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Communications in Theoretical Physics

Counterfactual Quantum Deterministic Key Distribution

Sheng Zhang, Jian Wang, Chaojing Tang

Published Jan 1, 2013• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We propose a new counterfactual quantum cryptography protocol concerning about distributing a deterministic key. By adding a controlled blocking operation module to the original protocol [T.G. Noh, Phys. Rev. Lett. 103 (2009) 230501 ], the correlation between the polarizations of the two parties, Alice and Bob, is extended, therefore, one can distribute both deterministic keys and random ones using our protocol. We have also given a simple proof of the security of our protocol using the technique we ever applied to the original protocol. Most importantly, our analysis produces a bound tighter than the existing ones.

DOI
10.1088/0253-6102/59/1/06

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We propose a new counterfactual quantum cryptography protocol concerning about distributing a deterministic key. By adding a controlled blocking operation module to the original protocol [T.G. Noh, Phys. Rev. Lett. 103 (2009) 230501 ], the correlation between the polarizations of the two parties, Alice and Bob, is extended, therefore, one can distribute both deterministic keys and random ones using our protocol. We have also given a simple proof of the security of our protocol using the technique we ever applied to the original protocol. Most importantly, our analysis produces a bound tighter than the existing ones.
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Recently, a ``counterfactual'' quantum-key-distribution scheme was proposed by T.-G. Noh [Phys. Rev. Lett. 103, 230501 (2009)]. In this scheme, two legitimate distant peers may share secret keys even when the information carriers are not traveled in the quantum channel. We find that this protocol is equivalent to an entanglement distillation protocol. According to this equivalence, a strict security proof and the asymptotic key bit rate are both obtained when a perfect single-photon source is applied and a Trojan horse attack can be detected. We also find that the security of this scheme is strongly related to not only the bit error rate but also the yields of photons. And our security proof may shed light on the security of other two-way protocols.
In counterfactual quantum key distribution (QKD), two remote parties can share a secure \nsecret random key even without transmission of a physical particle (a non-vacuum pulse) through the \nchannel. A QKD scheme is proposed which is counterfactual in one of the bits, and in which the secret bits \nare not encoded in the polarization, but in the joint action of Alice and Bob. On the conceptual level, our \nscheme throws new light on the origin of security in counterfactual cryptography. On the practical side, \nnon-polarization encoding makes it robust against certain trojan horse attacks. We study the the general \nphoton-number preserving incoherent attack in detail.
Recently, counterfactual quantum cryptography proposed by T. G. Noh [Phys. Rev. Lett. 103, 230501 (2009)] becomes an interesting direction in quantum cryptography, and has been realized by some researchers (such as Y. Liu et al's [Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 030501 (2012)]). However, we find out that it is insecure in practical high lossy channel setting. We analyze the secret key rates in lossy channel under a polarization-splitting-measurement attack. Analysis indicates that the protocol is insecure when the loss rate of the one-way channel exceeds 5050%50.
Secure key distribution between two remote parties is impossible when both are classical, unless some unproven (and arguably unrealistic) computation-complexity assumptions are made, such as the difficulty of factorizing large numbers. On the other hand, a secure key distribution is possible when both parties are quantum. What is possible when only one party (Alice) is quantum, yet the other (Bob) has only classical capabilities? Recently, a semiquantum key distribution protocol was presented [M. Boyer, D. Kenigsberg, and T. Mor, Phys. Rev. Lett. 99, 140501 (2007)], in which one of the parties (Bob) is classical, and yet, the protocol is proven to be completely robust against an eavesdropping attempt. Here we extend that result much further. We present two protocols with this constraint and prove their complete robustness against attacks: we prove that any attempt of an adversary to obtain information (and even a tiny amount of information) necessarily induces some errors that the legitimate parties could notice. One protocol presented here is identical to the one referred to above; however, its robustness is proven here in a much more general scenario. The other protocol is very different as it is based on randomization.