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PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association

Old Quantum Theory: A Paraconsistent Approach

Bryson Brown

Published Jan 1, 1992• 52 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Just what forms do (or should) our cognitive attitudes towards scientific theories take? The nature of cognitive commitment becomes particularly puzzling when scientists' commitments are) inconsistent. And inconsistencies have often infected our best efforts in science and mathematics. Since there are no models of inconsistent sets of sentences, straightforward semantic accounts fail. And syntactic accounts based on classical logic also collapse, since the closure of any inconsistent set under classical logic includes every sentence. In this essay I present some evidence that there really was a substantial cognitive commitment to OQT, and that some of its characteristics have a simple and straightforward explanation in terms of a model based on a form of paraconsistent logic.

DOI
10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.2.192852

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Just what forms do (or should) our cognitive attitudes towards scientific theories take? The nature of cognitive commitment becomes particularly puzzling when scientists' commitments are) inconsistent. And inconsistencies have often infected our best efforts in science and mathematics. Since there are no models of inconsistent sets of sentences, straightforward semantic accounts fail. And syntactic accounts based on classical logic also collapse, since the closure of any inconsistent set under classical logic includes every sentence. In this essay I present some evidence that there really was a substantial cognitive commitment to OQT, and that some of its characteristics have a simple and straightforward explanation in terms of a model based on a form of paraconsistent logic.
Bohr’s atomic model is one of the better known examples of empirically successful, albeit inconsistent, theoretical schemes in the history of physics. For this reason, many philosophers use this model to illustrate their position for the occurrence and the function of inconsistency in science. In this paper, I proceed to a critical comparison of the structure and the aims of Bohr’s research program – the starting point of which was the formulation of his model – with some of its contemporary philosophical readings. My study comes to conclude that the attempt of certain philosophers to accommodate Bohr’s model to a form of paraconsistent logic obliterates essential aspects of scientists' actual practice and reasoning.
This paper presents an alternative approach to quantum entanglement, one that effectively resolves the logical inconsistencies without leading to logical contradictions. By addressing some of the inconsistencies within quantum mechanics, such as state superposition and non-locality, that challenge classical causal explanations, our method is constructed on the principles of paraconsistent logic. Our aim is to develop a para-consistent framework that supports the features of quantum mechanics while remaining faithful to its fundamental principles. In this pursuit, we scrutinize the philosophical and mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics in relation to classical logic systems. This method is designed to untangle theoretical puzzle spaces and promote coherence in the discussion of quantum theory. Ultimately, our approach offers a potential solution for interpreting quantum mechanics in a more coherent manner.
Abstract There is something fundamentally disturbing about contemporary philosophy of mind and philosophical cognitive science. Almost without exception (exceptions such as Lockwood (1989) and Chalmers (1996, see esp. p. 349) ), the philosophical theories are logically inconsistent with the most well-confirmed theory ever developed by humans, namely, quantum mechanics. Why do philosophers develop theories of the mind-brain as if quantum mechanics does not exist, or as if it is utterly irrelevant to theories of the mind-brain? I believe this epistemic situation has arisen due to a series of questionable philosophical arguments about the role of philosophy of mind/cognitive science and quantum mechanics in our overall theoretical framework. In sect. I explain some of these arguments and contend they are unsound.
Abstract Quantum logics are non-classical logics defined from the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics. While they are conventionally used to model inferential processes in physics, their scope of application is potentially much broader. We argue that quantum logics can serve as a framework to model human cognition, as their semantics seem able to capture not only how people make inferences about quantum mechanics, but also how they reason in general. We begin by defining quantum logics from an algebraic perspective in a classical first-order setting. Next, we present findings from cognitive science that suggest these logics are apt to characterize human reasoning. We then consider how such a connection between quantum logics and cognition contributes to longstanding philosophical debates about the epistemological status of logic and the problem of adoption. Finally, we discuss how cognitive applications of quantum logics could advance our understanding of human psychology and even quantum foundations.
We still lack any consensus about what one is actually talking about as one uses quantum mechanics. There is a gap between the abstract terms in which the theory is couched and the phenomena the theory enables each of us to account for so well. Because it has no practical consequences for how we each use quantum mechanics to deal with physical problems, this cognitive dissonance has managed to coexist with the quantum theory from the very beginning. The absence of conceptual clarity for almost a century suggests that the problem might lie in some implicit misconceptions about the nature of scientific explanation that are deeply held by virtually all physicists, but are rarely explicitly acknowledged. I describe here such unvoiced but widely shared assumptions. Rejecting them clarifies and unifies a range of obscure remarks about quantum mechanics made almost from the beginning by some of the giants of physics, many of whom are held to be in deep disagreement. This new view of physics requires physicists to think about science in an unfamiliar way. My primary purpose is to explain the new perspective and urge that it be taken seriously. My secondary aims are to explain why this perspective differs significantly from what Bohr, Heisenberg, and Pauli had been saying from the very beginning, and why it is not solipsism, as some have maintained. To emphasize that this is a general view of science, and not just of quantum mechanics, I apply it to a long-standing puzzle in classical physics: the apparent inability of physics to give any meaning to 'Now'-the present moment.
Scientific realism in classical (i.e. pre-quantum) physics has remained compatible with the naive realism of everyday thinking on the whole; whereas it has proven impossible to find any consistent way to visualize the world underlying quantum theory in terms of our pictures in the everyday world. The general conclusion is that in quantum theory naive realism, although necessary at the level of observations, fails at the microscopic level. In this paper I offer a counter view that what fails in quantum theory is naive realism at the level of observations itself.