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PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association

From Micro to Macro: A Solution to the Measurement Problem of Quantum Mechanics

Jeffrey Bub

Published Jan 1, 1988• 19 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Philosophical debate on the measurement problem of quantum mechanics has, for the most part, been confined to the non-relativistic version of the theory. Quantizing quantum field theory, or making quantum mechanics relativistic, yields a conceptual framework capable of dealing with the creation and annihilation of an indefinite number of particles in interaction with fields, i.e. quantum systems with an infinite number of degrees of freedom. I want to show that a solution to the standard measurement problem is available if we exploit the properties of the infinite quantum models available in this broader conceptual framework. There is a qualitative difference between quantum systems with an infinite number of degrees of freedom and quantum systems with a finite number of degrees of freedom. In the infinite case, there exist many unitarily inequivalent irreducible Hilbert space representations of the algebra of observables of the system. In the finite case, there is only one such representation.

DOI
10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1988.2.192878

Related papers

Resolution of the Quantum Measurement Problem in Self-Construction Theory

Sun Chong

Abstract: The quantum measurement problem has been the deepest conceptual difficulty since the birth of quantum mechanics. Standard quantum mechanics accepts wavefunction collapse as an independent postulate but never provides a physical explanation. The decoherence approach attributes collapse to the interaction between the system and its environment, but faces two fundamental limitations: the “infinite regress” problem and the “insufficiency of decoherence” problem. Within the framework of the Self-Construction Theory (SCT), this paper provides a complete resolution of the measurement problem. The core thesis is that quantum measurement is not a fundamental process independent of the laws of physical evolution, but rather a local manifestation of constructive renormalization—the scale evolution of the spacetime complex field $K$ from microscopic degrees of freedom to macroscopic effective descriptions. The origins of wavefunction collapse, decoherence, and the Born rule receive a unified first‑principles interpretation in this framework. SCT’s spontaneous decoherence mechanism is the key to the resolution. Constructive renormalization inherently involves information loss—the integrated‑out microscopic degrees of freedom no longer exist in the macroscopic effective description. During a measurement, the measuring apparatus possesses a huge number ($\sim10^{23}$) of microscopic degrees of freedom. When the apparatus interacts with the measured system, constructive renormalization triggers information compression of these degrees of freedom—the apparatus can no longer distinguish which branch of the superposition it is in, and quantum coherence is thus spontaneously lost. No “external environment” is needed—the constructive renormalization dynamics of spacetime itself is the ultimate source of decoherence, thereby completely solving the “infinite regress” problem. Among the probability distribution given by the Born rule, the weights of non‑maximal probability branches are further suppressed by information compression under the huge number of microscopic degrees of freedom, so that macroscopic observers can perceive only a definite outcome in the effective description. The information loss caused by constructive renormalization is ontological—it does not rely on any approximation or truncation, thus fundamentally solving the “insufficiency of decoherence” problem. The Born rule—that measurement outcomes occur with probabilities given by the squared amplitudes—is directly derived from the constructive integral structure in SCT. In the constructive renormalization limit, interference terms between different configurations are naturally suppressed by off‑diagonal phase randomization, and the system automatically switches to a classical probabilistic description. In the diagonal density matrix representation, the squared amplitude is the only natural weight that is simultaneously real and non‑negative. Hence the Born rule is not an additional postulate of quantum mechanics but a necessary and unique manifestation of the relative frequencies of the constructive integral in the constructive renormalization limit. This derivation is rigorous within the mathematical framework of constructive renormalization—it does not rely on any approximations or truncations. SCT’s quantum measurement theory is deeply unified with the black hole information paradox. The “collapse” in quantum measurement and the “information loss” in black hole evaporation are different manifestations of the same core mechanism—the redistribution of information due to constructive renormalization—in two extreme physical situations. In quantum measurement, information is redistributed into the degrees of freedom of the macroscopic apparatus; in black hole evaporation, information is redistributed into the time‑point configurations on the horizon. This unification is the strongest proof of the universality of constructive renormalization as an information‑processing mechanism. Keywords: quantum measurement; spontaneous decoherence; constructive renormalization; Born rule; wavefunction collapse; information redistribution; Self-Construction Theory

•Jun 2, 2026•0 citations

Interpreting Quantum Theories

James Owen Weatherall

Most philosophical work on quantum physics has concerned simple systems. And for good reason. Even one or two particle systems can exhibit the striking features we have come to associate with quantum physics—features such as entanglement, interference, and nonlocality. But as far as physics goes, such systems barely scrape the surface. In particular, they have only a finite number of degrees of freedom, which means their states are characterized by a finite number of independent parameters. The systems studied in fields such as high-energy particle physics and many-body physics, meanwhile, have uncountably many degrees of freedom. They are far more complicated than the usual philosophical fare.This is not troubling as long as the conceptual heart of quantum physics can be effectively condensed down. But what if philosophers' toy systems are fundamentally different from realistic ones? That would be a problem. And indeed, as Laura Ruetsche convincingly argues in Interpreting Quantum Theories, systems with uncountable degrees of freedom—what Ruetsche collectively calls QM∞—are fundamentally different from the systems that have become the stock and trade of philosophy of physics, in ways that change the interpretational project.Ruetsche's book does two things exceedingly well. The first is to provide a (comparatively) accessible and philosophically oriented introduction to the algebraic approach to quantum physics, which is essential for understanding QM∞. This is a valuable contribution. The algebraic approach is the setting for much recent philosophical work. And yet learning it is notoriously difficult, as even pedagogical texts are aimed at research-level mathematicians. Ruetsche's book is technically demanding, but it works to bring nonmathematicians along. It is, without a doubt, the best place to enter this literature.Second, the book sets the agenda for future work on QM∞, by effectively and judiciously drawing important foundational questions out of a sprawling and difficult physics literature. In this regard, it is a close cousin to John Earman's (1995) excellent Bangs, Crunches, Whimpers, and Shrieks, which has had a significant influence on subsequent philosophy of spacetime physics. Philosophers of physics will be addressing the questions Ruetsche has raised, in many cases for the first time, for years to come.Interpreting Quantum Theories centers on what might be called the problem of inequivalent representations. The quantum theories that philosophers are accustomed to are set in a mathematical structure known as a (separable) Hilbert space, which is an at-most countably infinite dimensional complex vector space. Rays in a Hilbert space represent possible states of a physical system, and self-adjoint operators on that Hilbert space correspond to properties of the system.To treat QM∞, meanwhile, physicists pass to a generalization of this formalism. Now one begins with an abstract algebra of operators corresponding to the various properties associated with the system. States in this more general framework are linear functionals on the algebra whose value at each operator is interpreted as the expectation value of a measurement of that property in that state.The trouble with this more general framework is that the interpretational tools of Hilbert space quantum theories do not directly apply. Some solace comes from recognizing that any (appropriate) algebra of operators admits a representation in terms of the operators on a Hilbert space. This suggests that one can always move back to the more familiar Hilbert space formalism. But this is a pyrrhic victory. In general these Hilbert space representations are neither unique nor empirically equivalent. In particular, these inequivalent representations, interpreted in the familiar way, yield disagreements about which algebraic states are physically realizable.Faced with this situation, Ruetsche presents several principled options—what she calls “pristine” interpretations of QM∞. The two most significant are what she calls “Hilbert Space Conservatism” and “Algebraic Imperialism.” The Conservative claims that, for a given system, there is one true Hilbert space representation, which should be interpreted in the familiar ways. The Imperialist, meanwhile, insists that only the abstract algebra matters: the physical states are the algebraic states, properties correspond to the operators in the algebra, and if our old methods do not apply, so much the worse for our methods.At this level of description, Imperialists may appear to have the advantage, since they need not fret over which representation to choose. But there's a catch. As we have seen, there is a sense in which Imperialists generally recognize a broader range of possible physical states. But Conservatives allow for more properties. This is because when one represents the abstract algebra as operators on a Hilbert space, the operators in the representation naturally approximate additional operators on that Hilbert space, in a way that is unavailable in the abstract setting. Thus each interpretation suffers from limitations that the other does not.To adjudicate between the interpretations, Ruetsche takes them to the trenches, to see which provides the resources to support the actual explanatory and representational practices of physics. After a masterful survey, she concludes that neither interpretation has all of the requisite resources. In particular, she argues, physicists regularly make essential use of operators that are only available to Conservatives, while making equally essential use of multiple inequivalent representations—which only Imperialists can support. More, the particular mix of Conservatism and Imperialism varies between applications, apparently ruling out a stable interpretation of the formalism that can be articulated independently of the messy details. We are left with what Ruetsche calls “adulterated” interpretations.Philosophers' practice notwithstanding, it might seem unsurprising that we cannot separate our interpretation of physical theories from the pragmatics of their application to the world. After all, we are interested in these theories only insofar as they are successfully applied. But Ruetsche believes the problem is more acute. It is not merely that pragmatic considerations enter the debate between Conservatives and Imperialists. Ruetsche argues that there may not be any consistent, general interpretation of QM∞ compatible with practice. And this, she claims, makes realism about QM∞ untenable.The idea that the applications of a broad class of our best physical theories undermine their consistent interpretation in a way that renders realism incoherent is striking. Insofar as Ruetsche's case is convincing, it should have serious repercussions for general philosophy of science—both because it bears on important debates and because it shows how generalist questions depend on the details of particular scientific theories and their applications. Indeed, Ruetsche's skepticism about the terms of the realism debate and her radical particularism should influence general philosophy of science. But that said, her argument ultimately leaves room for disagreement.Ruetsche's basic claim is that Conservatism and Imperialism each support practices that the other cannot and that both kinds of practice are essential. But there is an important asymmetry here. Conservatives suffer because they fail to represent putative physical possibilities appealed to in practice. Imperialists, meanwhile, need to justify that in certain applications, they may limit attention to a subset of the physical possibilities their interpretation admits, and then use resources that only make sense in those limited regimes.The trouble is that the Imperialists' opportunism is neither unusual in physics nor difficult to motivate. In spacetime physics, for instance, properties such as the total mass of the universe or global time can be defined only in very special cases. And yet such properties are used in practice, because often the salient spacetimes are precisely the ones in which these quantities make (approximate) sense. To make her case that adulteration in QM∞ undermines realism, Ruetsche would need to establish that the representation-dependent quantities used in applications of QM∞ are different in kind from analogous quantities that appear throughout physics. And here it is not clear that she succeeds.None of this undercuts the importance of the book, however. Indeed, Ruetsche acknowledges that her argument may depend on how one understands idealization in physics. And even if one takes the view just described, there is a great deal of work to do on how Imperialism can support the practices Ruetsche identifies—work that will surely proceed within the framework Ruetsche has laid out, by addressing questions Ruetsche has raised. And so, wherever our study of QM∞ takes us, Ruetsche's book is sure to play a central role.

The Philosophical Review•Apr 1, 2015•0 citations

Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics and the measurement problem

Marco Genovese

We present a panoramic view on various attempts to "solve" the problems of quantum measurement and macro-objectivation, i.e. of the transition from a probabilistic quantum mechanic microscopic world to a deterministic classical macroscopic world.

arXiv:1002.0990•Feb 4, 2010•6 citations

THE PROBLEM OF ENTANGLEMENT OF QUANTUM STATES

On Matem, Atica Argentina

G.A. RAGGIO Abstract. We give a brief and incomplete survey of the problem of entan- glement of of composite quantum systems. 1960's - 1980's there were serious attempts (all of them anticipated by J. von Neu- mann) to do away with the underlying Hilbert space and work directly with the abstract algebraic structure modeled by C � -algebras or W � -algebras (abstract von Neumann algebras)(1, 2, 3). This was particularly fruitful when dealing with sys- tems of infinitely many degrees of freedom (quantum fields, thermodynamic limits, etc.). The problem of entanglement which we want to address here can be formu- lated quite straightforwardly in this algebraic framework of quantum theory. But we will stick to the quantum mechanics of the 1930's and keep the Hilbert space. Mainly because the results which are available concern the finite dimensional case. The states of the quantum system specified by H are associated with the lin- ear functionals f : B(H) → C which are positive (i.e., f(a) ≥ 0 for all positive a ∈ B(H)), normalized (i.e., f(1) = 1) and normal (i.e., f(supn{an}) = supnf(an) for any increasing family of selfadjoint operators {an : n = 1,2, � � � } which is uni- formly bounded). It is this normality condition which guarantees that the are in one-to-one correspondence with positive trace class operators d of unit trace (density operators) via the formula B(H) ∋ a 7→ tr(da). This gives an extremely convenient representation of and one often confuses the state f as a linear functional with the associated density operator d for which f(a) = tr(da). States are automatically continuous, and satisfy f(a � ) = f(a). The complex number f(a) is interpreted probabilistically as the expected value of the observable associated with the operator a when the system is in the state f. The normalization condi- tion is thus necessary for the consistency of this interpretation and the normality condition is seen as a non-commutative version of the �-additivity of probability measures. Clearly states, which we will denote by �(H), form a convex set which is closed

•Jan 1, 2008•0 citations

Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics and Measurement Problem

Marco Genovese

We present a panoramic view on various attempts to "solve" the problems of quantum measurement and macro-objectivation, i.e. of the transition from a probabilistic quantum mechanic microscopic world to a deterministic classical macroscopic world.

Advanced Science Letters•Sep 1, 2010•40 citations

Little-used Mathematical Structures in Quantum Mechanics II. Representations of the CCR and Superseparability

Rathindra Nath Sen

It often goes unnoticed that, even for a finite number of degrees of freedom, the canonical commutation relations have many inequivalent irreducible unitary representations; the free particle and a particle in a box provide examples that are both simple and well-known. The representations are unitarily inequivalent because the spectra of the position and momentum operators are different, and spectra are invariant under unitary transformations. The existence of these representations can have consequences that run from the merely unexpected to the barely conceivable. To start with, states of a single particle that belong to inequivalent representations will always be mutually orthogonal; they will never interfere with each other. This property, called superseparability elsewhere, is well-defined mathematically, but has not yet been observed. This article suggests two single-particle interference experiments that may reveal its existence. The existence of inequivalent irreducibile representations may be traced to the existence of different self-adjoint extensions of symmetric operators on infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. Analysis of the underlying mathematics reveals that some of these extensions can be interpreted in terms of topological, geometrical and physical quantities that can be controlled in the laboratory. The tests suggested are based on these interpretations. In conclusion, it is pointed out that mathematically rigorous many-worlds interpretations of quantum mechanics may be possible in a framework that admits superseparability.

arXiv:1201.4963•Jan 24, 2012•0 citations
Philosophical debate on the measurement problem of quantum mechanics has, for the most part, been confined to the non-relativistic version of the theory. Quantizing quantum field theory, or making quantum mechanics relativistic, yields a conceptual framework capable of dealing with the creation and annihilation of an indefinite number of particles in interaction with fields, i.e. quantum systems with an infinite number of degrees of freedom. I want to show that a solution to the standard measurement problem is available if we exploit the properties of the infinite quantum models available in this broader conceptual framework. There is a qualitative difference between quantum systems with an infinite number of degrees of freedom and quantum systems with a finite number of degrees of freedom. In the infinite case, there exist many unitarily inequivalent irreducible Hilbert space representations of the algebra of observables of the system. In the finite case, there is only one such representation.
Abstract: The quantum measurement problem has been the deepest conceptual difficulty since the birth of quantum mechanics. Standard quantum mechanics accepts wavefunction collapse as an independent postulate but never provides a physical explanation. The decoherence approach attributes collapse to the interaction between the system and its environment, but faces two fundamental limitations: the “infinite regress” problem and the “insufficiency of decoherence” problem. Within the framework of the Self-Construction Theory (SCT), this paper provides a complete resolution of the measurement problem. The core thesis is that quantum measurement is not a fundamental process independent of the laws of physical evolution, but rather a local manifestation of constructive renormalization—the scale evolution of the spacetime complex field KKK from microscopic degrees of freedom to macroscopic effective descriptions. The origins of wavefunction collapse, decoherence, and the Born rule receive a unified first‑principles interpretation in this framework. SCT’s spontaneous decoherence mechanism is the key to the resolution. Constructive renormalization inherently involves information loss—the integrated‑out microscopic degrees of freedom no longer exist in the macroscopic effective description. During a measurement, the measuring apparatus possesses a huge number (∼1023\sim10^{23}∼1023) of microscopic degrees of freedom. When the apparatus interacts with the measured system, constructive renormalization triggers information compression of these degrees of freedom—the apparatus can no longer distinguish which branch of the superposition it is in, and quantum coherence is thus spontaneously lost. No “external environment” is needed—the constructive renormalization dynamics of spacetime itself is the ultimate source of decoherence, thereby completely solving the “infinite regress” problem. Among the probability distribution given by the Born rule, the weights of non‑maximal probability branches are further suppressed by information compression under the huge number of microscopic degrees of freedom, so that macroscopic observers can perceive only a definite outcome in the effective description. The information loss caused by constructive renormalization is ontological—it does not rely on any approximation or truncation, thus fundamentally solving the “insufficiency of decoherence” problem. The Born rule—that measurement outcomes occur with probabilities given by the squared amplitudes—is directly derived from the constructive integral structure in SCT. In the constructive renormalization limit, interference terms between different configurations are naturally suppressed by off‑diagonal phase randomization, and the system automatically switches to a classical probabilistic description. In the diagonal density matrix representation, the squared amplitude is the only natural weight that is simultaneously real and non‑negative. Hence the Born rule is not an additional postulate of quantum mechanics but a necessary and unique manifestation of the relative frequencies of the constructive integral in the constructive renormalization limit. This derivation is rigorous within the mathematical framework of constructive renormalization—it does not rely on any approximations or truncations. SCT’s quantum measurement theory is deeply unified with the black hole information paradox. The “collapse” in quantum measurement and the “information loss” in black hole evaporation are different manifestations of the same core mechanism—the redistribution of information due to constructive renormalization—in two extreme physical situations. In quantum measurement, information is redistributed into the degrees of freedom of the macroscopic apparatus; in black hole evaporation, information is redistributed into the time‑point configurations on the horizon. This unification is the strongest proof of the universality of constructive renormalization as an information‑processing mechanism. Keywords: quantum measurement; spontaneous decoherence; constructive renormalization; Born rule; wavefunction collapse; information redistribution; Self-Construction Theory
Most philosophical work on quantum physics has concerned simple systems. And for good reason. Even one or two particle systems can exhibit the striking features we have come to associate with quantum physics—features such as entanglement, interference, and nonlocality. But as far as physics goes, such systems barely scrape the surface. In particular, they have only a finite number of degrees of freedom, which means their states are characterized by a finite number of independent parameters. The systems studied in fields such as high-energy particle physics and many-body physics, meanwhile, have uncountably many degrees of freedom. They are far more complicated than the usual philosophical fare.This is not troubling as long as the conceptual heart of quantum physics can be effectively condensed down. But what if philosophers' toy systems are fundamentally different from realistic ones? That would be a problem. And indeed, as Laura Ruetsche convincingly argues in Interpreting Quantum Theories, systems with uncountable degrees of freedom—what Ruetsche collectively calls QM∞—are fundamentally different from the systems that have become the stock and trade of philosophy of physics, in ways that change the interpretational project.Ruetsche's book does two things exceedingly well. The first is to provide a (comparatively) accessible and philosophically oriented introduction to the algebraic approach to quantum physics, which is essential for understanding QM∞. This is a valuable contribution. The algebraic approach is the setting for much recent philosophical work. And yet learning it is notoriously difficult, as even pedagogical texts are aimed at research-level mathematicians. Ruetsche's book is technically demanding, but it works to bring nonmathematicians along. It is, without a doubt, the best place to enter this literature.Second, the book sets the agenda for future work on QM∞, by effectively and judiciously drawing important foundational questions out of a sprawling and difficult physics literature. In this regard, it is a close cousin to John Earman's (1995) excellent Bangs, Crunches, Whimpers, and Shrieks, which has had a significant influence on subsequent philosophy of spacetime physics. Philosophers of physics will be addressing the questions Ruetsche has raised, in many cases for the first time, for years to come.Interpreting Quantum Theories centers on what might be called the problem of inequivalent representations. The quantum theories that philosophers are accustomed to are set in a mathematical structure known as a (separable) Hilbert space, which is an at-most countably infinite dimensional complex vector space. Rays in a Hilbert space represent possible states of a physical system, and self-adjoint operators on that Hilbert space correspond to properties of the system.To treat QM∞, meanwhile, physicists pass to a generalization of this formalism. Now one begins with an abstract algebra of operators corresponding to the various properties associated with the system. States in this more general framework are linear functionals on the algebra whose value at each operator is interpreted as the expectation value of a measurement of that property in that state.The trouble with this more general framework is that the interpretational tools of Hilbert space quantum theories do not directly apply. Some solace comes from recognizing that any (appropriate) algebra of operators admits a representation in terms of the operators on a Hilbert space. This suggests that one can always move back to the more familiar Hilbert space formalism. But this is a pyrrhic victory. In general these Hilbert space representations are neither unique nor empirically equivalent. In particular, these inequivalent representations, interpreted in the familiar way, yield disagreements about which algebraic states are physically realizable.Faced with this situation, Ruetsche presents several principled options—what she calls “pristine” interpretations of QM∞. The two most significant are what she calls “Hilbert Space Conservatism” and “Algebraic Imperialism.” The Conservative claims that, for a given system, there is one true Hilbert space representation, which should be interpreted in the familiar ways. The Imperialist, meanwhile, insists that only the abstract algebra matters: the physical states are the algebraic states, properties correspond to the operators in the algebra, and if our old methods do not apply, so much the worse for our methods.At this level of description, Imperialists may appear to have the advantage, since they need not fret over which representation to choose. But there's a catch. As we have seen, there is a sense in which Imperialists generally recognize a broader range of possible physical states. But Conservatives allow for more properties. This is because when one represents the abstract algebra as operators on a Hilbert space, the operators in the representation naturally approximate additional operators on that Hilbert space, in a way that is unavailable in the abstract setting. Thus each interpretation suffers from limitations that the other does not.To adjudicate between the interpretations, Ruetsche takes them to the trenches, to see which provides the resources to support the actual explanatory and representational practices of physics. After a masterful survey, she concludes that neither interpretation has all of the requisite resources. In particular, she argues, physicists regularly make essential use of operators that are only available to Conservatives, while making equally essential use of multiple inequivalent representations—which only Imperialists can support. More, the particular mix of Conservatism and Imperialism varies between applications, apparently ruling out a stable interpretation of the formalism that can be articulated independently of the messy details. We are left with what Ruetsche calls “adulterated” interpretations.Philosophers' practice notwithstanding, it might seem unsurprising that we cannot separate our interpretation of physical theories from the pragmatics of their application to the world. After all, we are interested in these theories only insofar as they are successfully applied. But Ruetsche believes the problem is more acute. It is not merely that pragmatic considerations enter the debate between Conservatives and Imperialists. Ruetsche argues that there may not be any consistent, general interpretation of QM∞ compatible with practice. And this, she claims, makes realism about QM∞ untenable.The idea that the applications of a broad class of our best physical theories undermine their consistent interpretation in a way that renders realism incoherent is striking. Insofar as Ruetsche's case is convincing, it should have serious repercussions for general philosophy of science—both because it bears on important debates and because it shows how generalist questions depend on the details of particular scientific theories and their applications. Indeed, Ruetsche's skepticism about the terms of the realism debate and her radical particularism should influence general philosophy of science. But that said, her argument ultimately leaves room for disagreement.Ruetsche's basic claim is that Conservatism and Imperialism each support practices that the other cannot and that both kinds of practice are essential. But there is an important asymmetry here. Conservatives suffer because they fail to represent putative physical possibilities appealed to in practice. Imperialists, meanwhile, need to justify that in certain applications, they may limit attention to a subset of the physical possibilities their interpretation admits, and then use resources that only make sense in those limited regimes.The trouble is that the Imperialists' opportunism is neither unusual in physics nor difficult to motivate. In spacetime physics, for instance, properties such as the total mass of the universe or global time can be defined only in very special cases. And yet such properties are used in practice, because often the salient spacetimes are precisely the ones in which these quantities make (approximate) sense. To make her case that adulteration in QM∞ undermines realism, Ruetsche would need to establish that the representation-dependent quantities used in applications of QM∞ are different in kind from analogous quantities that appear throughout physics. And here it is not clear that she succeeds.None of this undercuts the importance of the book, however. Indeed, Ruetsche acknowledges that her argument may depend on how one understands idealization in physics. And even if one takes the view just described, there is a great deal of work to do on how Imperialism can support the practices Ruetsche identifies—work that will surely proceed within the framework Ruetsche has laid out, by addressing questions Ruetsche has raised. And so, wherever our study of QM∞ takes us, Ruetsche's book is sure to play a central role.
G.A. RAGGIO Abstract. We give a brief and incomplete survey of the problem of entan- glement of of composite quantum systems. 1960's - 1980's there were serious attempts (all of them anticipated by J. von Neu- mann) to do away with the underlying Hilbert space and work directly with the abstract algebraic structure modeled by C � -algebras or W � -algebras (abstract von Neumann algebras)(1, 2, 3). This was particularly fruitful when dealing with sys- tems of infinitely many degrees of freedom (quantum fields, thermodynamic limits, etc.). The problem of entanglement which we want to address here can be formu- lated quite straightforwardly in this algebraic framework of quantum theory. But we will stick to the quantum mechanics of the 1930's and keep the Hilbert space. Mainly because the results which are available concern the finite dimensional case. The states of the quantum system specified by H are associated with the lin- ear functionals f : B(H) → C which are positive (i.e., f(a) ≥ 0 for all positive a ∈ B(H)), normalized (i.e., f(1) = 1) and normal (i.e., f(supn{an}) = supnf(an) for any increasing family of selfadjoint operators {an : n = 1,2, � � � } which is uni- formly bounded). It is this normality condition which guarantees that the are in one-to-one correspondence with positive trace class operators d of unit trace (density operators) via the formula B(H) ∋ a 7→ tr(da). This gives an extremely convenient representation of and one often confuses the state f as a linear functional with the associated density operator d for which f(a) = tr(da). States are automatically continuous, and satisfy f(a � ) = f(a). The complex number f(a) is interpreted probabilistically as the expected value of the observable associated with the operator a when the system is in the state f. The normalization condi- tion is thus necessary for the consistency of this interpretation and the normality condition is seen as a non-commutative version of the �-additivity of probability measures. Clearly states, which we will denote by �(H), form a convex set which is closed
It often goes unnoticed that, even for a finite number of degrees of freedom, the canonical commutation relations have many inequivalent irreducible unitary representations; the free particle and a particle in a box provide examples that are both simple and well-known. The representations are unitarily inequivalent because the spectra of the position and momentum operators are different, and spectra are invariant under unitary transformations. The existence of these representations can have consequences that run from the merely unexpected to the barely conceivable. To start with, states of a single particle that belong to inequivalent representations will always be mutually orthogonal; they will never interfere with each other. This property, called superseparability elsewhere, is well-defined mathematically, but has not yet been observed. This article suggests two single-particle interference experiments that may reveal its existence. The existence of inequivalent irreducibile representations may be traced to the existence of different self-adjoint extensions of symmetric operators on infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. Analysis of the underlying mathematics reveals that some of these extensions can be interpreted in terms of topological, geometrical and physical quantities that can be controlled in the laboratory. The tests suggested are based on these interpretations. In conclusion, it is pointed out that mathematically rigorous many-worlds interpretations of quantum mechanics may be possible in a framework that admits superseparability.