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Journal of Natural Science of Heilongjiang University

A group authenticated key exchange protocol in the wireless mobile environment

Hai Huang

Published Jan 1, 2011• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

A feasible group authenticated key exchange protocol is proposed in the wireless mobile environment.The proposed protocol has two distinguishing features.The first is the asymmetry of computation;means that protocol allows a powerful node to shoulder more computational burdens and the others can perform less.So this protocol can be better adapted to a wireless mobile environment,a computationally asymmetric one.Meanwhile,besides the basic security of the session key this protocol takes the insider attack into considerations.Finally,it is shown that the protocol is provably secure in formal model.

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Protocols for authenticated key exchange (AKE) allow parties within an insecure network to establish a common session key which can then be used to secure their future communication. It is fair to say that group AKE is currently less well understood than the case of two-party AKE; in particular, attacks by malicious insiders --- a concern specific to the group setting --- have so far been considered only in a relatively "ad-hoc" fashion. The main contribution of this work is to address this deficiency by providing a formal, comprehensive model and definition of security for group AKE which automatically encompasses insider attacks. We do so by defining an appropriate ideal functionality for group AKE within the universal composability (UC) framework. As a side benefit, any protocol secure with respect to our definition is secure even when run concurrently with other protocols, and the key generated by any such protocol may be used securely in any subsequent application.In addition to proposing this definition, we show that the resulting notion of security is strictly stronger than the one proposed by Bresson, et al. (termed "AKE-security"), and that our definition implies all previously-suggested notions of security against insider attacks. We also show a simple technique for converting any AKE-secure protocol into one secure with respect to our definition.

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An enhanced authentication key exchange protocol was proposed to exchange multiple session keys between two participants at a time. This paper shows that this enhanced protocol is insecure under the known session key attack, known long-term private key attack, signature forgery attack, and replay attack. This paper also proposes an enhanced and secure key agreement protocol for exchanging multiple session keys in one run of the protocol. The protocol is secure against the attacks mentioned above. Besides, a formal proof is given to guarantee the security of the proposed protocol under other potential attacks.

•Jan 1, 2008•1 citation
A feasible group authenticated key exchange protocol is proposed in the wireless mobile environment.The proposed protocol has two distinguishing features.The first is the asymmetry of computation;means that protocol allows a powerful node to shoulder more computational burdens and the others can perform less.So this protocol can be better adapted to a wireless mobile environment,a computationally asymmetric one.Meanwhile,besides the basic security of the session key this protocol takes the insider attack into considerations.Finally,it is shown that the protocol is provably secure in formal model.
In the distributed computing environments such as wireless network, it is critical to establish a secure session between communicators. A mutual key agreement protocol, namely Symmetrical Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol(SAKAP), is proposed to authenticate identities and establish secure session key between symmetrical users. The security of the protocol is proved in Random Oracle(RO) model, and its performances are analyzed. SAKAP has the advantages of provable security and considerable feasibility over other protocols.
Protocols for authenticated key exchange (AKE) allow parties within an insecure network to establish a common session key which can then be used to secure their future communication. It is fair to say that group AKE is currently less well understood than the case of two-party AKE; in particular, attacks by malicious insiders --- a concern specific to the group setting --- have so far been considered only in a relatively "ad-hoc" fashion. The main contribution of this work is to address this deficiency by providing a formal, comprehensive model and definition of security for group AKE which automatically encompasses insider attacks. We do so by defining an appropriate ideal functionality for group AKE within the universal composability (UC) framework. As a side benefit, any protocol secure with respect to our definition is secure even when run concurrently with other protocols, and the key generated by any such protocol may be used securely in any subsequent application.In addition to proposing this definition, we show that the resulting notion of security is strictly stronger than the one proposed by Bresson, et al. (termed "AKE-security"), and that our definition implies all previously-suggested notions of security against insider attacks. We also show a simple technique for converting any AKE-secure protocol into one secure with respect to our definition.
With the advancement in Internet-based technologies, network applications are no longer just limited to one-to-one communication; instead, it has become a publicly accessible resource. Regardless of this growth, such applications bring specific challenges concerning authentication, integrity, and privacy. Cryptography stands as an ideal solution to overcome these issues through an interactive method of secure communication called Key Exchange. Key exchange protocols allow two or more entities to agree upon a shared secret transmitted over a public channel without revealing any information to an eavesdropper. This thesis contributes to the design and analysis of the variants of key exchange protocols along with their applications. As per the security requirements, the proposed schemes are either designed in an interactive model or a non-interactive model. Each scheme undergoes a series of formal and informal security analysis. The formal analysis provides simulation result using cryptographic models. Whereas, an informal analysis showcases the theoretical proves on known attacks where an adversary controls the network. The performance analysis maps the protocol’s efficiency based on the computation cost and communication size. The first contribution introduces an interactive two-party authenticated key exchange protocol. We begin by investigating the security flaws in an existing system such as, lack of user anonymity, trace attack, clogging attack, and failure to resist replay attack. Then proposed an authenticated self-certified key exchange protocol that overcomes the addressed issues. Also, it eliminates the requirements of a trusted certificate authority to authorize the entities. The scheme achieves anonymity during session execution, mutual authentication and enables session key agreement.Based on the ideology, an application is designed, forsecure communication between ad-hoc nodes in a mobile ad-hoc network. The second contribution contributes to the design of an Identity-based authenticated three-party key exchange protocol that overcomes the incapability of managing huge peer-to-peer communication and high computation cost faced by two-party authenticated key exchange protocols. The proposed scheme preserves user privacy by enabling the property of anonymity and ensures non-repudiation. Based on the ideology, an application is designed to establish a secure session key between two users with the help of a trusted server for an electronic payment system. The third contribution proposes an interactive pairing-free certificateless authenticated group key agreement scheme suitable for a resource constrained mobile network. The scheme allows any user to join or leave the group dynamically. The key agreement protocol devised in this scheme ensures un-deniability property by incorporating the signcryption, and unsigncryption algorithm. The final contribution presents a non-interactive Identity-based deniable authentication protocol that allows an intended receiver to identify the origin of a given message without being able to prove sender’s identity to a third party.
Abstract An enhanced authentication key exchange protocol was proposed to exchange multiple session keys between two participants at a time. This paper shows that this enhanced protocol is insecure under the known session key attack, known long-term private key attack, signature forgery attack, and replay attack. This paper also proposes an enhanced and secure key agreement protocol for exchanging multiple session keys in one run of the protocol. The protocol is secure against the attacks mentioned above. Besides, a formal proof is given to guarantee the security of the proposed protocol under other potential attacks. Keywords Authentication, Diffie-Hellman key exchange, perfect forward secrecy, session key. 1.
In 2010, Fan et al. proposed a Smart Card-Based Authenticated Key Exchange protocol with CAPTCHAs for wireless mobile networks. In this paper, it is shown that their proposed protocol is vulnerable to Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) and ephemeral key compromise impersonation attacks while it does not provide the key confirmation attribute. Furthermore, it is inefficient due to number redundancy of rounds and computational costs. To overcome these weaknesses, two secure and efficient smart card-based Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols combined with CAPTCHAs are proposed for wireless mobile networks that provide many security attributes while they have a remarkable efficiency when compared with Fan et al.'s protocol in the terms of communication costs and computational complexities.
An enhanced authentication key exchange protocol was proposed to exchange multiple session keys between two participants at a time. This paper shows that this enhanced protocol is insecure under the known session key attack, known long-term private key attack, signature forgery attack, and replay attack. This paper also proposes an enhanced and secure key agreement protocol for exchanging multiple session keys in one run of the protocol. The protocol is secure against the attacks mentioned above. Besides, a formal proof is given to guarantee the security of the proposed protocol under other potential attacks.