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Chinese Journal of Quantum Electronics

Influence of path-attack on security of quantum key distribution networks

Mingxing Fu

Published Jan 1, 2008• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

The security of quantum key distribution(QKD) networks based on weak coherent pulses and optical node is analyzed.In this QKD network,an eavesdropper can launch a path-attack on the quantum channel to eavesdrop quantum information.Path-attack will not change quantum key generation rate and not destroy the photon number distribution in a weak coherent pulse,moreover,it can not be detected under the high quantum channel loss.The result indicates that even the decoy states skills cannot detect this kind of threat,also this threat is proportional to the average photon number.Therefore,the influence of the path-attack must be considered when designing the quantum key distribution networks.

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The security of quantum key distribution(QKD) networks based on weak coherent pulses and optical node is analyzed.In this QKD network,an eavesdropper can launch a path-attack on the quantum channel to eavesdrop quantum information.Path-attack will not change quantum key generation rate and not destroy the photon number distribution in a weak coherent pulse,moreover,it can not be detected under the high quantum channel loss.The result indicates that even the decoy states skills cannot detect this kind of threat,also this threat is proportional to the average photon number.Therefore,the influence of the path-attack must be considered when designing the quantum key distribution networks.
For a start, Quantum Key Distribution offers security not depending on any fundamental assumption. However, actual realizations choose to use weak coherent pulses as photon sources, rather than the ideal single-photon state, which bears security weaknesses due to the emission of sporadic multi-photon states. These states can be used in Photon-Number Splitting (PNS) attacks, where the attacker intercepts and buffers photons of multi-photon pulses and forwards the rest, enabling partial recovery of the key without inducing detectable perturbations. This article presents a simulation-based approach to analyze PNS attacks with realistic channel conditions like losses, detector imperfections, and finite key lengths. The research also examines the performance of decoy-state countermeasures, that use variable-intensity pulses to statistically reveal eavesdropping and Simulation results confirm the dominant character of PNS on raw key rates for the no-countermeasure scenario and ensure optimal decoy-state schemes restore security by cutting single-photon contributions. Results establish that although WCP QKD is vulnerable to PNS attacks in theory, strict adoption of decoy-state protocols aided with monitoring and finite-key analysis can provide immunity against an adversary. The paper emphasizes the need for simulation-based, implementation-dependent security analysis in direction towards well-designed practical quantum cryptographic systems. [1] [2] [3] [4] [10] [8]
For a start, Quantum Key Distribution offers security not depending on any fundamental assumption. However, actual realizations choose to use weak coherent pulses as photon sources, rather than the ideal single-photon state, which bears security weaknesses due to the emission of sporadic multi-photon states. These states can be used in Photon-Number Splitting (PNS) attacks, where the attacker intercepts and buffers photons of multi-photon pulses and forwards the rest, enabling partial recovery of the key without inducing detectable perturbations. This article presents a simulation-based approach to analyze PNS attacks with realistic channel conditions like losses, detector imperfections, and finite key lengths. The research also examines the performance of decoy-state countermeasures, that use variable-intensity pulses to statistically reveal eavesdropping and Simulation results confirm the dominant character of PNS on raw key rates for the no-countermeasure scenario and ensure optimal decoy-state schemes restore security by cutting single-photon contributions. Results establish that although WCP QKD is vulnerable to PNS attacks in theory, strict adoption of decoy-state protocols aided with monitoring and finite-key analysis can provide immunity against an adversary. The paper emphasizes the need for simulation-based, implementation-dependent security analysis in direction towards well-designed practical quantum cryptographic systems. [1] [2] [3] [4] [10] [8]
The safety of the six-state scheme in the practical communication systems was studied based on an effective eavesdropping method, which called path attacks adopted by eavesdroppers. In the practical systems, eavesdropper can select appropriate path to eavesdrop on legitimate users to obtain some information. This method will keep photon number distribution in the laser pulses, and the eavesdropper can be hidden by the losses of quantum channel without being detected. The results show that eavesdropper can get more information with the increase of transmission distance and the average number of photons.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is one of the most promising technologies that enable theoretically unbreakable secure communications in this highly advanced information security era. This work provides a comparative analysis of QKD protocols such as BB84, Coherent One-Way (COW), and Differential Phase-Shift (DPS) against eavesdropping attacks e.g., Photon Number Splitting (PNS) attack. It employs a realistic approach to simulations such as using weak coherent pulse (WCP) sources. This work also explores qubit generation and the whole key distribution process in non-ideal conditions. Detailed algorithms have been discussed that simulate the encoding, transmission, and decoding process for every protocol, as well as simulating PNS attacks where an eavesdropper removes photons to gain key information without any detectable errors. Statistical metrics, such as Visibility and the information gain, are used to quantify the impact of these attacks. Future work aspects may include the extension of the simulation to incorporate additional parameters such as channel noise, fiber attenuation, detector dark counts, etc. to provide a realistic analysis to compare various QKD protocols.
Quantum key distribution with the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol has been shown to be unconditionally secure even using weak coherent pulses instead of single-photon signals. The distances that can be covered by these methods are limited due to the loss in the quantum channel (e.g., loss in the optical fiber) and in the single-photon counters of the receivers. One can argue that the loss in the detectors cannot be changed by an eavesdropper in order to increase the covered distance. Here we show that the security analysis of this scenario is not as easy as is commonly assumed, since already two-photon processes allow eavesdropping strategies that outperform the known photon-number splitting attack. For this reason there is, so far, no satisfactory security analysis available in the framework of individual attacks.
The existing decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) beating photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack provides a more accurate method to estimate the secure key rate, while it still considers that only single-photon pulses can generate secure keys in any case. However, multiphoton pulses can also generate secure keys if we can detect the possibility of PNS attack in the channel. The ultimate goal of this line of research is to confirm the absence of all types of PNS attacks. In particular, the PNS attack mentioned and detected in this paper is only the weaker version of PNS attack which significantly changes the observed values of the legitimate users. In this paper, under the null hypothesis of no weaker version of PNS attack, we first determine whether there is an attack or not by retrieving the missing information of the existing decoy-state protocols, extract a Cauchy distribution statistic, and further provide a detection method and the type I error probability. If the result is judged to be an attack, we can use the existing decoy-state method and the GLLP formula to estimate the secure key rate. Otherwise, the pulses with the same basis received including both single-photon pulses and multiphoton pulses, can be used to generate the keys and we give the secure key rate in this case. Finally, the associated experiments we performed (i.e., the significance level is 5%) show the correctness of our method.