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Journal of Communications

Security model for ID-based key exchange

Xinghua Li

Published Jan 1, 2010• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

The provable security of ID-based key exchange protocols was investigated. In the universally composable framework, the provable secure model of ID-based key exchange was proposed. The ability of the adversary to corrupt key generation center was added to the adversary model. According to the characteristics of ID-based key exchange, the ideal functionality of ID-based key exchange was presented. Based on the adversary model and the ideal functionality, the proposed model captures not only the universally composable security of ID-based key exchange, but also implies one of the important properties of ID-based key exchange——key generation center forward secrecy. In addition, the protocol （with key confirmation） proposed by Chen and Kudla can securely realize the functionality of ID-based KE with KGC-FS.

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The provable security of ID-based key exchange protocols was investigated. In the universally composable framework, the provable secure model of ID-based key exchange was proposed. The ability of the adversary to corrupt key generation center was added to the adversary model. According to the characteristics of ID-based key exchange, the ideal functionality of ID-based key exchange was presented. Based on the adversary model and the ideal functionality, the proposed model captures not only the universally composable security of ID-based key exchange, but also implies one of the important properties of ID-based key exchange——key generation center forward secrecy. In addition, the protocol （with key confirmation） proposed by Chen and Kudla can securely realize the functionality of ID-based KE with KGC-FS.
Abstract. In 2001, Canetti and Krawczyk proposed a security model (CKmodel) for authentication protocols. They also gave an indistinguishabilitybased definition for key exchange protocols. Since then the model has almost exclusively been used for analyzing key exchange protocols, although it can be applied to authentication protocols in general. The model not only captures a large class of attacks but also provides a modular approach to the design of authentication protocols. However, the model does not capture the property of Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) Resilience. Until now, analysis concerning this property has mostly been done heuristically and restricted to key exchange protocols only. Previous attempts on formalizing KCI have mostly been done in some ad hoc manner and additional proofs have to be given specifically for the security of KCI resilience. In this paper, we propose an extension to the CK-model, which allows, for the first time, the KCI attacks to be considered in authentication protocols in general, rather than restricted to key exchange protocols, and no more additional proofs are required specifically for KCI security. With the revival of interest in identity-based (ID-based) cryptography, there have been many new ID-based key exchange protocols proposed. Despite the fact that some of them have been proven in some restricted versions of a model proposed by Bellare and Rogaway in 1993 and some others have been proven in the original CK-model, there is no rigorous model specifically for ID-based key exchange security. In particular, forward secrecy against compromised Key Generation Server (KGS-FS) has never been captured even though this notion is more important and stronger than the perfect forward secrecy in ID-based key exchange. For this, we further extend our model to ID-based setting and capture the property of KGS-FS for ID-based key exchange security. 1
The Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) model is a formalism for the analysis of keyexchange protocols, which can guarantee many security properties for the protocols proved secure by this model. But we find this model lacks the ability to guarantee key generation center (KGC) forward secrecy, which is an important security property for key-agreement protocols based on Identity. The essential reason leading to this weakness is that it does not fully consider the attacker's capabilities. In this paper, the CK model is accordingly extended with a new additional attacker's capability of the KGC corruption in Identity-based systems, which enables it to support KGC forward secrecy.
Abstract. This paper analyzes group communication within the universally composable framework. We first propose the group communication model, identity-based signcrytion mod-el and group key distribution model in the UC framework by designing the ideal functionality FSAGCOM, FIDSC and FGKD, respectively. Then, we construct a UC secure identity-based signcryption protocol πIDSC. Moreover, we shows that the identity-based signcryption πIDSC securely realizes the ideal functionality FIDSC if and only if the corresponding protocol ID-SC is secure. Finally, based on the identity-based protocol, we propose a group communica-tion scheme πSAGCOM, which can securely realizes the ideal functionality FSAGCOM in the (FIDSC,FGKD)-hybrid model.
Message authentication and key exchange are two of the most basic tasks of cryptography. Solutions based on public-key infrastructure (PKI) are prevalent. Still, the state of the art in composable security analysis of PKI-based authentication and key exchange is somewhat unsatisfactory. Specifically, existing treatments either (a) make the unrealistic assumption that the PKI is accessible only within the confines of the protocol itself, thus failing to capture real-world PKI-based authentication, or (b) impose oftenunnecessary requirements—such as strong on-line non-transferability—on candidate protocols, thus ruling out natural candidates. We give a modular and universally composable analytical framework for PKI-based message authentication and key exchange protocols. This framework guarantees security even when the PKI is pre-existing and globally available, without being unnecessarily restrictive. Specifically, we model PKI as a global set-up functionality within the Global UC security model [Canetti et al., TCC 2007] and relax the ideal authentication and key exchange functionalities accordingly. We then demonstrate the security of basic signature-based authentication and key exchange protocols. Our modeling makes minimal security assumptions on the PKI in use; in particular, “knowledge of the secret key” is not needed.
We treat the security of group key exchange (GKE) in the universal composability (UC) framework. Analyzing GKE protocols in the UC framework naturally addresses attacks by malicious insiders. We define an ideal functionality for GKE that captures contributiveness in addition to other desired security goals. We show that an efficient two-round protocol securely realizes the proposed functionality in the random oracle model. As a result, we obtain the most efficient UC-secure contributory GKE protocol known.