Transaction of Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics

Stronger Provable Secure Model for Key Exchange

Yongjun Ren, Jiandong Wang, Dazhuan Xu, Yi Zhuang

Published Dec 30, 2009• 0 citations

Abstract

The key exchange is a fundamental building block in the cryptography. Several provable security models for the key exchange protocol are proposed. To determine the exact properties required by the protocols, a single unified security model is essential. The eCK', eCK and CK models are examined and the result is proved that the eCK' model is the strongest provable security model for the key exchange. The relative security strength among these models is analyzed. To support the implication or non-implication relations among these models, the formal proofs and the counter-examples are given.

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