Investigations of Fully Homomorphic Encryption (IFHE)

Nigel Paul Smart

Published May 1, 2015• 2 citations

Abstract

Abstract : The IFHE project Investigation of Fully Homomorphic Encryption) originally set out to examine the security of FHE schemes, and the lattice hard problems on which they are based. This turned out to be relatively difficult, mainly due to the complexity of building software libraries which could support the advanced mathematics needed to perform experiments on modern multi-core processors. For example the NTL library is now (2015) able to support multi - threaded applications, but only if used with bleeding edge compilers on the latest Intel hardware. Thus the initial plan was perhaps a little ahead of its time. However, by leveraging additional sources of funding; most notably from the UKs EPSRC and the EUs ERC, the Bristol team was able to make substantial headway in other areas related to the PROCEED program which were not originally envisaged. These are centred around; General techniques for Fully Homomorphic Encryption Practical methods for actively secure Multi -Party Computation General theory behind Multi -Party Computation. This report documents the progress made by the Bristol team.

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