Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association

Minimal Disturbance in Quantum Logic

Sergio F. Martínez

Published Jan 1, 1988• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In this paper I formalize the notion of minimal disturbance, as this seems to be required by usual interpretations of the theory of quantum mechanics, and construct a quantum logical (lattice) model of the type of situation that seems to be at the root of the problem of the interpretation of Luders’ projection rule as a criterion of minimal disturbance for individual state transformations. What is particularly interesting in the situation to be depicted here is that, on the basis of a simple model, which depends only on some very general features of the lattice structure of the theory (and its semantical interpretation), usual interpretive assumptions on minimal disturbance appear to be wanting. If we restrict our attention to the statistics of measurement results, Luders’ rule can, easily be interpreted as a formula describing ‘minimal change’ for statistical states.

DOI
10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1988.1.192972

Related papers

Lüders's Rule as a Description of Individual State Transformations

Sergio F. Martínez

Usual derivations of Lüders's projection rule show that Lüders's rule is the rule required by quantum statistics to calculate the final state after an ideal (minimally disturbing) measurement. These derivations are at best inconclusive, however, when it comes to interpreting Lüders's rule as a description of individual state transformations. In this paper, I show a natural way of deriving Lüders's rule from well-motivated and explicit physical assumptions referring to individual systems. This requires, however, the introduction of a concept of individual state which is not standard.

Philosophy of Science•Sep 1, 1991•15 citations

Quantum Logic and the Projection Postulate

Geoffrey Paul Hellman

This paper explores the status of the von Neumann-Lüders state transition rule (the “projection postulate”) within “real-logic” quantum logic. The entire discussion proceeds from a reading of the Lüders rule according to which, although idealized in applying only to “minimally disturbing” measurements, it nevertheless makes empirical claims and is not a purely mathematical theorem. An argument (due to Friedman and Putnam) is examined to the effect that QL has an explanatory advantage over Copenhagen and other interpretations which relativize truth-value assignments to experimental arrangements. Two versions of QL, the lattice-theoretic (LT) and partial-Boolean-algebra (PBA), are considered. It turns out that the projection postulate is intimately connected with the choice of conditional connective for QL. The effect of the projection postulate is obtained with the Sasaki conditional. However, this choice is found to require extra assumptions, on both the LT and PBA versions, which are either just as ad hoc as the projection postulate itself or indefensible from within the real-logic QL framework.

Philosophy of Science•Sep 1, 1981•23 citations

Relating disturbance, information and orthogonality

Yizhou Liu, John B. DeBrota

In the general theory of quantum measurement, one associates a positive semidefinite operator on a $d$-dimensional Hilbert space to each of the $n$ possible outcomes of an arbitrary measurement. In the special case of a projective measurement, these operators are pairwise Hilbert--Schmidt orthogonal, but when $n>d$, orthogonality is restricted by positivity. This restriction has consequences which are not present from a classical perspective; in particular, we find it allows us to more precisely state the old quantum adage that it is impossible to extract information from a system without disturbance. Restricting attention throughout to the Luders state updating rule, we consider three properties of a measurement: its disturbance, a measure of how the expected post-measurement state deviates from the input state, its purity gain, a measure of the expected reduction of uncertainty resulting from measurement, and its orthogonality, a measure of the degree to which the measurement operators differ from an orthonormal set. We show that these quantities satisfy a simple algebraic relation amounting to an expression of an information-disturbance trade-off. Finally, we assess several classes of measurements on these grounds and identify symmetric informationally complete quantum measurements as the unique quantum analogs of a perfectly informative and nondisturbing classical ideal measurement.

•May 5, 2021•0 citations

Derivation of the quantum probability law from minimal non-demolition measurement

F Herbut

One more derivation of the quantum probability rule is presented in order to shed more light on the versatile aspects of this fundamental law. It is shown that the change of state in minimal quantum non-demolition measurement, also known as ideal measurement, implies the probability law in a simple way. Namely, the very requirement of minimal change of state, put in proper mathematical form, gives the well-known Lüders formula, which contains the probability rule.

arXiv:0708.1932•Journal of Physics A Mathematical and Theoretical•Aug 7, 2007•5 citations

Discussion: Quantum Logic and The Lüders Rule

Allen Stairs

In a recent paper, Michael Friedman and Hilary Putnam argued that the Lüders rule is ad hoc from the point of view of the Copenhagen interpretation but that it receives a natural explanation within realist quantum logic as a probability conditionalization rule. Geoffrey Hellman maintains that quantum logic cannot give a non-circular explanation of the rule, while Jeffrey Bub argues that the rule is not ad hoc within the Copenhagen interpretation. As I see it, all four are wrong. Given that there is to be a projection postulate, there are at least two natural arguments which the Copenhagen advocate can offer on behalf of the Lüders rule, contrary to Friedman and Putnam. However, the argument which Bub offers is not a good one. At the same time, contrary to Hellman, quantum logic really does provide an explanation of the Lüders rule, and one which is superior to that of the Copenhagen account, since it provides an understanding of why there should be a projection postulate at all.

Philosophy of Science•Sep 1, 1982•32 citations

The Statistical Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

L. E. Ballentine

The Statistical Interpretation of quantum theory is formulated for the purpose of providing a sound interpretation using a minimum of assumptions. Several arguments are advanced in favor of considering the quantum state description to apply only to an ensemble of similarily prepared systems, rather than supposing, as is often done, that it exhaustively represents an individual physical system. Most of the problems associated with the quantum theory of measurement are artifacts of the attempt to maintain the latter interpretation. The introduction of hidden variables to determine the outcome of individual events is fully compatible with the statistical predictions of quantum theory. However, a theorem due to Bell seems to require that any such hidden-variable theory which reproduces all of quantum mechanics exactly (i.e., not merely in some limiting case) must possess a rather pathological character with respect to correlated, but spacially separated, systems.

Reviews of Modern Physics•Oct 1, 1970•1,033 citations
In this paper I formalize the notion of minimal disturbance, as this seems to be required by usual interpretations of the theory of quantum mechanics, and construct a quantum logical (lattice) model of the type of situation that seems to be at the root of the problem of the interpretation of Luders’ projection rule as a criterion of minimal disturbance for individual state transformations. What is particularly interesting in the situation to be depicted here is that, on the basis of a simple model, which depends only on some very general features of the lattice structure of the theory (and its semantical interpretation), usual interpretive assumptions on minimal disturbance appear to be wanting. If we restrict our attention to the statistics of measurement results, Luders’ rule can, easily be interpreted as a formula describing ‘minimal change’ for statistical states.
Usual derivations of Lüders's projection rule show that Lüders's rule is the rule required by quantum statistics to calculate the final state after an ideal (minimally disturbing) measurement. These derivations are at best inconclusive, however, when it comes to interpreting Lüders's rule as a description of individual state transformations. In this paper, I show a natural way of deriving Lüders's rule from well-motivated and explicit physical assumptions referring to individual systems. This requires, however, the introduction of a concept of individual state which is not standard.
This paper explores the status of the von Neumann-Lüders state transition rule (the “projection postulate”) within “real-logic” quantum logic. The entire discussion proceeds from a reading of the Lüders rule according to which, although idealized in applying only to “minimally disturbing” measurements, it nevertheless makes empirical claims and is not a purely mathematical theorem. An argument (due to Friedman and Putnam) is examined to the effect that QL has an explanatory advantage over Copenhagen and other interpretations which relativize truth-value assignments to experimental arrangements. Two versions of QL, the lattice-theoretic (LT) and partial-Boolean-algebra (PBA), are considered. It turns out that the projection postulate is intimately connected with the choice of conditional connective for QL. The effect of the projection postulate is obtained with the Sasaki conditional. However, this choice is found to require extra assumptions, on both the LT and PBA versions, which are either just as ad hoc as the projection postulate itself or indefensible from within the real-logic QL framework.
In the general theory of quantum measurement, one associates a positive semidefinite operator on a ddd-dimensional Hilbert space to each of the nnn possible outcomes of an arbitrary measurement. In the special case of a projective measurement, these operators are pairwise Hilbert--Schmidt orthogonal, but when n>dn>dn>d, orthogonality is restricted by positivity. This restriction has consequences which are not present from a classical perspective; in particular, we find it allows us to more precisely state the old quantum adage that it is impossible to extract information from a system without disturbance. Restricting attention throughout to the Luders state updating rule, we consider three properties of a measurement: its disturbance, a measure of how the expected post-measurement state deviates from the input state, its purity gain, a measure of the expected reduction of uncertainty resulting from measurement, and its orthogonality, a measure of the degree to which the measurement operators differ from an orthonormal set. We show that these quantities satisfy a simple algebraic relation amounting to an expression of an information-disturbance trade-off. Finally, we assess several classes of measurements on these grounds and identify symmetric informationally complete quantum measurements as the unique quantum analogs of a perfectly informative and nondisturbing classical ideal measurement.
In a recent paper, Michael Friedman and Hilary Putnam argued that the Lüders rule is ad hoc from the point of view of the Copenhagen interpretation but that it receives a natural explanation within realist quantum logic as a probability conditionalization rule. Geoffrey Hellman maintains that quantum logic cannot give a non-circular explanation of the rule, while Jeffrey Bub argues that the rule is not ad hoc within the Copenhagen interpretation. As I see it, all four are wrong. Given that there is to be a projection postulate, there are at least two natural arguments which the Copenhagen advocate can offer on behalf of the Lüders rule, contrary to Friedman and Putnam. However, the argument which Bub offers is not a good one. At the same time, contrary to Hellman, quantum logic really does provide an explanation of the Lüders rule, and one which is superior to that of the Copenhagen account, since it provides an understanding of why there should be a projection postulate at all.
The Statistical Interpretation of quantum theory is formulated for the purpose of providing a sound interpretation using a minimum of assumptions. Several arguments are advanced in favor of considering the quantum state description to apply only to an ensemble of similarily prepared systems, rather than supposing, as is often done, that it exhaustively represents an individual physical system. Most of the problems associated with the quantum theory of measurement are artifacts of the attempt to maintain the latter interpretation. The introduction of hidden variables to determine the outcome of individual events is fully compatible with the statistical predictions of quantum theory. However, a theorem due to Bell seems to require that any such hidden-variable theory which reproduces all of quantum mechanics exactly (i.e., not merely in some limiting case) must possess a rather pathological character with respect to correlated, but spacially separated, systems.