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Boletim da Sociedade Paranaense de Matemática

Why quasi-sets?

Décio Krause

Published Jun 29, 2009• 12 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Quasi-set theory was developed to deal with collections of indistinguishable objects. In standard mathematics, there are no such kind of entities, for indistinguishability (agreement with respect to all properties) entails numerical identity. The main motivation underlying such a theory is of course quantum physics, for collections of indistinguishable (’identical’ in the physicists’ jargon) particles cannot be regarded as ’sets’ of standard set theories, which are collections of distinguishable objects. In this paper, a rationale for the development of such a theory is presented, motivated by Heinz Post’s claim that indistinguishability of quantum entities should be attributed ’right at the start’.

DOI
10.5269/bspm.v20i1-2.7524

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Quasi-set theory was developed to deal with collections of indistinguishable objects. In standard mathematics, there are no such kind of entities, for indistinguishability (agreement with respect to all properties) entails numerical identity. The main motivation underlying such a theory is of course quantum physics, for collections of indistinguishable (’identical’ in the physicists’ jargon) particles cannot be regarded as ’sets’ of standard set theories, which are collections of distinguishable objects. In this paper, a rationale for the development of such a theory is presented, motivated by Heinz Post’s claim that indistinguishability of quantum entities should be attributed ’right at the start’.
The topics of identity, individuality and indiscernibility had already entered the domain of the philosophy of physics, mainly in what respects the philosophy of quantum theories. In this paper, I present the main ideas of an underlying metaphysics that considers the basic entities of quantum physics as non-individuals, that is, as entities to which the standard theory of identity of classical logic and standard mathematics (set theory) does not apply. Two things must be emphasized: the first is that we pursue Erwin Schrödinger’s ideas that the notion of identity (or sameness ) does not apply to quantum things; the second is to follow Heinz Post’s claim that the non-individuality of quantum entities ‘must be introduced right at the start’ and not by taking individuals and making them pretend to be non-individuals ‘by hand’, say by confining them to non-rigid structures. Thus, this paper should be regarded as an attempt to justify the metaphysics of non-individuals and the logical systems that cope with them, although these systems are here only referred to. We also answer some criticisms that have been directed to such a view. The paper is directed to an audience of both physicists interested in foundations and philosophers of physics. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Identity, individuality and indistinguishability in physics and mathematics’.
Quantum theory is the land of indiscernible things, of things that in some situations cannot be put apart. This contrasts in much with standard mathematics and classical logic, which were elaborated to deal with \textit{individuals}, discernible things. Many thinkers, among them the mathematician Yuri Manin, have proposed that a more general theory of `sets' than standard set theories (where sets are collections of discernible elements) should be elaborated to cope with quantum physics. Quasi-set theory was proposed with such an aim. In this paper, we consider some aspects of this theory and discuss the way we can use such a theory as a framework for constructing deformable (not rigid) structures where indiscernible things can be considered but with one additional and fundamental detail: these structures cannot be extended to rigid structures as it happens in the standard frameworks. Really, the way of dealing with indiscernible (or indistinguishable) elements within a `standard' framework such as a `classical' set theory (like the ZFC system) requires the confinement of the discussion to deformable (non-rigid) structures. But in ZFC every structure can be extended to a rigid structure (encompassing only the trivial automorphism -- the identity function), so that in the extended structure (or in the whole universe) one can realize that the supposed indiscernible objects are not indiscernible at all. Quasi-set theory is such that the universe of quasi-sets is deformable and in such a theory one can construct deformable structures which cannot be extended to rigid ones. The aim of this paper is to put these things in a clear way.
Our aim in this paper is to take quite seriously Heinz Post’s claim that the non-individuality and the indiscernibility of quantum objects should be introduced right at the start, and not made a posteriori by introducing symmetry conditions. Using a different mathematical framework, namely, quasi-set theory, we avoid working within a labeltensor-product-vector-space-formalism, to use Redhead and Teller’s \nwords, and get a more intuitive way of dealing with the formalism of quantum mechanics, although the underlying logic should be modified. Thus, this paper can be regarded as a tentative to follow and enlarge Heinsenberg’s suggestion that new phenomena require the formation of a new “closed” (that is, axiomatic) theory, coping also with the physical theory’s underlying logic and mathematics.
In this work, we discuss a formal way of dealing with the properties of contextual systems. Our approach is to assume that properties describing the same physical quantity, but belonging to different measurement contexts, are indistinguishable in a strong sense. To construct the formal theoretical structure, we develop a description using quasi-set theory, which is a set-theoretical framework built to describe collections of elements that violate Leibnitz's principle of identity of indiscernibles. This framework allows us to consider a new ontology in order to study the properties of quantum systems. This article is part of the theme issue 'Contextuality and probability in quantum mechanics and beyond'.