After a brief introduction to issues that plague the realization of a theory of quantum gravity, I suggest that the main one concerns a quantization of the principle of relative simultaneity. This leads me to a distinction between time and space, to a further degree than that present in the canonical approach to general relativity. With this distinction, one can make sense of superpositions as interference between alternative paths in the relational configuration space of the entire universe. But the full use of relationalism brings us to a timeless picture of nature, as it does in the canonical approach (which culminates in the Wheeler–DeWitt equation). After a discussion of Parmenides and the Eleatics's rejection of time, I show that there is middle ground between their view of absolute timelessness and a view of physics taking place in timeless configuration space. In this middle ground, even though change does not fundamentally exist, the illusion of change can be recovered in a way not permitted by Parmenides. It is recovered through a particular density distribution over configuration space that gives rise to records. Incidentally, this distribution seems to have the potential to dissolve further aspects of the measurement problem that can still be argued to haunt the application of decoherence to many-worlds quantum mechanics. I end with a discussion indicating that the conflict between the conclusions of this paper and our view of the continuity of the self may still intuitively bother us. Nonetheless, those conclusions should be no more challenging to our intuition than Derek Parfit's thought experiments on the subject.
After a brief introduction to issues that plague the realization of a theory of quantum gravity, I suggest that the main one concerns a quantization of the principle of relative simultaneity. This leads me to a distinction between time and space, to a further degree than that present in the canonical approach to general relativity. With this distinction, one can make sense of superpositions as interference between alternative paths in the relational configuration space of the entire universe. But the full use of relationalism brings us to a timeless picture of nature, as it does in the canonical approach (which culminates in the Wheeler–DeWitt equation). After a discussion of Parmenides and the Eleatics's rejection of time, I show that there is middle ground between their view of absolute timelessness and a view of physics taking place in timeless configuration space. In this middle ground, even though change does not fundamentally exist, the illusion of change can be recovered in a way not permitted by Parmenides. It is recovered through a particular density distribution over configuration space that gives rise to records. Incidentally, this distribution seems to have the potential to dissolve further aspects of the measurement problem that can still be argued to haunt the application of decoherence to many-worlds quantum mechanics. I end with a discussion indicating that the conflict between the conclusions of this paper and our view of the continuity of the self may still intuitively bother us. Nonetheless, those conclusions should be no more challenging to our intuition than Derek Parfit's thought experiments on the subject.
After a brief introduction to issues that plague the realization of a theory of quantum gravity, I suggest that the main one concerns a quantization of the principle of relative simultaneity. This leads me to a distinction between time and space, to a further degree than that present in the canonical approach to general relativity. With this distinction, one can make sense of superpositions as interference between alternative paths in the relational configuration space of the entire Universe. But the full use of relationalism brings us to a timeless picture of Nature, as it does in the canonical approach (which culminates in the Wheeler-DeWitt equation). After a discussion of Parmenides and the Eleatics' rejection of time, I show that there is middle ground between their view of absolute timelessness and a view of physics taking place in timeless configuration space. In this middle ground, even though change does not fundamentally exist, the illusion of change can be recovered in a way not permitted by Parmenides. It is recovered through a particular density distribution over configuration space which gives rise to \lq{}records\rq{}. Incidentally, this distribution seems to have the potential to dissolve further aspects of the measurement problem that can still be argued to haunt the application of decoherence to Many-Worlds quantum mechanics. I end with a discussion indicating that the conflict between the conclusions of this paper and our view of the continuity of the self may still intuitively bother us. Nonetheless, those conclusions should be no more challenging to our intuition than Derek Parfit's thought experiments on the subject.
After a brief introduction to issues that plague the realization of a theory of quantum gravity, I suggest that the main one concerns a quantization of the principle of relative simultaneity. This leads me to a distinction between time and space, to a further degree than that present in the canonical approach to general relativity. With this distinction, one can make sense of superpositions as interference between alternative paths in the relational configuration space of the entire Universe. But the full use of relationalism brings us to a timeless picture of Nature, as it does in the canonical approach (which culminates in the Wheeler-DeWitt equation). After a discussion of Parmenides and the Eleatics' rejection of time, I show that there is middle ground between their view of absolute timelessness and a view of physics taking place in timeless configuration space. In this middle ground, even though change does not fundamentally exist, the illusion of change can be recovered in a way not permitted by Parmenides. It is recovered through a particular density distribution over configuration space which gives rise to 'records'. Incidentally, this distribution seems to have the potential to dissolve further aspects of the measurement problem that can still be argued to haunt the application of decoherence to Many-Worlds quantum mechanics. I end with a discussion indicating that the conflict between the conclusions of this paper and our view of the continuity of the self may still intuitively bother us. Nonetheless, those conclusions should be no more challenging to our intuition than Derek Parfit's thought experiments on the subject.
After a brief introduction to issues that plague the realization of a theory of quantum gravity, I suggest that the main one concerns a quantization of the principle of relative simultaneity. This leads me to a distinction between time and space, to a further degree than that present in the canonical approach to general relativity. With this distinction, one can make sense of superpositions as interference between alternative paths in the relational configuration space of the entire Universe. But the full use of relationalism brings us to a timeless picture of Nature, as it does in the canonical approach (which culminates in the Wheeler-DeWitt equation). After a discussion of Parmenides and the Eleatics' rejection of time, I show that there is a middle ground between their view of absolute timelessness and a view of physics taking place in timeless configuration space. In this middle ground, even though change does not fundamentally exist, the illusion of change can be recovered in a way not permitted by Parmenides. It is recovered through a particular density distribution over configuration space which gives rise to \lq{}records\rq{}. Incidentally, this distribution seems to have the potential to dissolve further aspects of the measurement problem that can still be argued to haunt the application of decoherence to Many-Worlds quantum mechanics. I end with a discussion indicating that the conflict between the conclusions of this paper and our view of the continuity of the self may still intuitively bother us. Nonetheless, those conclusions should be no more challenging to our intuition than Derek Parfit\rq{}s thought experiments on the subject.
After a brief introduction to issues that plague the realization of a theory of quantum gravity, I suggest that the main one concerns defining superpositions of causal structures. This leads me to a distinction between time and space, to a further degree than that present in the canonical approach to general relativity. With this distinction, one can make sense of superpositions as interference between alternative paths in the relational configuration space of the entire Universe. But the full use of relationalism brings us to a timeless picture of Nature, as it does in the canonical approach (which culminates in the Wheeler-DeWitt equation). After a discussion of Parmenides and the Eleatics' rejection of time, I show that there is middle ground between their view of absolute timelessness and a view of physics taking place in timeless configuration space. In this middle ground, even though change does not fundamentally exist, the illusion of change can be recovered in a way not permitted by Parmenides. It is recovered through a particular density distribution over configuration space which gives rise to 'records'. Incidentally, this distribution seems to have the potential to dissolve further aspects of the measurement problem that can still be argued to haunt the application of decoherence to Many-Worlds quantum mechanics. I end with a discussion indicating that the conflict between the conclusions of this paper and our view of the continuity of the self may still intuitively bother us. Nonetheless, those conclusions should be no more challenging to our intuition than Derek Parfit's thought experiments on the subject.
A strategy for quantization of general relativity is considered in the context of the `timelessness' of classical general relativity discussed in the preceding companion paper. The Wheeler--DeWitt equation (WDE) of canonical quantum gravity is interpreted as being like a time-independent Schrödinger equation for one fixed energy, the solution of which simply gives, once and for all, relative probabilities for each possible static relative configuration of the complete universe. Each such configuration is identified with a possible instant of experienced time. These instants are not embedded in any kind of external or internal time and, if experienced, exist in their own right. The central question is then: Whence comes the appearance of the passage of time, dynamics, and history? The answer proposed here is that these must all be `coded', in the form of what appear to be mutually consistent `records', in the individual static configurations of the universe that are actually experienced. Such configurations are called time capsules and suggest a new, many-instants , interpretation of quantum mechanics. Mott's explanation of why -particles make straight tracks in Wilson cloud chambers shows that the time-independent Schrödinger equation can concentrate its solution on time capsules. This demonstrates how the appearance of dynamics and history can arise in a static situation. If it can be shown that solutions of the Wheeler--DeWitt equation are spontaneously and generically concentrated on time capsules, this opens up the possibility of an explanation of time at a very deep level: the timeless wavefunction of the universe concentrates the quantum mechanical probability on static configurations that are time capsules, so that the situations which have the highest probability of being experienced carry within them the appearance of time and history. It is suggested that the inescapable asymmetry of the configuration space of the universe could play an important role in bringing about such concentration on time capsules and be the ultimate origin of the arrow of time.
The nature of time has long been debated in human history and nowadays is considered of central importance for understanding quantum gravity. We focus on and advocate the relational concept of time, which was put forward in the 17th century in opposition to Newton's absolute time, and only in 1990 explored in a quantum mechanical framework by Carlo Rovelli. After a historical introduction the mathematical models of time are carefully analyzed in chapter 1, followed by a discussion of the role of time played in fundamental theories. Using as an example nonrelativistic mechanics, the process of parametrization is explained, leading to a separation of a 'canonical time coordinate' from an arbitrary evolution parameter. The discussion of the role of time in special and general relativity as well as in quantum mechanics shows that more fundamental theories use less structure of time. This is followed by an exposition of the history of the relational concept of time, which negates the existence of an absolute duration and therefore often is called "timeless". Next it is shown how fundamental theories can be formulated and re-interpreted using this concept. We put emphasis on the hitherto neglected connection between relationalism and non-extensibility, while absolute time is shown to be unproblematic in classical mechanics just because of the possibility to extend the system without changing its nature. We conclude chapter 1 with a new axiomatic basis for the construction of time observables based on a simultaneity relation between 'observations', which are treated as a primitive concept and intuitively correspond to measurement events, but without knowing 'when' these events occur. There is no fundamental time observable; any observable qualifies as a time observable, if it allows to separate all instants. Chapter 2 gives a brief account of three main problems connected with time: a) The problem of the arrow of time. This has to be disentangled from the problem of irreversibility: a solution of the latter essentially excludes cyclic motions and is required for a solution of the former, which consists in showing that a fundamental direction between any two non-identical instants is physically meaningful. We give a formal definition of the arrow of time. This classical analysis is followed by a review of the problem of the arrow of time in quantum theory, where the situation becomes more complicated because of indeterminism. The discussion shows that there is no experimental evidence for a fundamental arrow of time, so that no contradiction with the relational concept of time arises. b) The problem of time measurement, which is of particular importance for the relational approach, in which time has no reality except if measured by a clock. In quantum theory useful time operators seem to be possible only within the more general formalism of positive operator valued measures (POVM). Clocks based on an oscillation mechanism do however require phase measurements; quantum phase operators can be defined as certain POVMs. Phase difference operators do also exist in the traditional Hilbert space formalism, if another quantization is used, as is done with relational quantization. c) The problem of quantum gravity is sketched only briefly. Chapter 3 introduces and discusses a model of Rovelli consisting of two oscillators with no external time. In this model one oscillator is considered as a clock and defines a relational time for the other one. In the first section we introduce this model and generalize it to a free massless scalar field in one dimension. We establish the relation between a single field mode and the infrared behaviour of the field through constants of motion. In the second section after a short review of canonical quantization we review Rovelli's quantization and generalize it to the free field. We could not prove the existence of the quantization map, but calculations using computer algebra indicate that the quantization does exist. For an enlarged algebra we are able to prove the nonexistence of a quantization map similar to a proof by Groenewold and van Hove. In chapter 4 we observe that a clock time always requires infinitely many degrees of freedom, and we make the hypothesis that a time observable is given by the infrared behaviour of quantum fields, leading to a classical notion of time when using algebraic quantum mechanics. This does however not solve the main problem of quantum relationalism: Which conditions determine a particular evolution?