Efficient multi-party computation with information-theoretic security

As far as we know, the literature on secure computation from cut-and-choose has focused on achieving computational security against malicious adversaries. It is unclear whether the idea of cut-and-choose can be adapted to secure computation with information-theoretic security. In this work we explore the possibility of using cut-and-choose in information theoretic setting for secure three-party computation (3PC). Previous work on 3PC has mainly focus on the semi-honest case, and is motivated by the observation that real-word deployments of multi-party computation (MPC) seem to involve few parties. We propose a new protocol for information-theoretically secure 3PC tolerating one malicious party with cheating probability $2^{-s}$ using $s$ runs of circuit computation in the cut-and-choose paradigm. The computational cost of our protocol is essentially only a small constant worse than that of state-of-the-art 3PC protocols against a semi-honest corruption, while its communication round is greatly reduced compared to other maliciously secure 3PC protocols in information-theoretic setting.As far as we know, the literature on secure computation from cut-and-choose has focused on achieving computational security against malicious adversaries. It is unclear whether the idea of cut-and-choose can be adapted to secure computation with information-theoretic security. In this work we explore the possibility of using cut-and-choose in information theoretic setting for secure three-party computation (3PC). Previous work on 3PC has mainly focus on the semi-honest case, and is motivated by the observation that real-word deployments of multi-party computation (MPC) seem to involve few parties. We propose a new protocol for information-theoretically secure 3PC tolerating one malicious party with cheating probability $2^{-s}$ using $s$ runs of circuit computation in the cut-and-choose paradigm. The computational cost of our protocol is essentially only a small constant worse than that of state-of-the-art 3PC protocols against a semi-honest corruption, while its communication round is greatly reduced compared to other maliciously secure 3PC protocols in information-theoretic setting.

arXiv:1908.03718Aug 10, 20191 citation

Fast and Secure Three-party Computation

Payman Mohassel, Mike Rosulek, Ye Zhang

Many deployments of secure multi-party computation (MPC) in practice have used information-theoretic three-party protocols that tolerate a single, semi-honest corrupt party, since these protocols enjoy very high efficiency. We propose a new approach for secure three-party computation (3PC) that improves security while maintaining practical efficiency that is competitive with traditional information-theoretic protocols. Our protocol is based on garbled circuits and provides security against a single, malicious corrupt party. Unlike information-theoretic 3PC protocols, ours uses a constant number of rounds. Our protocol only uses inexpensive symmetric-key cryptography: hash functions, block ciphers, pseudorandom generators (in particular, no oblivious transfers) and has performance that is comparable to that of Yao's (semi-honest) 2PC protocol.Many deployments of secure multi-party computation (MPC) in practice have used information-theoretic three-party protocols that tolerate a single, semi-honest corrupt party, since these protocols enjoy very high efficiency. We propose a new approach for secure three-party computation (3PC) that improves security while maintaining practical efficiency that is competitive with traditional information-theoretic protocols. Our protocol is based on garbled circuits and provides security against a single, malicious corrupt party. Unlike information-theoretic 3PC protocols, ours uses a constant number of rounds. Our protocol only uses inexpensive symmetric-key cryptography: hash functions, block ciphers, pseudorandom generators (in particular, no oblivious transfers) and has performance that is comparable to that of Yao's (semi-honest) 2PC protocol.

ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)Oct 6, 2015112 citations

Secure Multi-Party Computation: Theory, practice and applications

Chuan Zhao, Shengnan Zhao, Minghao Zhao +4 more

Information SciencesOct 16, 2018509 citations

2^{-s}

using

s

runs of circuit computation in the cut-and-choose paradigm. The computational cost of our protocol is essentially only a small constant worse than that of state-of-the-art 3PC protocols against a semi-honest corruption, while its communication round is greatly reduced compared to other maliciously secure 3PC protocols in information-theoretic setting.