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IFIP advances in information and communication technology

Cryptographic key distribution and authentication protocols for secure group communication

Andrew C. M. Hutchison, Kurt Bauknecht

Published Jan 1, 1996• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-1-5041-2919-0_46

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Authenticated group key agreement is an important cryptographic mechanism underlying many collaborative and distributed applications. Some identity-based authenticated group key agreement schemes are proposed, however most of these protocols are vulnerable to insider attacks, while the other protocols are not efficient in communication. In this paper a new authenticated group key agreement protocol is proposed based on a modified identity-based cryptography infrastructure with new system setup and key extraction algorithms. The main feature of this protocol is that it needs only one round, which is optimal in terms of communication complexity; meanwhile the protocol is secure against insider attacks such as impersonation attacks and other known attacks.
Protocols for group key exchange are cryptographic algorithms that allow a group of parties communicating over a public network to come up with a common secret key. One of the interesting results of research on group key exchange is the protocol compiler presented by Abdalla et al. in TCC ’07. Abdalla et al.’s compiler shows how one can transform any authenticated 2-party key exchange protocol into an authenticated group key exchange protocol with 2 more rounds of communication. This compiler certainly is elegant in its genericness, sym-metricity, simplicity and efficiency. However, the situation completely changes when it comes to security. In this work, we reveal a major security weakness in Abdalla et al.’s compiler and show how to address it. The security weakness uncovered here implies that Abdalla et al.’s proof of security for their compiler is invalid.
In a distributed wireless communication network,authenticated key agreement protocol is critical to the secure sessions between communication parties,and much attention is paid to formal theories of cryptographic protocol analysis. A Mutually-Authenticated Key Establish Protocol(AKEP) based on entity authentication with elliptic curve cryptography is proposed,which could provide data confidentiality of exchanged information between Server and client via symmetric cryptography. The security of the protocol is verified by SVO logic.