underlying the design of several authentication protocols that are currently being