Quantum mechanics is the most powerful of the theories developed by the human beings. In fact, it is able to predict successfully the experimental results with an impressive degree of accuracy. For this reason, the majority of physicists tends to believe that quantum mechanics has no problem and that we are close to finding a real ”theory of everything”. As it has been underlined many times, starting from the famous Bohr–Einstein debate and finally arriving at the writing of John Bell, it is far from being true.
Quantum mechanics is the most powerful of the theories developed by the human beings. In fact, it is able to predict successfully the experimental results with an impressive degree of accuracy. For this reason, the majority of physicists tends to believe that quantum mechanics has no problem and that we are close to finding a real ”theory of everything”. As it has been underlined many times, starting from the famous Bohr–Einstein debate and finally arriving at the writing of John Bell, it is far from being true.
Scientific realists believe, of successful scientific theories, that they’re at least approximately true. Quantum mechanics (QM) lays credible claim to being the most successful theory in the history of human science. But what does a scientific realist believe when she believes QM? And what can we learn about the scientific realism debate from the fact that that debate, conducted in abstraction, appears incapable of settling what a realist about QM should believe when she believes QM? This contribution explores both questions.
Quantum mechanics is our most successful physical theory. It underlies our very detailed understanding of atomic physics, chemistry, and nuclear physics, and the many technologies to which physical systems in these regimes give rise. Additionally, relativistic quantum mechanics is the basis for the standard model of elementary particles, which very successfully gives a partial unification of the forces operating at the atomic, nuclear, and subnuclear levels. However, from its inception the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics, and the fact that “quantum measurements” in the orthodox formulation appear to require the intervention of non-quantum mechanical “classical systems,” have led to speculations by many physicists, mathematicians, and philosophers of science that quantum mechanics may be incomplete. Among the Founding Fathers of quantum theory, Einstein and Schrödinger were both of the opinion that quantum mechanics is in some way unsatisfactory, and this view has been amplified in more recent profound work of John Bell, among others. In an opposing camp, many others in the physics, mathematics, and philosophy communities have attempted to provide an interpretational foundation in which quantum mechanics remains a complete and self-contained system. Among the Founding Fathers, Bohr, Born, and Heisenberg maintained that quantum mechanics is a complete system, and a number of recent proposals have been made to improve upon or to provide alternatives to their “Copenhagen Interpretation.” The debate continues, and has spawned an enormous literature.
Quantum theory is considered as the most successful scientific theory of all time. However, the understanding1 and interpretation of quantum theory has been subjected to a continuous debate since its formulation. A leading role was played by Einstein in the development of the old quantum theory but he was not impressed by the statistical interpretation of the quantum theory. He believed in a world of well defined law and order in which objectivity exists. He never thought that the new quantum theory as a complete theory. In 1926 in a letter to Max Born, Einstein wrote: Quantum mechanics is very impressive. ... The theory produces good deal but hardly brings us closer to the secret of the old one. I am at all events convinced that God does not play dice.
Quantum mechanics occupies a unique position in the history of science. It has survived all experimental tests to date, culminating with the most precise comparison of any measurement to any theory – a 1987 measurement of the electron's magnetic moment, or gyromagnetic ratio g e = 2.002 319 304 39 (Van Dyck et al. 1987), agreeing with QED theory to 12 digits. Despite this and other dramatic successes of quantum mechanics, its foundations are often questioned, owing to the glaring difficulties in reconciling quantum physics with the classical laws of physics that govern macroscopic bodies. If quantum mechanics is indeed a complete theory of nature, why does it not apply to everyday life? Even Richard Feynman (1982), a fierce defender of quantum mechanics, memorably stated that: We have always had a great deal of difficulty in understanding the world view that quantum mechanics represents … Okay, I still get nervous with it … It has not yet become obvious to me that there is no real problem. I cannot define the real problem, therefore I suspect there's no real problem, but I'm not sure there's no real problem. In the dawn of the twenty-first century, John A. Wheeler's big question “Why the quantum?” has returned to the forefront of physics with full steam. Advances in experimental physics are beginning to realize the same thought-experiments that proved helpful to Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, and the other founders of quantum mechanics.
For over nine decades, quantum mechanics has profoundly shaped our understanding of nature, offering explanations for the stability of atoms, the formation of mole cules, the properties of materials, and phenomena such as light or radioactivity. It is essential to modern technologies—from microchips to lasers—and underpins the physics of elementary particles. Yet, despite its successes, it remains a deeply mysterious theory, confronting a central enigma: why does the quantum world behave so differently from everyday reality? Elements such as superposition and quantum entanglement—which allow particles to exist simultaneously in multiple states or remain interconnected regardless of distance—contradict classical world intuitions. This gap between microscopic and macroscopic behavior has given rise to what is known as the “measurement problem,” raising fundamental questions about the nature of reality. Diverging interpretations have led to two major schools of thought: anti-realism, promoted by Niels Bohr, which holds that reality depends on the observer and their interaction with measurement instruments; and realism, supported by Albert Einstein, which argues that quantum mechanics is incomplete and that eality exists independently of observation. Bohr’s complementary philosophy and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle were central to the formulation of the “Copenhagen interpretation,” which became dominant in the 20th century. However, the persistent opposition of scientists like Einstein and Schrödinger inspired generations of physicists to seek a unification between quantum mechanics and relativity, culminating in new theories such as loop quantum gravity and string theory. Thus, the debate between realism and anti-realism remains alive, and philosophy continues to play a crucial role in exploring the new foundations of physics.
The previous chapters contain many examples of the successful application of quantum mechanics to the solution of real physical problems. These represent only a small sample of the wide range of experimental results, spanning just about all areas of physics and chemistry and beyond, that have been successfully explained by quantum theory. So far at least, no quantum-mechanical prediction has been experimentally falsified. Despite these successes, however, many scientists have considered the basic conceptual framework of the subject to be unsatisfactory, and repeated attempts have been made to reinterpret quantum mechanics, or even replace it with a different theory whose philosophical and conceptual basis could be considered more acceptable. In the present chapter we shall explain the reasons for this dissatisfaction and outline some of the reinterpretations and alternative approaches that have been devised. Inevitably many of the questions that arise in this area are matters of opinion rather than fact and, for this reason, some physicists consider that they belong more properly to the realm of philosophy than of physics. However, the conceptual basis of quantum mechanics is so fundamental to our whole understanding of the nature of the physical universe that it should surely be important for physicists to understand the nature of the problems involved, if nothing else.1,2 16.1 THE CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS In this section we outline some of the main areas of difficulty with a view to more detailed discussion later in the chapter.