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Vulnerability to ciphertext-only attack of optical encryption scheme based on double random phase encoding

Xiaoli Liu, Jiachen Wu, Wenqi He, Meihua Liao, Chenggong Zhang, Xiang Peng

Published Jul 14, 2015• 107 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We demonstrate in this paper that the traditional double random phase encoding (DRPE) technique is vulnerable to ciphertext-only attack (COA). In this method, an unauthorized user (or say attacker) is assumed to be able to retrieve the corresponding plaintext from the only ciphertext under some certain condition. The proposed scheme mainly relies on a hybrid iterative phase retrieval (HIPR) algorithm, which combines various phase retrieval algorithms. With an estimation of the number of nonzero pixels (NNP) in the original plaintext, an attacker could recover the plaintext in a large extent. The simulation results show that this method is feasible and validate.

DOI
10.1364/oe.23.018955

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Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering/Proceedings of SPIE•Feb 10, 2017•1 citation

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In this paper, a special ciphertext-only attack (COA) scenario to the traditional double random phase encoding (DRPE) technique is proposed based on plaintext shifting. We assume the attacker can illegally manipulate the DRPE system to gain multiple ciphertexts from randomly shifted versions of the same plaintext. The plaintext image can be recovered when our proposed scenario is combined with a speckle correlation attacking method proposed in previous work. Simulation results demonstrate that our proposed scheme can successfully crack the DRPE system even when the speckle correlation method alone fails to work in the conventional single ciphertext scenario due to the small size of the plaintext image. The work in this paper reveals a severe security flaw of DRPE systems when minor position shifting of the plaintext occurs.

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Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering/Proceedings of SPIE•Aug 10, 2011•2 citations
We demonstrate in this paper that the traditional double random phase encoding (DRPE) technique is vulnerable to ciphertext-only attack (COA). In this method, an unauthorized user (or say attacker) is assumed to be able to retrieve the corresponding plaintext from the only ciphertext under some certain condition. The proposed scheme mainly relies on a hybrid iterative phase retrieval (HIPR) algorithm, which combines various phase retrieval algorithms. With an estimation of the number of nonzero pixels (NNP) in the original plaintext, an attacker could recover the plaintext in a large extent. The simulation results show that this method is feasible and validate.
The speckle correlation technique is applied to ciphertext-only attack (COA) on optical cryptosystem based on double random phase encoding. According to the inherent merits of speckle correlation, we have revealed a fact that the ciphertext’s autocorrelation is essentially identical to the plaintext’s own autocorrelation. Then, a plaintext image can be directly reconstructed from the autocorrelation of its corresponding ciphertext by employing a iterate phase-retrieval algorithm. This could then lead to a potential security flaw because an unauthorized user could directly retrieve the plaintext from an intercepted ciphertext by performing proposed COA approach. Meanwhile, a series of numerical simulations will also be provided to verify the validity and feasibility of our proposed COA method.
In this paper, a special ciphertext-only attack (COA) scenario to the traditional double random phase encoding (DRPE) technique is proposed based on plaintext shifting. We assume the attacker can illegally manipulate the DRPE system to gain multiple ciphertexts from randomly shifted versions of the same plaintext. The plaintext image can be recovered when our proposed scenario is combined with a speckle correlation attacking method proposed in previous work. Simulation results demonstrate that our proposed scheme can successfully crack the DRPE system even when the speckle correlation method alone fails to work in the conventional single ciphertext scenario due to the small size of the plaintext image. The work in this paper reveals a severe security flaw of DRPE systems when minor position shifting of the plaintext occurs.
Security analysis of optical encryption system based on double random phase encoding indicates that the system can be classified as a linear symmetric block-cipher cryptosystem, which may lead to a great vulnerability. Under the ciphertext-only attack (COA), an opponent can attack such a cryptosystem only on the basis of estimated support of wave function in the object plane with iterative phase retrieval methods, and subsequently deduce the phase keys in the Fourier plane easily. The ciphertext-only attack (COA) requires much less resources than other types of attacks. Estimated support of wave function in the object plane could have some translations relative to the true support, so retrieved wave function could also have translations in both the amplitude and the phase, leading to a translation of retrieved plaintext relative to original plaintext. However, attackers can take this translation as a priori knowledge to traverse estimated support in the object plane until finding the best estimated keys, which bring about the best decryption quality.
Classical double-random phase encoding (C-DRPE) is an optical symmetric-key encryption technique. C-DRPE is reported to be vulnerable to a known-plaintext attack (KPA) that uses a phase retrieval algorithm. However, although phase-only DRPE (PO-DRPE) is reported to be more resistant to KPAs than C-DRPE, it is not obvious yet that PO-DRPE is sufficiently resistant to a KPA under any condition, because the vulnerability to KPA varies depending on various factors, such as the number of the known plaintext-ciphertext pairs that are given for the KPA, or the gray level of the known-plaintext image (i.e., binary or multivalued image). In this paper, we investigate the resistance of C-DRPE and PO-DRPE to KPA under various conditions related to the number of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs and to the gray level of the known-plaintext image.
Abstract Background: The double random phase encoding techniques have received considerable attention from researchers in recent years because of its advantages of parallel and high speed processing capability. Meanwhile, the security of cryptosystem is also one of the major concerns. Methods : We experimentally demonstrated the ciphertext redundancy vulnerability of the coherent double random encryption system (DRPE). Based on the statistical ergodicity of speckles and the consistency of the power spectral density (ESD), we have proved that the most plaintext information can be retrieved from partial ciphertext alone. Results: In this paper, the simulation and experiment result were performed to verify whether the algorithm is effectiveness. The ciphertext redundancy of the DRPE system is analyzed from the results of ciphertext occlusion test. There is a risk of plaintext leakage of this scheme, as long as the average ESD can be estimated from the sub-images. The results will help to open up deeper understanding of limitation of current optical security techniques. Conclusions: The DRPE system has potential redundancy risk. Even one-time-pad manner is not secured in DRPE system. This vulnerability allows a cryptanalyst to estimate the plaintext information with only a half or less ciphertext.
Double Random Phase Encoding (DRPE), which is a typical optical encryption technique, has been reported to be vulnerable to Known Plaintext-Attacks (KPAs) using a Phase Retrieval Algorithm (PRA). But the reported case in which the encryption key is successfully estimated was that the plain image was rather simple such as the image of a character. In addition, although Phase Only DRPE (PO-DRPE) was proposed to achieve more resistance to the KPA than Complex DRPE (C-DRPE) in which both amplitude and phase components are used as an encrypted image, no quantitative results about the relationship between the vulnerability and the plaintext image. In this paper, we show the result of quantitative analysis on KPA by PRA to C-DRPE and PO-DRPE, for the plaintext images of different characteristics. As a result of experiment, KPA to C-DRPE succeeded to estimate the correct key while the probability of success became lower when the number of non-zero pixel increases in the plaintext image. However, KPA to PO-DRPE enabled to estimate only "singular" keys, which are effective for no more than given plaintext/ciphertext image pair and far different from the correct encryption key. We also conducted KPA using two plaintext-ciphertext image pairs for KPA. In the case when two plaintext-ciphertext image pairs were given to KPA, the cryptanalysis succeeded with higher probability than the case of one. Moreover, the probability of success in the KPA was high even in PO-DRPE.