Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

International Conference on Computer Engineering and Applications

Computational geometric analysis of physically allowed quantum cloning transformations for quantum cryptography

László Gyöngyösi, Sándor Imre

Published Jan 27, 2010• 9 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Abstract:- The safety of quantum cryptography relies on the no-cloning theorem. In secret quantum communications, an eavesdropper cannot clone the sent qubits perfectly, however the best eavesdropping attacks for quantum cryptography are based on imperfect cloning machines. The eavesdropper’s physically allowed quantum evolutions on the sent qubit can be described in terms of the quantum state’s geometry. We use a fundamentally new computational geometrical method to analyze the informational theoretical impacts of cloning activity on the quantum channel. Our method uses Delaunay tessellation and convex hull calculation, with respect to quantum relative entropy as distance measure. The security analysis is focused on the four state (BB84) and Six state quantum cryptography protocols. The proposed geometrical method can be used to analyze efficiently the informational theoretical impacts of physically allowed quantum cloning transformations.

Related papers

Efficient computational information geometric analysis of physically allowed quantum cloning attacks for quantum key distribution protocols

László Gyöngyösi, Sándor Imre

Abstract:- In secret quantum communications the best eavesdropping attacks on quantum cryptography are based on imperfect cloning machines. The incoherent attack, based on quantum cloning, is the most common eavesdropping strategy. Using a probe, the eavesdropper imperfectly clones the sender’s quantum state which keeps one copy and sends the other. The physically allowed transformations of Eve’s quantum cloner on Bob’s qubit can be described in terms of Completely Positive (CP), trace preserving maps. The map of the quantum cloner compresses the Bloch-ball, as an affine map. This affine map has to be a complete positive, trace preserving map, which shrinks the Bloch ball. The effects of a quantum cloner can be given in tetrahedron representation. In this paper we show a new, quantum information theoretical representation of eavesdropping detection, focused on the Four-state (BB84) and Six-state quantum cryptography protocols. We use a fundamentally new computational geometrical method to analyze the informational theoretical impacts of cloning activity on the quantum channel. The proposed algorithm uses Delaunay tessellation and convex hull calculation on the Bloch sphere, with respect to quantum relative entropy as distance measure. The improved core-set approach can be used to analyze efficiently the informational theoretical impacts of physically allowed quantum cloning attacks.

WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on COMMUNICATIONS archive•Mar 1, 2010•2 citations

Quantum Informational Geometry for Secret Quantum Communication

László Gyöngyösi, Sándor Imre

The problem of quantum cloning is closely connected to quantum cryptography. In quantum cryptography, an eavesdropper on the quantum channel can not copy perfectly the sent quantum states, however in many cases the cloning machine is known to be the most powerful eavesdropping strategy against quantum cryptographic protocols. The geometric interpretation of quantum states investigates distances between two different quantum states. In our method we use quantum relative entropy as an informational distance between quantum states. We show a geometrical approach to analyze the security of quantum cryptography, based on quantum relative entropy and Delaunay triangulation on the Bloch sphere. In our security analysis, we use an approximation algorithm from classical computational geometry to determine the smallest enclosing ball of balls using core-sets.

Computation World: Future Computing, Service Computation, Cognitive, Adaptive, Content, Patterns•Nov 1, 2009•0 citations

Fidelity analysis of quantum cloning based attacks in quantum cryptography

László Gyöngyösi, Sándor Imre

In quantum cryptography the encoded pure quantum states are sent through a quantum communication channel. An eavesdropper can not measure the sent qubit, since the result of the measurement is one of the single quantum system's eigenstates. The best eavesdropping attacks for quantum cryptography use the cloning machines. In this paper, we show an effective method to compute the fidelity of quantum cloning based attacks in quantum cryptography, using Delaunay tessellation. We extend our method to study the fidelity of optimal cloning of mixed states in quantum cryptography.

International Conference on Telecommunications•Jan 1, 2009•5 citations

High-dimensional quantum cloning and applications to quantum hacking

Frédéric Bouchard, Robert Fickler, Robert W. Boyd +1 more

Attempts at cloning a quantum system result in the introduction of imperfections in the state of the copies. This is a consequence of the no-cloning theorem, which is a fundamental law of quantum physics and the backbone of security for quantum communications. Although perfect copies are prohibited, a quantum state may be copied with maximal accuracy via various optimal cloning schemes. Optimal quantum cloning, which lies at the border of the physical limit imposed by the no-signaling theorem and the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, has been experimentally realized for low-dimensional photonic states. However, an increase in the dimensionality of quantum systems is greatly beneficial to quantum computation and communication protocols. Nonetheless, no experimental demonstration of optimal cloning machines has hitherto been shown for high-dimensional quantum systems. We perform optimal cloning of high-dimensional photonic states by means of the symmetrization method. We show the universality of our technique by conducting cloning of numerous arbitrary input states and fully characterize our cloning machine by performing quantum state tomography on cloned photons. In addition, a cloning attack on a Bennett and Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol is experimentally demonstrated to reveal the robustness of high-dimensional states in quantum cryptography.

arXiv:1608.04396•Science Advances•Feb 3, 2017•144 citations

Quantum Informational Divergence in Quantum Channel Security Analysis

László Gyöngyösi, Sándor Imre

Abstract Computational Geometry is the art of designing efficientalgorithms for answering geometric questions. Computa-tional Geometry involves efficient and elegant solutionsfor difficult algorithmic problems and plays a central rolein many different areas of computer science. Quantumcloning-based attacks have deep relevance to quantumcryptography. In this paper we use the results of clas-sical Computational Geometry to analyze the security ofa quantum channel using current classical computer ar-chitectures. To analyze a quantum channel for a largenumber of input quantum states with classical computerarchitectures, very fast and effective algorithms are re-quired.Keywords: Quantum communication, quantum cryptogra-phy, quantum informational distance 1 Introduction In today’s communication networks, the widespread useof optical fiber and passive optical elements allows to usequantum cryptography in the current standard opticalnetwork infrastructure. In the past few years, quantumkey distribution schemes have attracted much study. Thesecurity of modern cryptographic methods, like asymmet-ric cryptography, relies heavily on the problem of factor-ing large integers [7]. In the future, if quantum computersbecome reality, any information exchange using currentclassical cryptographic schemes will be immediately inse-cure [11, 13]. Current classical cryptographic methods arenot able to guarantee long-term security. Other crypto-graphic methods, with absolute security must be appliedin the future. Cryptography based on the principles ofquantum theory is known as quantum cryptography. Us-ing current network technology, in order to spread quan-tum cryptography, interfaces must be implemented thatare able to manage together the quantum and classicalchannels [10].Many challenging hard algorithmic problems can bestudied with computational geometry and, at present,there exist many geometric algorithms that offer an effi-cient and well implementable solution for hard computa-tional problems. Computational Geometry was originallyfocused on the construction of efficient algorithms and itprovides a very valuable and efficient tool for computinghard tasks [8]. In many cases, the traditional linear pro-gramming methods are not very efficient. The computa-tion of the convex hull between quantum states cannot becomputed efficiently by linear programming, however themethods of computational geometry are better at solvingthese kinds of hard problems [18, 3, 8]. ComputationalGeometry uses the results of classical geometry and thepower of computing. In Figure 1, we illustrate the logicalstructure of the analysis and the cooperation of classi-cal and quantum systems. To this day, the most efficientclassical algorithms for this purpose are computationalgeometric methods. We use these classical computationalgeometrictoolsto analyzethe securityofa quantum chan-nel.

International journal of network security•Jan 1, 2011•2 citations

Security of quantum cryptography against individual attacks

Boris A. Slutsky, Ramesh R. Rao, Pang-Chen Sun +1 more

An attempt to eavesdrop on a quantum cryptographic channel reveals itself through errors it inevitably introduces into the transmission. We investigate the relationship between the induced error rate and the maximum amount of information the eavesdropper can extract, in both the two-state B92 [B92 refers to the work of C. H. Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121 (1992)] and the four-state BB84 [BB84 refers to the work of C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India (IEEE, New York, 1984), pp. 175--179] quantum cryptographic protocols. In each case, the optimal eavesdropping method that on average yields the most information for a given error rate is explicitly constructed. Analysis is limited to eavesdropping strategies where each bit of the quantum transmission is attacked individually and independently from other bits. Subject to this restriction, however, we believe that all attacks not forbidden by physical laws are covered. Unlike previous work, the eavesdropper's advantage is measured in terms of Renyi (rather than Shannon) information, and with respect only to bits received error-free by Bob (rather than all bits). This alters both the maximum extractable information and the optimal eavesdropping attack. The result can be used directly at the privacy amplification stage of the protocol to accomplish secure communication over a noisy channel.

Physical Review A•Apr 1, 1998•112 citations
Abstract:- The safety of quantum cryptography relies on the no-cloning theorem. In secret quantum communications, an eavesdropper cannot clone the sent qubits perfectly, however the best eavesdropping attacks for quantum cryptography are based on imperfect cloning machines. The eavesdropper’s physically allowed quantum evolutions on the sent qubit can be described in terms of the quantum state’s geometry. We use a fundamentally new computational geometrical method to analyze the informational theoretical impacts of cloning activity on the quantum channel. Our method uses Delaunay tessellation and convex hull calculation, with respect to quantum relative entropy as distance measure. The security analysis is focused on the four state (BB84) and Six state quantum cryptography protocols. The proposed geometrical method can be used to analyze efficiently the informational theoretical impacts of physically allowed quantum cloning transformations.
Abstract:- In secret quantum communications the best eavesdropping attacks on quantum cryptography are based on imperfect cloning machines. The incoherent attack, based on quantum cloning, is the most common eavesdropping strategy. Using a probe, the eavesdropper imperfectly clones the sender’s quantum state which keeps one copy and sends the other. The physically allowed transformations of Eve’s quantum cloner on Bob’s qubit can be described in terms of Completely Positive (CP), trace preserving maps. The map of the quantum cloner compresses the Bloch-ball, as an affine map. This affine map has to be a complete positive, trace preserving map, which shrinks the Bloch ball. The effects of a quantum cloner can be given in tetrahedron representation. In this paper we show a new, quantum information theoretical representation of eavesdropping detection, focused on the Four-state (BB84) and Six-state quantum cryptography protocols. We use a fundamentally new computational geometrical method to analyze the informational theoretical impacts of cloning activity on the quantum channel. The proposed algorithm uses Delaunay tessellation and convex hull calculation on the Bloch sphere, with respect to quantum relative entropy as distance measure. The improved core-set approach can be used to analyze efficiently the informational theoretical impacts of physically allowed quantum cloning attacks.
The problem of quantum cloning is closely connected to quantum cryptography. In quantum cryptography, an eavesdropper on the quantum channel can not copy perfectly the sent quantum states, however in many cases the cloning machine is known to be the most powerful eavesdropping strategy against quantum cryptographic protocols. The geometric interpretation of quantum states investigates distances between two different quantum states. In our method we use quantum relative entropy as an informational distance between quantum states. We show a geometrical approach to analyze the security of quantum cryptography, based on quantum relative entropy and Delaunay triangulation on the Bloch sphere. In our security analysis, we use an approximation algorithm from classical computational geometry to determine the smallest enclosing ball of balls using core-sets.
In quantum cryptography the encoded pure quantum states are sent through a quantum communication channel. An eavesdropper can not measure the sent qubit, since the result of the measurement is one of the single quantum system's eigenstates. The best eavesdropping attacks for quantum cryptography use the cloning machines. In this paper, we show an effective method to compute the fidelity of quantum cloning based attacks in quantum cryptography, using Delaunay tessellation. We extend our method to study the fidelity of optimal cloning of mixed states in quantum cryptography.
Attempts at cloning a quantum system result in the introduction of imperfections in the state of the copies. This is a consequence of the no-cloning theorem, which is a fundamental law of quantum physics and the backbone of security for quantum communications. Although perfect copies are prohibited, a quantum state may be copied with maximal accuracy via various optimal cloning schemes. Optimal quantum cloning, which lies at the border of the physical limit imposed by the no-signaling theorem and the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, has been experimentally realized for low-dimensional photonic states. However, an increase in the dimensionality of quantum systems is greatly beneficial to quantum computation and communication protocols. Nonetheless, no experimental demonstration of optimal cloning machines has hitherto been shown for high-dimensional quantum systems. We perform optimal cloning of high-dimensional photonic states by means of the symmetrization method. We show the universality of our technique by conducting cloning of numerous arbitrary input states and fully characterize our cloning machine by performing quantum state tomography on cloned photons. In addition, a cloning attack on a Bennett and Brassard (BB84) quantum key distribution protocol is experimentally demonstrated to reveal the robustness of high-dimensional states in quantum cryptography.
Abstract Computational Geometry is the art of designing efficientalgorithms for answering geometric questions. Computa-tional Geometry involves efficient and elegant solutionsfor difficult algorithmic problems and plays a central rolein many different areas of computer science. Quantumcloning-based attacks have deep relevance to quantumcryptography. In this paper we use the results of clas-sical Computational Geometry to analyze the security ofa quantum channel using current classical computer ar-chitectures. To analyze a quantum channel for a largenumber of input quantum states with classical computerarchitectures, very fast and effective algorithms are re-quired.Keywords: Quantum communication, quantum cryptogra-phy, quantum informational distance 1 Introduction In today’s communication networks, the widespread useof optical fiber and passive optical elements allows to usequantum cryptography in the current standard opticalnetwork infrastructure. In the past few years, quantumkey distribution schemes have attracted much study. Thesecurity of modern cryptographic methods, like asymmet-ric cryptography, relies heavily on the problem of factor-ing large integers [7]. In the future, if quantum computersbecome reality, any information exchange using currentclassical cryptographic schemes will be immediately inse-cure [11, 13]. Current classical cryptographic methods arenot able to guarantee long-term security. Other crypto-graphic methods, with absolute security must be appliedin the future. Cryptography based on the principles ofquantum theory is known as quantum cryptography. Us-ing current network technology, in order to spread quan-tum cryptography, interfaces must be implemented thatare able to manage together the quantum and classicalchannels [10].Many challenging hard algorithmic problems can bestudied with computational geometry and, at present,there exist many geometric algorithms that offer an effi-cient and well implementable solution for hard computa-tional problems. Computational Geometry was originallyfocused on the construction of efficient algorithms and itprovides a very valuable and efficient tool for computinghard tasks [8]. In many cases, the traditional linear pro-gramming methods are not very efficient. The computa-tion of the convex hull between quantum states cannot becomputed efficiently by linear programming, however themethods of computational geometry are better at solvingthese kinds of hard problems [18, 3, 8]. ComputationalGeometry uses the results of classical geometry and thepower of computing. In Figure 1, we illustrate the logicalstructure of the analysis and the cooperation of classi-cal and quantum systems. To this day, the most efficientclassical algorithms for this purpose are computationalgeometric methods. We use these classical computationalgeometrictoolsto analyzethe securityofa quantum chan-nel.
An attempt to eavesdrop on a quantum cryptographic channel reveals itself through errors it inevitably introduces into the transmission. We investigate the relationship between the induced error rate and the maximum amount of information the eavesdropper can extract, in both the two-state B92 [B92 refers to the work of C. H. Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121 (1992)] and the four-state BB84 [BB84 refers to the work of C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India (IEEE, New York, 1984), pp. 175--179] quantum cryptographic protocols. In each case, the optimal eavesdropping method that on average yields the most information for a given error rate is explicitly constructed. Analysis is limited to eavesdropping strategies where each bit of the quantum transmission is attacked individually and independently from other bits. Subject to this restriction, however, we believe that all attacks not forbidden by physical laws are covered. Unlike previous work, the eavesdropper's advantage is measured in terms of Renyi (rather than Shannon) information, and with respect only to bits received error-free by Bob (rather than all bits). This alters both the maximum extractable information and the optimal eavesdropping attack. The result can be used directly at the privacy amplification stage of the protocol to accomplish secure communication over a noisy channel.