Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

IET Information Security

Unified security model of authenticated key exchange with specific adversarial capabilities

Weiqiang Wen, Libin Wang, Jiaxin Pan

Published Jul 22, 2015• 8 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The most widely accepted models in the security proofs of authenticated key exchange protocols are the Canetti–Krawczyk (CK) and extended CK models that admit different adversarial queries with ambiguities and incomparable strength. It is desirable to incorporate specific and powerful adversarial queries into a single unified security model and establish a more practical oriented security notion. Concerning the security of one‐round implicitly authenticated Diffie–Hellman (DH) key exchange protocols, the authors present a unified security model that has many advantages over the previous ones. In the model, a system environment is set up, all of adversarial queries are practically interpreted and definitely characterised through physical environment, and some rigorous rules of secret leakage are also specified. To demonstrate usability of their model, a new protocol based on the OAKE protocol is proposed, which satisfies the presented strong security notion and attains high efficiency. The protocol is proven secure in random oracle model under gap DH assumption.

DOI
10.1049/iet-ifs.2014.0234

Related papers

A practical strongly secure one‐round authenticated key exchange protocol without random oracles

Zheng Yang, Yang Wu

Abstract Most recently, a variant of extended Canetti–Krawczyk model called aseCKwis introduced to provide stronger security than previous eCK models. NamelyeCKwmodels formulate a stronger notion regarding weak perfect forward secrecy than other eCK models. In particular, anyeCKwsecure protocols can be generally transformed to achieve full provide perfect forward secrecy without requiring additional round. So far, there is no protocol which has been proven secure in theeCKwmodel without random oracles. In this paper, we study the open problem on constructingeCKwsecure AKE protocol in the standard model. A new one‐round AKE protocol is introduced relying on standard cryptographic primitives and a variant of bilinear decisional Diffie–Hellman assumption. The main advantage of our proposal is its high efficiency in key exchange in contrast to the previous eCK secure protocols without random oracles and under post‐specified peer setting. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Security and Communication Networks•Sep 9, 2014•3 citations

Strongly Secure Identity-based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol

Jian Shu

Recently,LaMacchia et al.proposed the extended Canetti-Krawczyk(eCK) model,which captures all security properties of authenticated key enchange protocols.Most of existing identity-based authenticated key exchange protocols are not secure in the eCK model.This paper proposes an identity-based authenticated key exchange protocol,and the security of proposed protocol can be proved in the eCK model.When compaer with other schemes,the proposed protocol achieves efficiency in terms of computation and communication.The proposal achieve strong security,and can be proved under the random oracle assumption and the Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.

Journal of Chinese Computer Systems•Jan 1, 2011•0 citations

Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol in the Standard Model under Weaker Assumptions

Janaka Alawatugoda

A two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol allows each of the two parties to share a common secret key over insecure channels, even in the presence of active adversaries who can actively control and modify the exchanged messages. To capture the malicious behaviors of the adversaries, there have been many efforts to define security models. Amongst them, the extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) security model is considered one of the strongest security models and has been widely adopted. In this paper, we present a simple construction of a pairing-based eCK-secure AKE protocol in the standard model. Our protocol can be instantiated with a suitable signature scheme (i.e., an existentially unforgeable signature scheme against adaptive chosen message attacks). The underlying assumptions of our construction are the decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption and the existence of a pseudorandom function. Note that the previous eCK-secure protocol constructions either relied on random oracles for their security or used somewhat strong assumptions, such as the existence of strong-pseudorandom functions, target collision-resistant functions, etc., while our protocol construction uses fewer and more-standard assumptions in the standard model. Furthermore, preserving the same security argument, our protocol can be instantiated with any appropriate signature scheme that comes in the future with better efficiency.

Cryptography•Jan 5, 2023•2 citations

A New Efficient and Strongly Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol

Qingfeng Cheng, Guangguo Han, Chuangui Ma

In 2007, LaMacchia et al.proposed the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model for authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols. In this paper, we first modify the eCK model by adding a new query to make the adversary can reveal all ephemeral secret information. Then we propose a new efficient and strongly secure AKE protocol in the asymmetric setting, called E-NETS (enhanced NETS) protocol, and prove its security in the modified eCK (meCK) model under the random oracle assumption and the gap Diffie-Hellman assumption.

International Conference on Information Assurance and Security (IAS)•Jan 1, 2009•7 citations

Strongly-secure and Efficient Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol

Jinyue Xia

This paper presents an Authenticated Key Exchange(AKE) protocol,named AKE-1.Compared with previous protocols,the proposal is more efficient and proven to be safe in newly enhanced Canetti-Krawczyk(eCK07) model under the random oracle assumption and the Computational Diffie-Hellman(CDH) assumption.It uses a technique named trapdoor test,recently proposed by Cash,Kiltz and Shoup.In addition,it presents a one-pass variant(for only one entity on line) and three-pass variant(providing key confirmation) of AKE-1 for different applications.

Jisuanji gongcheng•Jan 1, 2010•0 citations

An efficient strongly secure authenticated key exchange protocol without random oracles

Zheng Yang

Abstract Since the introduction of extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) security model for two‐party key exchange, many protocols have been proposed to provide eCK security. However, most of those protocols are provably secure in the random oracle model or rely on special design technique, which is well known as the NAXOS trick. In contrast to previous schemes, we present an eCK secure protocol in the standard model, without NAXOS trick and without knowledge of secret key assumption for public key registration. The security proof of our scheme is based on standard pairing assumption, collision‐resistant hash functions, Bilinear Decision Diffie–Hellman and Decision Linear Diffie–Hellman assumptions, and pseudo‐random functions with pairwise independent random source. Although our proposed protocol is based on bilinear groups, it does not require any pairing operation during key exchange procedure. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Security and Communication Networks•Aug 28, 2014•0 citations
The most widely accepted models in the security proofs of authenticated key exchange protocols are the Canetti–Krawczyk (CK) and extended CK models that admit different adversarial queries with ambiguities and incomparable strength. It is desirable to incorporate specific and powerful adversarial queries into a single unified security model and establish a more practical oriented security notion. Concerning the security of one‐round implicitly authenticated Diffie–Hellman (DH) key exchange protocols, the authors present a unified security model that has many advantages over the previous ones. In the model, a system environment is set up, all of adversarial queries are practically interpreted and definitely characterised through physical environment, and some rigorous rules of secret leakage are also specified. To demonstrate usability of their model, a new protocol based on the OAKE protocol is proposed, which satisfies the presented strong security notion and attains high efficiency. The protocol is proven secure in random oracle model under gap DH assumption.
Abstract Most recently, a variant of extended Canetti–Krawczyk model called aseCKwis introduced to provide stronger security than previous eCK models. NamelyeCKwmodels formulate a stronger notion regarding weak perfect forward secrecy than other eCK models. In particular, anyeCKwsecure protocols can be generally transformed to achieve full provide perfect forward secrecy without requiring additional round. So far, there is no protocol which has been proven secure in theeCKwmodel without random oracles. In this paper, we study the open problem on constructingeCKwsecure AKE protocol in the standard model. A new one‐round AKE protocol is introduced relying on standard cryptographic primitives and a variant of bilinear decisional Diffie–Hellman assumption. The main advantage of our proposal is its high efficiency in key exchange in contrast to the previous eCK secure protocols without random oracles and under post‐specified peer setting. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Recently,LaMacchia et al.proposed the extended Canetti-Krawczyk(eCK) model,which captures all security properties of authenticated key enchange protocols.Most of existing identity-based authenticated key exchange protocols are not secure in the eCK model.This paper proposes an identity-based authenticated key exchange protocol,and the security of proposed protocol can be proved in the eCK model.When compaer with other schemes,the proposed protocol achieves efficiency in terms of computation and communication.The proposal achieve strong security,and can be proved under the random oracle assumption and the Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.
A two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol allows each of the two parties to share a common secret key over insecure channels, even in the presence of active adversaries who can actively control and modify the exchanged messages. To capture the malicious behaviors of the adversaries, there have been many efforts to define security models. Amongst them, the extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) security model is considered one of the strongest security models and has been widely adopted. In this paper, we present a simple construction of a pairing-based eCK-secure AKE protocol in the standard model. Our protocol can be instantiated with a suitable signature scheme (i.e., an existentially unforgeable signature scheme against adaptive chosen message attacks). The underlying assumptions of our construction are the decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption and the existence of a pseudorandom function. Note that the previous eCK-secure protocol constructions either relied on random oracles for their security or used somewhat strong assumptions, such as the existence of strong-pseudorandom functions, target collision-resistant functions, etc., while our protocol construction uses fewer and more-standard assumptions in the standard model. Furthermore, preserving the same security argument, our protocol can be instantiated with any appropriate signature scheme that comes in the future with better efficiency.
In 2007, LaMacchia et al.proposed the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model for authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols. In this paper, we first modify the eCK model by adding a new query to make the adversary can reveal all ephemeral secret information. Then we propose a new efficient and strongly secure AKE protocol in the asymmetric setting, called E-NETS (enhanced NETS) protocol, and prove its security in the modified eCK (meCK) model under the random oracle assumption and the gap Diffie-Hellman assumption.
This paper presents an Authenticated Key Exchange(AKE) protocol,named AKE-1.Compared with previous protocols,the proposal is more efficient and proven to be safe in newly enhanced Canetti-Krawczyk(eCK07) model under the random oracle assumption and the Computational Diffie-Hellman(CDH) assumption.It uses a technique named trapdoor test,recently proposed by Cash,Kiltz and Shoup.In addition,it presents a one-pass variant(for only one entity on line) and three-pass variant(providing key confirmation) of AKE-1 for different applications.
Abstract Since the introduction of extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) security model for two‐party key exchange, many protocols have been proposed to provide eCK security. However, most of those protocols are provably secure in the random oracle model or rely on special design technique, which is well known as the NAXOS trick. In contrast to previous schemes, we present an eCK secure protocol in the standard model, without NAXOS trick and without knowledge of secret key assumption for public key registration. The security proof of our scheme is based on standard pairing assumption, collision‐resistant hash functions, Bilinear Decision Diffie–Hellman and Decision Linear Diffie–Hellman assumptions, and pseudo‐random functions with pairwise independent random source. Although our proposed protocol is based on bilinear groups, it does not require any pairing operation during key exchange procedure. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.