Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Philosophy of Science

Fine's “Shaky Game” (And Why Noa is no Ark for Science)

Richard H. Schlagel

Published Jun 1, 1991• 5 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The primary title of this essay is derived from Arthur Fine's recent book, The Shaky Game (1986), which is a rephrasing of “risky game”, a term Einstein applied to the defenders of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, claiming that “‘most of them simply do not see what sort of risky game they are playing with reality‘” (Fine 1986, 2). Just as Einstein's term indicates his disagreement with this standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, Fine's term is being used to express disapproval of his interpretation of the philosophy of physics of Einstein and Bohr. The subtitle forecasts my evaluation of Fine's attempt in NOA (the “Natural Ontological Attitude”) to provide a satisfactory ontological basis of scientific inquiry.

DOI
10.1086/289618

Related papers

The Natural Ontological Attitude from a Physicist's Perspective: Towards Quantum Realism

Daniel James Robertson

The debate between Arthur Fine and Alan Musgrave is well known amongst those involved in the scientific realism debate and centres upon two papers that are quite often found together in philosophy of science anthologies. Reading them like this gives the very strong impression the Musgrave is the victor which is the commonly held view. In this thesis, I wish to overturn this view by placing Fine's paper in context, namely as part of a larger work on the history and philosophy of quantum physics. Fine's book, The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism and Quantum Theory, gives us good reason to believe that quantum physics significantly undermines the whole scientific realism debate, and as such, has strongly influenced Fine's development of the Natural Ontological Attitude, which is as Fine believes a middle ground between realism and anti-realism. The present thesis evaluates the Natural Ontological Attitude from a physicist's perspective and defends Fine against Musgrave's reply to the extent that it demonstrates that Musgrave would do well to read Fine's paper in context. That said, just as Fine in his youth hoped that a quantum realist position will one day be found, so I also possess this aspiration; and so, despite my concluding that Fine is justified in holding to NOA, I argue furthermore that NOA is but a precursor to a potential quantum structural realist position. After showing that structural realism is worthy of consideration by using it to counter Fine's objections to scientific realism, I analyse the results of quantum physics in an attempt to understand what it can tell us about reality in the quantum realm. Eliminativist Ontic Structural Realism holds great promise as a quantum realism contender, and as such, it inspired the questions regarding individuality and reality that are discussed in the final main chapter. I thus resuscitate hope that the cause of the quantum realist is not yet lost.

•Jan 1, 2011•1 citation

The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism and the Quantum Theory

Lewis Pyenson

Arthur Fine 1986 Chicago: University of Chicago Press xi + 186 pp price £21.25 ISBN 0 226 24946 8 The Shaky Game concentrates on Einstein's view of quantum mechanics, largely the matter of indeterminacy. Although the author wants to distance himself from recent unnamed French hermeneuts and exegetes, we see here precisely the shaky game identified by Lucien Febvre in 1928 – one where a commentator seeks to 'engender concepts from disincarnated minds which live their lives beyond time and space'.

Physics Bulletin•Jun 1, 1987•384 citations

The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism, and the Quantum Theory by Arthur Fine

R. I. G. Hughes

The Journal of Philosophy•Jan 1, 1991•1 citation

On What There Is according to Quantum mechanics

Brendan Kane

In this essay I make use of the resources of ‘naturalized ontology’ in order to determine what quantum mechanics implies about answers to fundamental metaphysical questions. Naturalized ontology is a methodology for metaphysics influenced by the philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine which makes explicit reference to our best scientific theories in order to answer questions which have traditionally been reckoned to belong solely to the realm of philosophy such as ‘What is the nature of reality in the most general sense?’ Quantum mechanics faces a unique interpretational problem known as the ‘measurement problem’ which makes determining the answer to such general metaphysical questions on this view especially problematic; nevertheless, naturalized ontology interprets and evaluates the various responses to this problem via measures of ‘theoretical virtue’, and ultimately concludes that the best interpretation of quantum mechanics—and thus reality—is absurd.

•Jan 1, 2015•0 citations

Quantum mechanics and the limits of empiricism

Christopher Norris

The measurement problem in quantum mechanics first cropped up during the 1930s during a famous series of debates between Einstein and Bohr concerning the physical adequacy – or ‘completeness’ – of the orthodox (Copenhagen) theory.1 As we have seen, it is a topic central to Hanson’s thinking not only with regard to quantum mechanics but also for its wider bearing on the scope and limits of scientific knowledge, the theory-laden character of observations, and the underdetermination of theory by evidence.2 Thus it is frequently adduced in support of his proto-Kuhnian claim that scientists working within different paradigms must be thought of as observing different things or inhabiting ‘different worlds’.3 What I propose to do now is look in more detail at the arguments surrounding this topic and, especially, at various proposals – from Einstein down – for a realist construal of the quantum data (i.e., the empirical measurement-results) that would offer an alternative to Hanson’s idea of the uncertainty principle as placing an absolute limit on our knowledge of objects and events in the microphysical domain. Having set out his arguments already in chapters 4 and 5, I shall not make any further detailed reference to Hanson’s work but assume that the reader who has come this far will have them clearly in mind. Thus my purpose in the remainder of this book is to raise the question: what becomes of the paradigm-relativist approach to issues in the history and philosophy of science if it derives so much of its suasive force from an interpretation of quantum mechanics that has proved increasingly open to challenge?

Routledge eBooks•Jun 2, 2004•0 citations

Conclusions

George Jaroszkiewicz

In the Preface to this book, we started with Alice and Bob having very different views of their observations. Alice used an optical telescope and reported nothing unusual about a distant galaxy that she could see. Bob, on the other hand, detected intense radio activity in that galaxy. Our question was: who has the true view of that galaxy? We advised the reader that the answer is not Alice . Neither is it Bob . The answer is not both of them , nor is it neither of them . It is not a trick question either. So what is the answer that this book would supply? Our answer will come presently. While this book has set forth a definite mathematical perspective on empirical physics, it has contained quite a lot of commentary that might be disparaged as metaphysics or philosophy. Such commentary is generally frowned on in science, because it has no empirical content. It is vacuous. In our defense, we point out the obvious: science is not a robotic activity; it is carried out by humans and these are driven by their metaphysical, philosophical, and emotional imperatives. For instance, the hard-core scientific view that quantum theory needs no interpretation but only application is itself a philosophy. It is no more than a conditioned response, based on opinion and subscription to current scientific norms. It is, indeed, a philosophy of how to do quantum mechanics. So we all do it, in one way or another. Our concern in this book is that the way that we do it should be based soundly on scientific principles. The quantized detector approach that we describe and use in this book is our attempt to do just that. There is an excellent paper on all of this that has the provocative title “Quantum Theory Needs No Interpretation,” by Fuchs and Peres (2000). It seems on the face of it to dismiss any sort of “interpretation” of quantum mechanics. In fact, close reading of it confirms (to us at least) the agenda that we have set out in this book. Yes, quantum mechanics needs no interpretation, when it is being applied to processes that take place in the information void .

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Nov 28, 2017•0 citations
The primary title of this essay is derived from Arthur Fine's recent book, The Shaky Game (1986), which is a rephrasing of “risky game”, a term Einstein applied to the defenders of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, claiming that “‘most of them simply do not see what sort of risky game they are playing with reality‘” (Fine 1986, 2). Just as Einstein's term indicates his disagreement with this standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, Fine's term is being used to express disapproval of his interpretation of the philosophy of physics of Einstein and Bohr. The subtitle forecasts my evaluation of Fine's attempt in NOA (the “Natural Ontological Attitude”) to provide a satisfactory ontological basis of scientific inquiry.
The debate between Arthur Fine and Alan Musgrave is well known amongst those involved in the scientific realism debate and centres upon two papers that are quite often found together in philosophy of science anthologies. Reading them like this gives the very strong impression the Musgrave is the victor which is the commonly held view. In this thesis, I wish to overturn this view by placing Fine's paper in context, namely as part of a larger work on the history and philosophy of quantum physics. Fine's book, The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism and Quantum Theory, gives us good reason to believe that quantum physics significantly undermines the whole scientific realism debate, and as such, has strongly influenced Fine's development of the Natural Ontological Attitude, which is as Fine believes a middle ground between realism and anti-realism. The present thesis evaluates the Natural Ontological Attitude from a physicist's perspective and defends Fine against Musgrave's reply to the extent that it demonstrates that Musgrave would do well to read Fine's paper in context. That said, just as Fine in his youth hoped that a quantum realist position will one day be found, so I also possess this aspiration; and so, despite my concluding that Fine is justified in holding to NOA, I argue furthermore that NOA is but a precursor to a potential quantum structural realist position. After showing that structural realism is worthy of consideration by using it to counter Fine's objections to scientific realism, I analyse the results of quantum physics in an attempt to understand what it can tell us about reality in the quantum realm. Eliminativist Ontic Structural Realism holds great promise as a quantum realism contender, and as such, it inspired the questions regarding individuality and reality that are discussed in the final main chapter. I thus resuscitate hope that the cause of the quantum realist is not yet lost.
Arthur Fine 1986 Chicago: University of Chicago Press xi + 186 pp price £21.25 ISBN 0 226 24946 8 The Shaky Game concentrates on Einstein's view of quantum mechanics, largely the matter of indeterminacy. Although the author wants to distance himself from recent unnamed French hermeneuts and exegetes, we see here precisely the shaky game identified by Lucien Febvre in 1928 – one where a commentator seeks to 'engender concepts from disincarnated minds which live their lives beyond time and space'.
In this essay I make use of the resources of ‘naturalized ontology’ in order to determine what quantum mechanics implies about answers to fundamental metaphysical questions. Naturalized ontology is a methodology for metaphysics influenced by the philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine which makes explicit reference to our best scientific theories in order to answer questions which have traditionally been reckoned to belong solely to the realm of philosophy such as ‘What is the nature of reality in the most general sense?’ Quantum mechanics faces a unique interpretational problem known as the ‘measurement problem’ which makes determining the answer to such general metaphysical questions on this view especially problematic; nevertheless, naturalized ontology interprets and evaluates the various responses to this problem via measures of ‘theoretical virtue’, and ultimately concludes that the best interpretation of quantum mechanics—and thus reality—is absurd.
The measurement problem in quantum mechanics first cropped up during the 1930s during a famous series of debates between Einstein and Bohr concerning the physical adequacy – or ‘completeness’ – of the orthodox (Copenhagen) theory.1 As we have seen, it is a topic central to Hanson’s thinking not only with regard to quantum mechanics but also for its wider bearing on the scope and limits of scientific knowledge, the theory-laden character of observations, and the underdetermination of theory by evidence.2 Thus it is frequently adduced in support of his proto-Kuhnian claim that scientists working within different paradigms must be thought of as observing different things or inhabiting ‘different worlds’.3 What I propose to do now is look in more detail at the arguments surrounding this topic and, especially, at various proposals – from Einstein down – for a realist construal of the quantum data (i.e., the empirical measurement-results) that would offer an alternative to Hanson’s idea of the uncertainty principle as placing an absolute limit on our knowledge of objects and events in the microphysical domain. Having set out his arguments already in chapters 4 and 5, I shall not make any further detailed reference to Hanson’s work but assume that the reader who has come this far will have them clearly in mind. Thus my purpose in the remainder of this book is to raise the question: what becomes of the paradigm-relativist approach to issues in the history and philosophy of science if it derives so much of its suasive force from an interpretation of quantum mechanics that has proved increasingly open to challenge?
In the Preface to this book, we started with Alice and Bob having very different views of their observations. Alice used an optical telescope and reported nothing unusual about a distant galaxy that she could see. Bob, on the other hand, detected intense radio activity in that galaxy. Our question was: who has the true view of that galaxy? We advised the reader that the answer is not Alice . Neither is it Bob . The answer is not both of them , nor is it neither of them . It is not a trick question either. So what is the answer that this book would supply? Our answer will come presently. While this book has set forth a definite mathematical perspective on empirical physics, it has contained quite a lot of commentary that might be disparaged as metaphysics or philosophy. Such commentary is generally frowned on in science, because it has no empirical content. It is vacuous. In our defense, we point out the obvious: science is not a robotic activity; it is carried out by humans and these are driven by their metaphysical, philosophical, and emotional imperatives. For instance, the hard-core scientific view that quantum theory needs no interpretation but only application is itself a philosophy. It is no more than a conditioned response, based on opinion and subscription to current scientific norms. It is, indeed, a philosophy of how to do quantum mechanics. So we all do it, in one way or another. Our concern in this book is that the way that we do it should be based soundly on scientific principles. The quantized detector approach that we describe and use in this book is our attempt to do just that. There is an excellent paper on all of this that has the provocative title “Quantum Theory Needs No Interpretation,” by Fuchs and Peres (2000). It seems on the face of it to dismiss any sort of “interpretation” of quantum mechanics. In fact, close reading of it confirms (to us at least) the agenda that we have set out in this book. Yes, quantum mechanics needs no interpretation, when it is being applied to processes that take place in the information void .