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Nature China

Quantum physics: Security on the move

Felix Cheung

Published May 1, 2013• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1038/nchina.2013.40

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Due to the openness nature of wireless medium, security issues have increasingly become a bottleneck that restricts the development of ultra-reliable and low-latency communications (uRLLCs). Physical layer security (PLS) technique has been proposed to fulfill the security and confidentiality of information transmission by exploiting the characteristics of the wireless channel, which caters to the features of uRLLC. Furthermore, PLS also shows great practicality in artificial intelligence field, especially in wireless intelligent networks. However, the previous works on the study of PLS ignored the significance of mobility and limited packet length constraint required by uRLLC for satisfying low latency, in this paper, we investigate the impact of mobility on the secrecy performance of uRLLC by using the Random WayPoint (RWP) model and the Random Direction (RD) model. Specifically, with the tools of stochastic geometry, to observe the impact of key system parameters on the secrecy performance, we establish the closed-form expression of connection outage probability, secrecy outage probability, and decoding error probability-based secrecy transmission capacity (DEP-STC). Furthermore, we derive the condition that achieves a positive DEP-STC under two moving models, which can offer the network designer some greatly significant insights into achieving perfect secrecy. Simulations validate our derived theoretical results, and indicate that RWP moving receiver can obtain a higher security level than RD moving one, while RWP eavesdropper can lead to a lower security.
The future of hardware security will evolve with hardware. As packaging advances and focus moves to beyond Moore's law technologies, hardware security experts will need to keep ahead of changing security paradigms, including system and process vulnerabilities. Research focused on quantum hacking is emblematic of the translation of principles of security on the physical attack plane for emerging communications and computing technologies. Perhaps the commercial market will evolve such that the GAO will run a study on compromised quantum technologies in the not-too-distant future.