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Lecture notes in computer science

Standard Security Does Imply Security Against Selective Opening for Markov Distributions

Georg Fuchsbauer, Felix Heuer, Eike Kiltz, Krzysztof Pietrzak

Published Dec 18, 2015• 12 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-662-49096-9_12

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Standard Security Does Imply Security Against Selective Opening for Markov Distributions.

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About three decades ago it was realized that implementing private channels between parties which can be adaptively corrupted requires an encryption scheme that is secure against selective opening attacks. Whether standard (IND-CPA) security implies security against selective opening attacks has been a major open question since. The only known reduction from selective opening to IND-CPA security loses an exponential factor. A polynomial reduction is only known for the very special case where the distribution considered in the selective opening security experiment is a product distribution, i.e., the messages are sampled independently from each other. In this paper we give a reduction whose loss is quantified via the dependence graph (where message dependencies correspond to edges) of the underlying message distribution. In particular, for some concrete distributions including Markov distributions, our reduction is polynomial.

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We show that no commitment scheme that is hiding andbindingaccordingtothestandarddefinition is semantically-secure under selective opening attack (SOA), resolving a long-standing and fundamental open question about the power of SOAs. We also obtain the first examples of IND-CPA encryption schemesthatarenotsecureunderSOA, bothforsendercorruptionswhereencryptioncoinsare revealed and receiver corruptions where decryption keys are revealed. These results assume only the existence of collision-resistant hash functions.

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About three decades ago it was realized that implementing private channels between parties which can be adaptively corrupted requires an encryption scheme that is secure against selective opening attacks. Whether standard (IND-CPA) security implies security against selective opening attacks has been a major open question since. The only known reduction from selective opening to IND-CPA security loses an exponential factor. A polynomial reduction is only known for the very special case where the distribution considered in the selective opening security experiment is a product distribution, i.e., the messages are sampled independently from each other. In this paper we give a reduction whose loss is quantified via the dependence graph (where message dependencies correspond to edges) of the underlying message distribution. In particular, for some concrete distributions including Markov distributions, our reduction is polynomial.
We show that no commitment scheme that is hiding andbindingaccordingtothestandarddefinition is semantically-secure under selective opening attack (SOA), resolving a long-standing and fundamental open question about the power of SOAs. We also obtain the first examples of IND-CPA encryption schemesthatarenotsecureunderSOA, bothforsendercorruptionswhereencryptioncoinsare revealed and receiver corruptions where decryption keys are revealed. These results assume only the existence of collision-resistant hash functions.