Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Physical Review A

Measurement-device-independent entanglement-based quantum key distribution

Xiuqing Yang, Kejin Wei, Haiqiang Ma, Shi‐Hai Sun, Hongwei Liu, Zhen−Qiang Yin, Zuohan Li, Shibin Lian, Yungang Du, Ling-An Wu

Published May 2, 2016• 24 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We present a quantum key distribution protocol in a model in which the legitimate users gather statistics as in the measurement-device-independent entanglement witness to certify the sources and the measurement devices. We show that the task of measurement-device-independent quantum communication can be accomplished based on monogamy of entanglement, and it is fairly loss tolerate including source and detector flaws. We derive a tight bound for collective attacks on the Holevo information between the authorized parties and the eavesdropper. Then with this bound, the final secret key rate with the source flaws can be obtained. The results show that long-distance quantum cryptography over 144 km can be made secure using only standard threshold detectors.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.93.052303

Related papers

Measurement-device-independent quantum secret sharing

Xiuqing Yang, Kejin Wei, Haiqiang Ma +6 more

Measurement-device-independent entanglement witness (MDI-EW) will always give an affirmative certification for witnessing entanglement with untrusted measurement apparatuses. Using the MDI-EW method, we propose a measurement-device-independent quantum secret sharing (MDI-QSS) protocol that Charlie can securely distribute a key between the two agents Alice and Bob. A tight bound for collective attacks can provide good bounds on the long-distance MDI-QSS with source flaws. Then we show through numerical simulations that using single-photon source a secure QSS over 136 km can be achieved.

arXiv:1608.00114•Jul 30, 2016•2 citations

Long distance measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution with entangled photon sources

Feihu Xu, Bing Qi, Zhongfa Liao +1 more

We present a feasible method that can make quantum key distribution (QKD), both ultra-long-distance and immune, to all attacks in the detection system. This method is called measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) with entangled photon sources in the middle. By proposing a model and simulating a QKD experiment, we find that MDI-QKD with one entangled photon source can tolerate 77 dB loss (367 km standard fiber) in the asymptotic limit and 60 dB loss (286 km standard fiber) in the finite-key case with state-of-the-art detectors. Our general model can also be applied to other non-QKD experiments involving entanglement and Bell state measurements.

arXiv:1306.5814•Applied Physics Letters•Aug 5, 2013•75 citations

Measurement-device-independent Quantum Key Distribution with Inaccurate Coherent Sources

Guodong Kang

Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution is proposed to fight against all possible side channel detector attacks. The security of the original proposal relies on the assumption that the legitimate users can character their sources exactly, which might not be satisfied in practice. Here we propose a measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution protocol with inaccurate coherent sources. The assumption is that legitimate users only have the knowledge that sources, for encoding, are coherent sources, while the accuracy of the encoding operation can not be controlled exactly. We give the security proofs for it under collective attacks, and simulation results of the security bound are also presented by employing parameters of current quantum key distribution experiments.

International Conference on Computer Science and Application Engineering (CSAE)•Oct 21, 2019•1 citation

Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution

Hoi‐Kwong Lo, Marcos Curty, Bing Qi

How to remove detector side channel attacks has been a notoriously hard problem in quantum cryptography. Here, we propose a simple solution to this problem--measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (QKD). It not only removes all detector side channels, but also doubles the secure distance with conventional lasers. Our proposal can be implemented with standard optical components with low detection efficiency and highly lossy channels. In contrast to the previous solution of full device independent QKD, the realization of our idea does not require detectors of near unity detection efficiency in combination with a qubit amplifier (based on teleportation) or a quantum nondemolition measurement of the number of photons in a pulse. Furthermore, its key generation rate is many orders of magnitude higher than that based on full device independent QKD. The results show that long-distance quantum cryptography over say 200 km will remain secure even with seriously flawed detectors.

arXiv:1109.1473•Physical Review Letters•Mar 30, 2012•2,252 citations

Detector-device-independent quantum secret sharing with source flaws

Xiuqing Yang, Kejin Wei, Haiqiang Ma +4 more

Measurement-device-independent entanglement witness (MDI-EW) plays an important role for detecting entanglement with untrusted measurement device. We present a double blinding-attack on a quantum secret sharing (QSS) protocol based on GHZ state. Using the MDI-EW method, we propose a QSS protocol against all detector side-channels. We allow source flaws in practical QSS system, so that Charlie can securely distribute a key between the two agents Alice and Bob over long distances. Our protocol provides condition on the extracted key rate for the secret against both external eavesdropper and arbitrary dishonest participants. A tight bound for collective attacks can provide good bounds on the practical QSS with source flaws. Then we show through numerical simulations that using single-photon source a secure QSS over 136 km can be achieved.

Scientific Reports•Apr 10, 2018•16 citations

Device-Independent Security of Quantum Cryptography against Collective Attacks

Antonio Acín, Nicolas Brunner, Nicolas Gisin +3 more

We present the optimal collective attack on a quantum key distribution protocol in the "device-independent" security scenario, where no assumptions are made about the way the quantum key distribution devices work or on what quantum system they operate. Our main result is a tight bound on the Holevo information between one of the authorized parties and the eavesdropper, as a function of the amount of violation of a Bell-type inequality.

arXiv:quant-ph/0702152•Physical Review Letters•Jun 4, 2007•1,711 citations
We present a quantum key distribution protocol in a model in which the legitimate users gather statistics as in the measurement-device-independent entanglement witness to certify the sources and the measurement devices. We show that the task of measurement-device-independent quantum communication can be accomplished based on monogamy of entanglement, and it is fairly loss tolerate including source and detector flaws. We derive a tight bound for collective attacks on the Holevo information between the authorized parties and the eavesdropper. Then with this bound, the final secret key rate with the source flaws can be obtained. The results show that long-distance quantum cryptography over 144 km can be made secure using only standard threshold detectors.
Measurement-device-independent entanglement witness (MDI-EW) will always give an affirmative certification for witnessing entanglement with untrusted measurement apparatuses. Using the MDI-EW method, we propose a measurement-device-independent quantum secret sharing (MDI-QSS) protocol that Charlie can securely distribute a key between the two agents Alice and Bob. A tight bound for collective attacks can provide good bounds on the long-distance MDI-QSS with source flaws. Then we show through numerical simulations that using single-photon source a secure QSS over 136 km can be achieved.
We present a feasible method that can make quantum key distribution (QKD), both ultra-long-distance and immune, to all attacks in the detection system. This method is called measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD) with entangled photon sources in the middle. By proposing a model and simulating a QKD experiment, we find that MDI-QKD with one entangled photon source can tolerate 77 dB loss (367 km standard fiber) in the asymptotic limit and 60 dB loss (286 km standard fiber) in the finite-key case with state-of-the-art detectors. Our general model can also be applied to other non-QKD experiments involving entanglement and Bell state measurements.
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution is proposed to fight against all possible side channel detector attacks. The security of the original proposal relies on the assumption that the legitimate users can character their sources exactly, which might not be satisfied in practice. Here we propose a measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution protocol with inaccurate coherent sources. The assumption is that legitimate users only have the knowledge that sources, for encoding, are coherent sources, while the accuracy of the encoding operation can not be controlled exactly. We give the security proofs for it under collective attacks, and simulation results of the security bound are also presented by employing parameters of current quantum key distribution experiments.
How to remove detector side channel attacks has been a notoriously hard problem in quantum cryptography. Here, we propose a simple solution to this problem--measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (QKD). It not only removes all detector side channels, but also doubles the secure distance with conventional lasers. Our proposal can be implemented with standard optical components with low detection efficiency and highly lossy channels. In contrast to the previous solution of full device independent QKD, the realization of our idea does not require detectors of near unity detection efficiency in combination with a qubit amplifier (based on teleportation) or a quantum nondemolition measurement of the number of photons in a pulse. Furthermore, its key generation rate is many orders of magnitude higher than that based on full device independent QKD. The results show that long-distance quantum cryptography over say 200 km will remain secure even with seriously flawed detectors.
Measurement-device-independent entanglement witness (MDI-EW) plays an important role for detecting entanglement with untrusted measurement device. We present a double blinding-attack on a quantum secret sharing (QSS) protocol based on GHZ state. Using the MDI-EW method, we propose a QSS protocol against all detector side-channels. We allow source flaws in practical QSS system, so that Charlie can securely distribute a key between the two agents Alice and Bob over long distances. Our protocol provides condition on the extracted key rate for the secret against both external eavesdropper and arbitrary dishonest participants. A tight bound for collective attacks can provide good bounds on the practical QSS with source flaws. Then we show through numerical simulations that using single-photon source a secure QSS over 136 km can be achieved.