Epistemological closure of the natural world, inferred by Newtonian metaphysics, provides a point of departure for formally exploring the question, What is environment?'. This question leads to the open universe conjecture of Popper that the world is epistemologically open. In the ontological Many Interpretation (MW) of Quantum Mechanics and the epistemological logic theory of Possible Worlds (PW) for example, each choice of a particle or a proposition for a path to follow implies that all choices are in fact followed and all possible worlds thereby entered. Such openness suggests that PW concepts might be employed to shed light also on the question of Environment. Exploring this leads to recasting classical mechanistic causality in more ecologically consistent directions. This paper expands a Newtonian environmental theory (Theory of Environment: Patten) in epistemological directions more compatible with the open-universe and PW-hypotheses. Deterministic interpretations of Quantum Mechanics, are favored over orthodox, indeterministic Copenghagen interpretation. Quantum principles are incorporated into PW theory by replacing traditional logic with fuzzy, modal and temporal logics which better reflect ecological realities. The new resulting PW-logic is the employed to extend Environ Theory. The following specific results are obtained; (1) possibilistic ontology and actualistic epistemology are linked; (2) possibilistic and existential sets and functions are defined; (3) possibilistic and existential processes are clarified; (4) expansions of input (creaon) and output (genon) environments (from Environ Theory) are achieved
Epistemological closure of the natural world, inferred by Newtonian metaphysics, provides a point of departure for formally exploring the question, What is environment?'. This question leads to the open universe conjecture of Popper that the world is epistemologically open. In the ontological Many Interpretation (MW) of Quantum Mechanics and the epistemological logic theory of Possible Worlds (PW) for example, each choice of a particle or a proposition for a path to follow implies that all choices are in fact followed and all possible worlds thereby entered. Such openness suggests that PW concepts might be employed to shed light also on the question of Environment. Exploring this leads to recasting classical mechanistic causality in more ecologically consistent directions. This paper expands a Newtonian environmental theory (Theory of Environment: Patten) in epistemological directions more compatible with the open-universe and PW-hypotheses. Deterministic interpretations of Quantum Mechanics, are favored over orthodox, indeterministic Copenghagen interpretation. Quantum principles are incorporated into PW theory by replacing traditional logic with fuzzy, modal and temporal logics which better reflect ecological realities. The new resulting PW-logic is the employed to extend Environ Theory. The following specific results are obtained; (1) possibilistic ontology and actualistic epistemology are linked; (2) possibilistic and existential sets and functions are defined; (3) possibilistic and existential processes are clarified; (4) expansions of input (creaon) and output (genon) environments (from Environ Theory) are achieved
Abstract Open Systems: Physics, Metaphysics, and Methodology argues that many of the most illuminating questions in contemporary science are best approached by treating systems as inherently embedded in, and interacting with, their environments. While closed-system modelling has long dominated physics, recent advances—from non-equilibrium thermodynamics and open-system quantum dynamics to complex systems science and quantum causal modelling—show that environmental coupling is often not a dispensable complication but a defining feature. Bringing together leading scholars across physics and philosophy, this volume develops the “open systems view” and probes its limits. Part I sets out the view within quantum theory and clarifies its relations to alternative frameworks. Part II traces open/closed concepts across the history and practice of physics, from Newtonian celestial mechanics to blackbody radiation, gravity with boundaries, and biological emergence. Part III turns to the largest scales, examining cosmology, many worlds, and realism about the universal quantum state. Throughout, contributors connect formal tools—density matrices, Lindblad dynamics, interventionist causation—with methodological and metaphysical stakes, including autonomy, reduction, and fundamentality. The result is a unified guide to modelling, explanation, and ontology when closure is an idealisation rather than a premise.
Abstract Metaphysicians should pay attention to quantum mechanics, but not because it provides definitive answers to many metaphysical questions. The theory itself is remarkably silent on the nature of the physical world, and the various interpretations of the theory on offer present conflicting ontological pictures. Rather, quantum mechanics is essential to the metaphysician because it reshapes standard metaphysical debates and opens up unforeseen new metaphysical possibilities. Even if quantum mechanics provides few clear answers, there are good reasons to think that any adequate understanding of the quantum world will result in a radical reshaping of our classical worldview in some way or other. Whatever the world is like at the atomic scale, it is almost certainly not the swarm of particles pushed around by forces that is often presupposed. This book guides readers through the theory of quantum mechanics and its implications for metaphysics in a clear and accessible way. The theory and its various interpretations are presented with a minimum of technicality. The consequences of these interpretations for metaphysical debates concerning realism, indeterminacy, causation, determinism, holism, and individuality (among other topics) are explored in detail, stressing the novel form that the debates take given the empirical facts in the quantum domain. While quantum mechanics may not deliver unconditional pronouncements on these issues, the range of possibilities consistent with our knowledge of the empirical world is relatively small—and each possibility is metaphysically revisionary in some way.
Recognizing that syntactic and semantic structures of classical logic are not sufficient to understand the meaning of quantum phenomena, we propose in this paper a new interpretation of quantum mechanics based on evidence theory. The connection between these two theories is obtained through a new language, quantum set theory, built on a suggestion by J. Bell. Further, we give a modal logic interpretation of quantum mechanics and quantum set theory by using Kripke's semantics of modal logic based on the concept of possible worlds. This is grounded on previous work of a number of researchers (Resconi, Klir, Harmanec) who showed how to represent evidence theory and other uncertainty theories in terms of modal logic. Moreover, we also propose a reformulation of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics in terms of Kripke's semantics. We thus show how three different theories — quantum mechanics, evidence theory, and modal logic — are interrelated. This opens, on one hand, the way to new applications of quantum mechanics within domains different from the traditional ones, and, on the other hand, the possibility of building new generalizations of quantum mechanics itself.
There appear to be multiple mathematically and physically distinct theories that successfully reproduce the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics, so-called "interpretations" of quantum mechanics. This dissertation uses the tools of formal epistemology (prominently, the concept of self-locating uncertainty) to investigate which of the theories that have been put forward really are empirically adequate and what alternatives can be devised. The first chapter introduces a novel theory that incorporates aspects of two well-developed alternatives, Bohmian mechanics and the many-worlds interpretation. The quantum wave function can be represented as a field on configuration space, the space of possible ways particles can be arranged. According to Bohmian mechanics a single point in this space is special; it represents the way all of the particles actually are arranged. The newly introduced theory holds that many of the points in configuration space are special; for each, there is a world in which particles are arranged that way. In general, there will be multiple worlds that are so similar that an agent cannot tell directly from experience which they are in; self-locating uncertainty is unavoidable. The next chapter argues for the empirical adequacy of the many-worlds interpretation. In this version of quantum mechanics, processes like quantum measurements cause agents to split into multiple copies and enter periods of self-locating uncertainty. An epistemic principle demarcating which facts about the world one's credences might reasonably depend on (only facts about what's happening around here) is used to derive probabilistic predictions from the many-worlds interpretation. In the third chapter self-locating uncertainty is employed in evaluating another version of quantum mechanics, Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theory. In this theory, random collapse events prevent our world from splitting into many. If the collapse events are rare, this prevention fails. Other worlds have time to form but most are short-lived. Our survival provides evidence against that kind of theory. The final chapter is an original introduction to relativistic quantum field theory which lays groundwork for evaluating the prospects of extending various interpretations of quantum mechanics to this more sophisticated theory.
This paper re-opens the debate on the failure of quantum mechanics to provide an understandable view of micro-reality. A critique is offered of the commonly accepted ‘Copenhagen Interpretation’ of a theory that is only a mathematical approach to the level of reality characterized by atoms and electrons. This critique is based on the oldest approach to thinking about nature for over 2500 years, known as Natural Philosophy. Quantum mechanics (QM) was developed over the first quarter of the 20th Century, when scientists were enthralled by a new philosophy known as Positivism, whose foundations were based on the assumption that material objects exist only when measured by humans – This central assumption conflates epistemology (knowledge) with ontology (existence). The present critique rejects this human-centered view of reality by assuming material reality has existed long before (and will persist long after) human beings (“Realism”). The defensive view that the micro-world is too different to understand using regular thinking (and only a mathematical approach is possible) is rejected totally. At least 12 earlier QM interpretations are critically analyzed, indicating the broad interest in “what does QM mean?” The standard theory of quantum mechanics is thus constructed on only how the micro-world appears to macro measurements - as such, it cannot offer any view of how the foundations of the world are acting when humans are not observing it - this has generated almost 100 years of confusion and contradiction at the very heart of physics. Significantly, we live in a world that is not being measured by scientists but is interacting with itself and with us. QM has failed to provide explanations: only recipes (meaningless equations), not insights. Physics has returned to the pre-Newtonian world of Ptolemaic phenomenology: only verifiable numbers without real understanding. The focus needs to be on an explicit linkage between the micro-world, when left to itself, and our mental models of this sphere of material reality, via the mechanism of measurement. This limits the role of measurement to confirming our mental models of reality but never confusing these with a direct image of ‘the thing in itself’. This implies a deep divide between reality and appearances. This paper proposes that it is the attempt to preserve continuum mathematics (especially calculus), which drives much of the mystery and confusion behind all attempts to understand quantum mechanics. The introduction of discrete mathematics is proposed to help analyze the discrete interactions between the quintessential quantum objects: the electrons and their novel properties. Additionally, several hidden major assumptions have been present in Classical Mechanics (represented by continuum mathematics) since its inception by Newton that are blocking progress and understanding of quantum mechanics. A related paper demonstrates that it is possible to create a point-particle theory of electrons that explains all their peculiar (and ‘paradoxical’) behavior without introducing the continuum mathematical ideas of fields or waves. * Surrey, B.C. Canada (604) 542-2299 spsi99@telus.net Version 1.195 10-07-2016 Begun 23-06-2008 {pp. 80, 70.4 Kw; 800 KB}
This paper deals with the foundations of quantum mechanics. We start by outlining the characterisation, due to Birkhoff and Von Neumann, of the logical structures of the theories of classical physics and quantum mechanics, as boolean and modular lattices respectively. We then derive these descriptions from what we claim are basic properties of any physical theory - i.e. the notion that a quantity in such a theory may be analysed into parts and that the results of this analysis may be treated in languages with an underlying boolean structure. We shall see that in the course of constructing a model of a theory with these properties different indistinguishable possibilities will arise for how the elements of the model may be named, that is to say different possibilities arise for how they can be associated with points from Set. Taking a particular collection of possibilities gives the usual boolean lattice of the propositions of classical physics. Taking all possibilities - in a sense, the set of all things that may be described by physical theories - gives the lattice of quantum mechanical propositions. This gives an interpretation of quantum mechanics as the complete set of such possible descriptions, the complete physical description of the world.