The Source of Uncertainty in Probabilistic Preferences Over Gambles

Diederik Aerts, Sandro Sozzo

G. Charles-Cadogan

Peter D. Kvam, Jerome R. Busemeyer, Timothy Joseph Pleskac

The decision process is often conceptualized as a constructive process in which a decision maker accumulates information to form preferences about the choice options and ultimately make a response. Here we examine how these constructive processes unfold by tracking dynamic changes in preference strength. Across two experiments, we observed that mean preference strength systematically oscillated over time and found that eliciting a choice early in time strongly affected the pattern of preference oscillation later in time. Preferences following choices oscillated between being stronger than those without prior choice and being weaker than those without choice. To account for these phenomena, we develop an open system dynamic model which merges the dynamics of Markov random walk processes with those of quantum walk processes. This model incorporates two sources of uncertainty: epistemic uncertainty about what preference state a decision maker has at a particular point in time; and ontic uncertainty about what decision or judgment will be observed when a person has some preference state. Representing these two sources of uncertainty allows the model to account for the oscillations in preference as well as the effect of choice on preference formation.

Emmanuel E. Haven, Sandro Sozzo

Polina Khrennikova, Emmanuel E. Haven

Politics is regarded as a vital area of social science and strongly relies on the assumptions of voters’ rationality and as such the stability of preferences (at least in decisions that are made simultaneously). The phenomenon of divided government that has dominated the US political arena for many election periods over the last 40 years is not consistent with the notion of stable preferences of voters. The authors claim that there is no well defined ranking of their preferences on their utility function of “political preferences.” Recently, this problem has been handled by using the novel approach based on the formalism of quantum mechanics. The theory of quantum decision-making is applicable to the modeling of irrational and biased behavior of voters as well as to the nonseparability of their preferences. Irrationality, biases, and nonseparability lead to a deeper uncertainty than classical probabilistic uncertainty. In particular, quantum probability describes well the violation of Bayesian rationality. The authors model this nonclassical uncertainty in voters’ preferences by using elements of the fundamental quantum information structures such as superposition and entanglement. The chapter is an introduction to the quantum modeling of the behavior of an electorate with unstable preferences (contextual preferences) and the authors use one of the most potent theories of adaptive dynamics, namely, the theory of open quantum systems. In this model a voter’s decision is created in the process of interaction with an information bath in which the mass media play the key role. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Emmanuel M. Pothos, Richard M. Shiffrin, Jerome R. Busemeyer