Almost all the existing identity-based key agreement (ID-KA) protocols cannot achieve both ephemeral secret reveal resilience and pairing-free. In this paper, a pairing-free ID-KA protocol is proposed, which captures all basic desirable security properties including key generation center forward secrecy, key compromise impersonation resilience and ephemeral secrets reveal resistance. On the other hand, the proposed scheme only needs one round communication between the two parties. Compared with the previous ID-KA protocols, the proposed scheme is more secure and efficient.
Almost all the existing identity-based key agreement (ID-KA) protocols cannot achieve both ephemeral secret reveal resilience and pairing-free. In this paper, a pairing-free ID-KA protocol is proposed, which captures all basic desirable security properties including key generation center forward secrecy, key compromise impersonation resilience and ephemeral secrets reveal resistance. On the other hand, the proposed scheme only needs one round communication between the two parties. Compared with the previous ID-KA protocols, the proposed scheme is more secure and efficient.
Two-Party Authenticated key agreement protocol is essential for setting up the common session key for parties to establish secure channel for network communication in the open environment. Most of proposed schemes require expensive bilinear pairing operation and only provide limited security attributes. So such protocols are unsuitable for real-world applications that require stronger sense of secrecy. In this paper, we first analysis two schemes recently proposed by Cao etc., and then present a one-round ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol with more desired security attributes, which need no pairing operations while still achieve nice computational efficiency. These security attributes include known-key secrecy, perfect forward secrecy, PKG forward secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience and no key control. Moreover, it captures the enhanced security attributes known session-specific temporary key information secrecy, which means that even the ephemeral secret key were compromised, the adversary can hardly acquire the agreed session key.
Authenticated key agreement protocol is used to set up the session key and establish secure channel for network communication in the open environment. So far, great deals of identity-based protocols have been proposed to provide robust mutual authentication and key establishment in the two-party setting. Majority of the existing identity-based key agreement protocols require expensive bilinear pairing operation and only provide limited security attributes. Therefore, such protocols are unsuitable for real-world applications that require stronger sense of secrecy. In this paper, we first analysis some of the schemes proposed recently, and then present a one-round ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol with enhanced security attributes, which doesn't need pairing operation and achieves most of the required security attributes, such as known-key secrecy, perfect forward secrecy, PKG Forward Secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience and no key control. In addition, it captures the enhanced security attributes-Known session-specific temporary key information secrecy.
A few of certificateless key agreement schemes have been proposed in recent years,all of them need pairing operations,what's more,most of them are vulnerable to the key compromise impersonation attack and resistance to leakage of ephemeral keys.The provably secure certificateless key agreement protocol was proposed by Lippold in 2009,but their protocol suffered from computation burden.In order to solve the above-mentioned problem,this paper proposed a new pairing-free certificateless two party key agreement scheme (CL-KA) and presened its security properties.The new scheme was secure as long as each party had at least one uncompromised secret.Thus,the new scheme was secure even if the key generation centre learned the ephemeral secrets of both parties.The new scheme achieves efficiency in computational cost when compared with Lippold's protocol.
Key escrow is a default property that is inherent in identity-based cryptography, where a curious private key generator (PKG) can derive a secret value shared by communicating entities in its domain. Therefore, a dishonest PKG can encrypt and decrypt ciphers or can carry out any attack on the communicating parties. Of course, the escrow property is not completely unwanted but is acceptable in other particular applications. On the other hand, in more civil applications, this key escrow property is undesirable and needs to be removed to provide maximum communication privacy. Therefore, this paper presents an escrow-free identity-based key agreement protocol that is also applicable even in a distinct PKG condition that does not use pairings. The proposed protocol has comparable computational and communicational performance to many other protocols with similar security attributes, of which their security is based on costly bilinear pairings. The protocol’s notion was inspired by McCullagh et al. and Chen-Kudla, in regard to escrow-free and multi-PKG key agreement ideas. In particular, the scheme captures perfect forward secrecy and key compromise impersonation resilience, which were lacking in McCullagh et al.’s study, as well as all other desirable security attributes, such as known key secrecy, unknown key-share resilience and no-key control. The merit in the proposed protocol is the achievement of all required security requirements with a relatively lower computational overhead than many other protocols because it precludes pairings.
Authenticated key agreement (AK) protocol is crucial in providing data confidentiality and integrity for subsequent communications among two or more parties over a public network. Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) combines the advantage of the identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) and the traditional public key cryptography (PKC). Unfortunately, construction of CL-PKC and AK protocols has so far depended on the use of identity-based encryption, which results in the bilinear pairing-based schemes that need costly operations. We present a secure certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol without paring, based on the certificateless encryption scheme proposed by J. Baek et al. It shows that the newly proposed scheme is of nice efficiency and practical. Moreover, it provides perfect forward secrecy, PKG forward secrecy and almost all the other known security attributes, such as known-key secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience, known session-specific temporary information security, message independence and no key control.