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International Journal of Engineering and Technology

A New Secure Protocol for Authenticated Key Agreement

Hassan M. A. Elkamchouchi, Mohamed R. M. Rizk, Fatma Ahmed

Published Jan 1, 2013• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Authenticated key agreement protocols have an important role in building secure communications between two or more parties over the open network. In this paper we propose an efficient and secure authenticated key agreement protocol based on RSA factoring and Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP). We try to design strong protocol depends on the relation between two assumption (RSA factoring and DLP). We show that our protocol meets the security attributes and strong against most of potential attacks.

DOI
10.7763/ijet.2013.v5.551

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Authenticated key agreement protocols have an important role in building secure communications between two or more parties over the open network. In this paper we propose an efficient and secure authenticated key agreement protocol based on RSA factoring and Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP). We try to design strong protocol depends on the relation between two assumption (RSA factoring and DLP). We show that our protocol meets the security attributes and strong against most of potential attacks.
Key agreement is one of the fundamental cryptographic primitives in public key cryptography. It plays an important role for securing systems in practice. In this paper, we present the first certificateless one-way authenticated two-party key agreement protocol. The security of the proposed protocol is analyzed based on the intractability of the standard discrete logarithm (DL) and bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problems. For efficiency, our protocol enjoys low complexity in both communication and computation.
Summary Successful and efficient key management plays a critical role toward secured computing and communication systems. Many authenticated key agreement protocols have been proposed to meet the great challenges of information security. The two‐party key agreement protocol can be classified into two categories: implicit and explicit key authentications. This paper investigates the issue on authenticated two‐party key agreement protocol over an insecure public network and extends the existing implicit authenticated key agreement protocol into the explicit one by introducing the authenticators. The advantage of this explicit protocol is that it does not need any fixed public key infrastructure. Furthermore, this explicit protocol is provably secure in the random oracle under the Computation Gap Diffie‐Hellman assumption. Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience, 2013.© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Authenticated key agreement protocol is the fundamental building block for secure communication in the open network to ensure authentication and confidentiality of e-commerce and e-government applications. Certificateless public key cryptography combines the advantage of the identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) and the traditional PKI. In this paper, we present a secure and efficient two-party authenticated key agreement protocol based on an efficient and secure certificateless public key encryption scheme. It achieves almost all the known security attributes for authenticated key agreement protocol, such as perfect forward secrecy, PKG forward secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience, message independence and no key control. Compared to other comparable schemes, it is more secure and has nice efficiency.
As the fundamental building block for secure communication in the open network, authenticated key agreement protocols are usually constructed in the public key setting. Certificateless public key cryptography combines the advantage of the identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) and the traditional PKI. In this paper, we present a secure and efficient two-party authenticated key agreement protocol based on the efficient certificateless public key encryption scheme due to Cheng and Comley. Security analysis shows that it achieves perfect forward secrecy, PKG forward secrecy and almost all the other known security attributes for authenticated key agreement protocol, such as known-key secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience, known session-specific temporary information security, message independence and no key control. Compared to other comparable schemes, it is more secure and has nice efficiency.
A key exchange (or agreement) protocol is designed to allow two entities establishing a session key to encrypt the communication data over an open network. In 1990, Gunther proposed an identity-based key exchange protocol based on the difficulty of computing a discrete logarithm problem. Afterwards, several improved protocols were proposed to reduce the number of communication steps and the communicational cost required by Gunther's protocol. This paper presents an efficient identity-based key exchange protocol based on the difficulty of computing a discrete logarithm problem. As compared with the previously proposed protocols, it has better performance in terms of the computational cost and the communication steps. The proposed key exchange protocol provides implicit key authentication as well as the desired security attributes of an authenticated key exchange protocol.
Authenticated key agreement protocol is one of the important cryptographic primitives to ensure secure communication in an open network. Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) represents an interesting and potentially useful balance between public key cryptography based on certificates and identity-based cryptography. The topic of CL-PKC has undergone quite rapid development with schemes being proposed for encryption and signatures, while certificateless authenticated key agreement protocols are seldom discussed. In this paper, we present a secure two-party authenticated key agreement protocol based on an efficient certificateless public key encryption with pairing. Such a scheme achieves almost all of the security attributes, including known-key secrecy, perfect forward secrecy, PKG forward secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience, known session-specific temporary information security, message independence and no key control. Meanwhile, it is also practical with nice efficiency.