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Practical Quantum Communication

Juan Miguel Arrazola

Published Oct 30, 2015• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Current communication networks are based on classical physics and classical information-processing. However, for nearly a century, we have known that at its most fundamental level, the universe is governed by the laws of quantum mechanics. With quantum communication, new possibilities arise in our capabilities to transmit and process information which, in many cases, lead to advantages compared to what is classically possible. The entire scope of tasks for which quantum communication can offer improvements has not yet been fully explored, but several quantum protocols are known that can either perform tasks which are impossible with classical resources or can outperform classical protocols. These quantum protocols are well understood from a theoretical point of view, but many of them have never been demonstrated in practice. Thus, in the context of quantum communication, there is a significant gap between theory and experiment that must be removed in order to harness the advantages provided by quantum mechanics in a practical setting. \n \nIn this thesis, we develop a series of tools for developing and testing practical quantum communication protocols. Our main technique is a theoretical reformulation of existing quantum communication protocols that converts them into a form in which they can be demonstrated with existing experimental techniques. More precisely, they can be implemented using only coherent states of light and linear optics circuits while still retaining the crucial properties of the original abstract protocols. We use this result to construct practical protocols for the Hidden Matching problem and quantum fingerprinting. \n \n \nIn the case of quantum fingerprinting, we make a thorough analysis of the role played by experimental errors and show that our practical protocol can still be implemented in the presence of these imperfections. In fact, we report a proof of concept experimental demonstration of a quantum fingerprinting system that is capable of transmitting less information than the best known classical protocol for this problem. Our implementation is based on a modified version of a commercial quantum key distribution system using off-the-shelf optical components over telecom wavelengths, and is practical for messages as large as 100 Mbits, even in the presence of experimental imperfections. \n \nSimilarly, in the context of cryptography, we propose a multiparty quantum signature protocol that can be implemented from any point-to-point quantum key distribution network, proving its security against forging, repudiation and non-transferability. Crucially, since quantum key distribution is already a practical technology, so is this protocol. However, unlike other tasks in quantum communication, there has not been significant theoretical work on establishing a security model for quantum signature schemes. Consequently, we also constructed a security framework for these schemes and proved several properties that these protocols must satisfy in order to achieve their security goals. \n \nFinally, in addition to proposing new practical protocols, we provide a reliable data analysis technique to verify an important property of many quantum communication protocols: the presence of entanglement. Our technique is based on entanglement witnesses and it does not require the specification of a prior distribution nor the assumption of independent measurements. The technique is suitable to be used with nonlinear entanglement witnesses, which we show can be constructed from any linear witness and evaluated from the same experimental data. We also develop numerical tools necessary to employ this approach in practice, rendering the procedure ready to be applied to current experiments. We demonstrate this by analyzing the data of a photonic experiment generating two-photon states whose entanglement is verified with the use of an accessible nonlinear witness.

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Experimental quantum fingerprinting with weak coherent pulses

Feihu Xu, Juan Miguel Arrazola, Kejin Wei +6 more

Quantum communication holds the promise of creating disruptive technologies that will play an essential role in future communication networks. For example, the study of quantum communication complexity has shown that quantum communication allows exponential reductions in the information that must be transmitted to solve distributed computational tasks. Recently, protocols that realize this advantage using optical implementations have been proposed. Here we report a proof-of-concept experimental demonstration of a quantum fingerprinting system that is capable of transmitting less information than the best-known classical protocol. Our implementation is based on a modified version of a commercial quantum key distribution system using off-the-shelf optical components over telecom wavelengths, and is practical for messages as large as 100 Mbits, even in the presence of experimental imperfections. Our results provide a first step in the development of experimental quantum communication complexity.

arXiv:1503.05499•Nature Communications•Oct 30, 2015•81 citations

Multiparty quantum signature schemes

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Digital signatures are widely used in electronic communications to secure important tasks such as financial transactions, software updates, and legal contracts. The signature schemes that are in use today are based on public-key cryptography and derive their security from computational assumptions. However, it is possible to construct unconditionally secure signature protocols. In particular, using quantum communication, it is possible to construct signature schemes with security based on fundamental principles of quantum mechanics. Several quantum signature protocols have been proposed, but none of them has been explicitly generalised to more than three participants, and their security goals have not been formally defined. Here, we first extend the security definitions of Swanson and Stinson [1] so that they can apply also to the quantum case, and introduce a formal definition of transferability based on different verification levels. We then prove several properties that multiparty signature protocols with informationtheoretic security – quantum or classical – must satisfy in order to achieve their security goals. We also express two existing quantum signature protocols with three parties in the security framework we have introduced. Finally, we generalize a quantum signature protocol given in [2] to the multiparty case, proving its security against forging, repudiation and non-transferability. Notably, this protocol can be implemented using any pointto-point quantum key distribution network and therefore is ready to be experimentally demonstrated.

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Currently, theoretical and experimental work in the field of quantum cryptography is being carried out in many research centers around the world. Over the past two decades since the start of active research, many quantum cryptographic protocols have been proposed, a significant number of laboratory experiments have been performed on their practical implementation, important work has been done to prove the resistance of the proposed protocols to certain types of attacks, and the first commercial quantum key distribution systems have been developed. However, there are still many tasks and problems in the field of quantum cryptography, the solution of which is of great scientific and technical importance. So, in particular, such a promising direction as quantum protocols for direct secure communication requires further development, allowing, under certain conditions, to transfer secret information without encryption, both between two and between a large number of users. Currently, such protocols have been developed using two-and three-particle entangled states, but there are almost no similar protocols with entangled states of a larger number of qubits that do not require large quantum memory for their implementation and, at the same time, have a large information capacity. Therefore, the development of new quantum direct secure communication protocols with increased information capacity, the analysis of their resistance to attacks, as well as the determination of the best protocols according to the criteria of resistance and information capacity.

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On Experimental Quantum Communication and Cryptography

Chris Erven

One of the most fascinating recent developments in research has been how different disciplines have become more and more interconnected. So much so that fields as disparate as information theory and fundamental physics have combined to produce ideas for the next generation of computing and secure information technologies, both of which have far reaching consequences. For more than fifty years Moore's law, which describes the trend of the transistor's size shrinking by half every two years, has proven to be uncannily accurate. However, the computing industry is now approaching a fundamental barrier as the size of a transistor approaches that of an individual atom and the laws of physics and quantum mechanics take over. Rather then look at this as the end, quantum information science has emerged to ask the question of what additional power and functionality might be realized by harnessing some of these quantum effects. This thesis presents work on the sub-field of quantum cryptography which seeks to use quantum means in order to assure the security of ones communications. The beauty of quantum cryptographic methods are that they can be proven secure, now and indefinitely into the future, relying solely on the validity of the laws of physics for their proofs of security. This is something which is impossible for nearly all current classical cryptographic methods to claim. \n \nThe thesis begins by examining the first implementation of an entangled quantum key distribution system over two free-space optical links. This system represents the first test-bed of its kind in the world and while its practical importance in terrestrial applications is limited to a smaller university or corporate campus, the system mimics the setup for an entangled satellite system aiding in the study of distributing entangled photons from an orbiting satellite to two earthbound receivers. Having completed the construction of a second free-space link and the automation of the alignment system, I securely distribute keys to Alice and Bob in two distant locations separated by 1,575 m with no direct line-of-sight between them. I examine all of the assumptions necessary for my claims of security, something which is particularly important for moving these systems out of the lab and into commercial industry. I then go on to describe the free-space channel over which the photons are sent and the implementation of each of the major system components. I close with a discussion of the experiment which saw raw detected entangled photon rates of 565 s^{-1} and a quantum bit error rate (QBER) of 4.92% resulting in a final secure key rate of 85 bits/s. Over the six hour night time experiment I was able to generate 1,612,239 bits of secure key. \n \nWith a successful QKD experiment completed, this thesis then turns to the problem of improving the technology to make it more practical by increasing the key rate of the system and thus the speed at which it can securely encrypt information. It does so in three different ways, involving each of the major disciplines comprising the system: measurement hardware, source technology, and software post-processing. First, I experimentally investigate a theoretical proposal for biasing the measurement bases in the QKD system showing a 79% improvement in the secret key generated from the same raw key rates. Next, I construct a second generation entangled photon source with rates two orders of magnitude higher than the previous source using the idea of a Sagnac interferometer. More importantly, the new source has a QBER as low as 0.93% which is not only important for the security of the QKD system but will be required for the implementation of a new cryptographic primitive later. Lastly, I study the free-space link transmission statistics and the use of a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) filter to improve the key rate by 25.2% from the same amount of raw key. The link statistics have particular relevance for a current project with the Canadian Space Agency to exchange a quantum key with an orbiting satellite - a project which I have participated in two feasibility studies for. \n \nWanting to study the usefulness of more recent ideas in quantum cryptography this thesis then looks at the first experimental implementation of a new cryptographic primitive called oblivious transfer (OT) in the noisy storage model. This primitive has obvious important applications as it can be used to implement a secure identification scheme provably secure in a quantum scenario. Such a scheme could one day be used, for example, to authenticate a user over short distances, such as at ATM machines, which have proven to be particularly vulnerable to hacking and fraud. Over a four hour experiment, Alice and Bob measure 405,642,088 entangled photon pairs with an average QBER of 0.93% allowing them to create a secure OT key of 8,939,150 bits. As a first implementer, I examine many of the pressing issues currently preventing the scheme from being more widely adopted such as the need to relax the dependance of the OT rate on the loss of the system and the need to extend the security proof to cover a wider range of quantum communication channels and memories. It is important to note that OT is fundamentally different than QKD for security as the information is never physically exchanged over the communication line but rather the joint equality function f(x) = f(y) is evaluated. Thus, security in QKD does not imply security for OT. \n \nFinally, this thesis concludes with the construction and initial alignment of a second generation free-space quantum receiver, useful for increasing the QKD key rates, but designed for a fundamental test of quantum theory namely a Svetlichny inequality violation. Svetlichny's inequality is a generalization of Bell's inequality to three particles where any two of the three particles maybe be non-locally correlated. Even so, a violation of Svetlichny's inequality shows that certain quantum mechanical states are incompatible with this restricted class of non-local yet realistic theories. Svetlichny's inequality is particularly important because while there has been an overwhelming number of Bell experiments performed testing two-body correlations, experiments on many-body systems have been few and far between. Experiments of this type are particularly valuable to explore since we live in a many-body world. The new receiver incorporates an active polarization analyzer capable of switching between measurement bases on a microsecond time-scale through the use of a Pockels cell while maintaining measurements of a high fidelity. Some of the initial alignment and analysis results are detailed including the final measured contrasts of 1:25.2 and 1:22.6 in the rectilinear and diagonal bases respectively.

•Mar 29, 2012•4 citations

Practical security of quantum cryptography

Lars Lydersen

The peculiar properties of quantum mechanics enable possibilities not allowed by classical physics. In particular, two parties can generate a random, secret key at a distance, even though an eavesdropper can do anything permitted by the laws of physics. Measuring the quantum properties of the signals generating the key, would ultimately change them, and thus reveal the eavesdropper’s presence. This exchange of a random, secret key is known as quantum cryptography.\n\nQuantum cryptography can be, and has been proven unconditionally secure using perfect devices. However, when quantum cryptography is implemented, one must use components available with current technology. These are usually imperfect. Although the security of quantum cryptography has been proven for components with certain imperfections, the question remains: can quantum cryptography be implemented in a provable, unconditionally secure way, using components available with current technology? This thesis contains both a theoretical, and an experimental contribution to the answer of this question. On the experimental side, components used in, and complete quantum cryptography systems have been carefully examined for security loopholes. In particular, it turned out that two commercial quantum cryptography systems contained loopholes, which would allow an eavesdropper to capture the full secret key, without exposing her presence. Furthermore, this detector control attack could be implemented with current technology. The attack is applicable against a variety of quantum cryptography implementations and protocols.\n\nThe theoretical contribution consists of security proofs for quantum cryptography in a very general setting. Precisely, the security is proven with arbitrary individual imperfections in the source and detectors. These proofs should make it possible to use a wide array of imperfect devices in implementations of quantum cryptography.\n\nFinally, a secure detection scheme is proposed, immune to the detector control attack and compatible with those security proofs. Therefore, if this scheme is implemented correctly, it offers provable security.

•Jan 1, 2011•4 citations

Security Evaluation of Practical Quantum Communication Systems

Shihan Sajeed

Modern information and communication technology (ICT), including internet, smart phones, cloud computing, global positioning system, e-commerce, e-Health, global communications and internet of things (IoT), all rely fundamentally - for identification, authentication, confidentiality and confidence - on cryptography. However, there is a high chance that most modern cryptography protocols will be annihilated upon the arrival of quantum computers. This necessitates taking steps for making the current ICT systems secure against quantum computers. The task is a huge and time-consuming task and there is a serious probability that quantum computers will arrive before it is complete. Hence, it is of utmost importance to understand the risk and start planning for the solution now. \n \nAt this moment, there are two potential paths that lead to solution. One is the path of post-quantum cryptography: inventing classical cryptographic algorithms that are secure against quantum attacks. Although they are hoped to provide security against quantum attacks for most situations in practice, there is no mathematical proof to guarantee unconditional security (`unconditional security' is a technical term that means security is not dependent on a computational hardness assumption). This has driven many to choose the second path: quantum cryptography (QC). \n \nQuantum cryptography - utilizing the power of quantum mechanics - can guarantee unconditional security in theory. However, in practice, device behavior varies from the modeled behavior, leading to side-channels that can be exploited by an adversary to compromise security. Thus, practical QC systems need to be security evaluated - i.e., scrutinized and tested for possible vulnerabilities - before they are sold to customers or deployed in large scale. Unfortunately, this task has become more and more demanding as QC systems are being built in various style, variants and forms at different parts of the globe. Hence, standardization and certification of security evaluation methods are necessary. Also, a number of compatibility, connectivity and interoperability issues among the QC systems require standardization and certification which makes it an issue of highest priority. \n \n \nIn this thesis, several areas of practical quantum communication systems were scrutinized and tested for the purpose of standardization and certification. At the source side, the calibration mechanism of the outgoing mean photon number - a critical parameter for security - was investigated. As a prototype, the pulse-energy-monitoring system (PEMS) implemented in a commercial quantum key distribution (QKD) machine was chosen and the design validity was tested. It was found that the security of PEMS was based on flawed design logic and conservative assumptions on Eve's ability. Our results pointed out the limitations of closed security standards developed inside a company and highlighted the need for developing - for security - open standards and testing methodologies in collaboration between research and industry. \n \nAs my second project, I evaluated the security of the free space QKD receiver prototype designed for long-distance satellite communication. The existence of spatial-mode-efficiency-mismatch side-channel was experimentally verified and the attack feasibility was tested. The work identified a methodology for checking the spatial-mode-detector-efficiency mismatch in these types of receivers and showed a simple, implementable countermeasure to block this side-channel. \n \nNext, the feasibility of laser damage as a potential tool for eavesdropping was investigated. After testing on two different quantum communication systems, it was confirmed that laser damage has a high chance of compromising the security of a QC system. This work showed that a characterized and side-channel free system does not always mean secure; as side-channels can be created on demand. The result pointed out that the standardization and certification process must consider laser-damage related security critical issues and ensure that it is prevented. \n \nFinally, the security proof assumptions of the detector-device-independent QKD (ddiQKD) protocol - that restricted the ability of an eavesdropper - was scrutinized. By introducing several eavesdropping schemes, we showed that ddiQKD security cannot be based on post selected entanglement. Our results pointed out that testing the validity of assumptions are equally important as testing hardware for the standardization and certification process. \n \nSeveral other projects were undertaken including security evaluation of a QKD system against long wavelength Trojan-horse attack, certifying a countermeasure against a particular attack, analyzing the effects of finite-key-size and imperfect state preparation in a commercial QKD system, and experimental demonstration of quantum fingerprinting. All of these works are parts of an iterative process for standardization and certification that a new technology - in this case, quantum cryptography- must go through before being able to supersede the old technology - classical cryptography. I expect that after few more iterations like the ones outlined in this thesis, security of practical QC will advance to a state to be called unconditional and the technology will truly be able to win the trust to be deployed on large scale.

•Sep 29, 2017•1 citation
Current communication networks are based on classical physics and classical information-processing. However, for nearly a century, we have known that at its most fundamental level, the universe is governed by the laws of quantum mechanics. With quantum communication, new possibilities arise in our capabilities to transmit and process information which, in many cases, lead to advantages compared to what is classically possible. The entire scope of tasks for which quantum communication can offer improvements has not yet been fully explored, but several quantum protocols are known that can either perform tasks which are impossible with classical resources or can outperform classical protocols. These quantum protocols are well understood from a theoretical point of view, but many of them have never been demonstrated in practice. Thus, in the context of quantum communication, there is a significant gap between theory and experiment that must be removed in order to harness the advantages provided by quantum mechanics in a practical setting. \n \nIn this thesis, we develop a series of tools for developing and testing practical quantum communication protocols. Our main technique is a theoretical reformulation of existing quantum communication protocols that converts them into a form in which they can be demonstrated with existing experimental techniques. More precisely, they can be implemented using only coherent states of light and linear optics circuits while still retaining the crucial properties of the original abstract protocols. We use this result to construct practical protocols for the Hidden Matching problem and quantum fingerprinting. \n \n \nIn the case of quantum fingerprinting, we make a thorough analysis of the role played by experimental errors and show that our practical protocol can still be implemented in the presence of these imperfections. In fact, we report a proof of concept experimental demonstration of a quantum fingerprinting system that is capable of transmitting less information than the best known classical protocol for this problem. Our implementation is based on a modified version of a commercial quantum key distribution system using off-the-shelf optical components over telecom wavelengths, and is practical for messages as large as 100 Mbits, even in the presence of experimental imperfections. \n \nSimilarly, in the context of cryptography, we propose a multiparty quantum signature protocol that can be implemented from any point-to-point quantum key distribution network, proving its security against forging, repudiation and non-transferability. Crucially, since quantum key distribution is already a practical technology, so is this protocol. However, unlike other tasks in quantum communication, there has not been significant theoretical work on establishing a security model for quantum signature schemes. Consequently, we also constructed a security framework for these schemes and proved several properties that these protocols must satisfy in order to achieve their security goals. \n \nFinally, in addition to proposing new practical protocols, we provide a reliable data analysis technique to verify an important property of many quantum communication protocols: the presence of entanglement. Our technique is based on entanglement witnesses and it does not require the specification of a prior distribution nor the assumption of independent measurements. The technique is suitable to be used with nonlinear entanglement witnesses, which we show can be constructed from any linear witness and evaluated from the same experimental data. We also develop numerical tools necessary to employ this approach in practice, rendering the procedure ready to be applied to current experiments. We demonstrate this by analyzing the data of a photonic experiment generating two-photon states whose entanglement is verified with the use of an accessible nonlinear witness.
Quantum communication holds the promise of creating disruptive technologies that will play an essential role in future communication networks. For example, the study of quantum communication complexity has shown that quantum communication allows exponential reductions in the information that must be transmitted to solve distributed computational tasks. Recently, protocols that realize this advantage using optical implementations have been proposed. Here we report a proof-of-concept experimental demonstration of a quantum fingerprinting system that is capable of transmitting less information than the best-known classical protocol. Our implementation is based on a modified version of a commercial quantum key distribution system using off-the-shelf optical components over telecom wavelengths, and is practical for messages as large as 100 Mbits, even in the presence of experimental imperfections. Our results provide a first step in the development of experimental quantum communication complexity.
Digital signatures are widely used in electronic communications to secure important tasks such as financial transactions, software updates, and legal contracts. The signature schemes that are in use today are based on public-key cryptography and derive their security from computational assumptions. However, it is possible to construct unconditionally secure signature protocols. In particular, using quantum communication, it is possible to construct signature schemes with security based on fundamental principles of quantum mechanics. Several quantum signature protocols have been proposed, but none of them has been explicitly generalised to more than three participants, and their security goals have not been formally defined. Here, we first extend the security definitions of Swanson and Stinson [1] so that they can apply also to the quantum case, and introduce a formal definition of transferability based on different verification levels. We then prove several properties that multiparty signature protocols with informationtheoretic security – quantum or classical – must satisfy in order to achieve their security goals. We also express two existing quantum signature protocols with three parties in the security framework we have introduced. Finally, we generalize a quantum signature protocol given in [2] to the multiparty case, proving its security against forging, repudiation and non-transferability. Notably, this protocol can be implemented using any pointto-point quantum key distribution network and therefore is ready to be experimentally demonstrated.
Currently, theoretical and experimental work in the field of quantum cryptography is being carried out in many research centers around the world. Over the past two decades since the start of active research, many quantum cryptographic protocols have been proposed, a significant number of laboratory experiments have been performed on their practical implementation, important work has been done to prove the resistance of the proposed protocols to certain types of attacks, and the first commercial quantum key distribution systems have been developed. However, there are still many tasks and problems in the field of quantum cryptography, the solution of which is of great scientific and technical importance. So, in particular, such a promising direction as quantum protocols for direct secure communication requires further development, allowing, under certain conditions, to transfer secret information without encryption, both between two and between a large number of users. Currently, such protocols have been developed using two-and three-particle entangled states, but there are almost no similar protocols with entangled states of a larger number of qubits that do not require large quantum memory for their implementation and, at the same time, have a large information capacity. Therefore, the development of new quantum direct secure communication protocols with increased information capacity, the analysis of their resistance to attacks, as well as the determination of the best protocols according to the criteria of resistance and information capacity.
One of the most fascinating recent developments in research has been how different disciplines have become more and more interconnected. So much so that fields as disparate as information theory and fundamental physics have combined to produce ideas for the next generation of computing and secure information technologies, both of which have far reaching consequences. For more than fifty years Moore's law, which describes the trend of the transistor's size shrinking by half every two years, has proven to be uncannily accurate. However, the computing industry is now approaching a fundamental barrier as the size of a transistor approaches that of an individual atom and the laws of physics and quantum mechanics take over. Rather then look at this as the end, quantum information science has emerged to ask the question of what additional power and functionality might be realized by harnessing some of these quantum effects. This thesis presents work on the sub-field of quantum cryptography which seeks to use quantum means in order to assure the security of ones communications. The beauty of quantum cryptographic methods are that they can be proven secure, now and indefinitely into the future, relying solely on the validity of the laws of physics for their proofs of security. This is something which is impossible for nearly all current classical cryptographic methods to claim. \n \nThe thesis begins by examining the first implementation of an entangled quantum key distribution system over two free-space optical links. This system represents the first test-bed of its kind in the world and while its practical importance in terrestrial applications is limited to a smaller university or corporate campus, the system mimics the setup for an entangled satellite system aiding in the study of distributing entangled photons from an orbiting satellite to two earthbound receivers. Having completed the construction of a second free-space link and the automation of the alignment system, I securely distribute keys to Alice and Bob in two distant locations separated by 1,575 m with no direct line-of-sight between them. I examine all of the assumptions necessary for my claims of security, something which is particularly important for moving these systems out of the lab and into commercial industry. I then go on to describe the free-space channel over which the photons are sent and the implementation of each of the major system components. I close with a discussion of the experiment which saw raw detected entangled photon rates of 565 s^{-1} and a quantum bit error rate (QBER) of 4.92% resulting in a final secure key rate of 85 bits/s. Over the six hour night time experiment I was able to generate 1,612,239 bits of secure key. \n \nWith a successful QKD experiment completed, this thesis then turns to the problem of improving the technology to make it more practical by increasing the key rate of the system and thus the speed at which it can securely encrypt information. It does so in three different ways, involving each of the major disciplines comprising the system: measurement hardware, source technology, and software post-processing. First, I experimentally investigate a theoretical proposal for biasing the measurement bases in the QKD system showing a 79% improvement in the secret key generated from the same raw key rates. Next, I construct a second generation entangled photon source with rates two orders of magnitude higher than the previous source using the idea of a Sagnac interferometer. More importantly, the new source has a QBER as low as 0.93% which is not only important for the security of the QKD system but will be required for the implementation of a new cryptographic primitive later. Lastly, I study the free-space link transmission statistics and the use of a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) filter to improve the key rate by 25.2% from the same amount of raw key. The link statistics have particular relevance for a current project with the Canadian Space Agency to exchange a quantum key with an orbiting satellite - a project which I have participated in two feasibility studies for. \n \nWanting to study the usefulness of more recent ideas in quantum cryptography this thesis then looks at the first experimental implementation of a new cryptographic primitive called oblivious transfer (OT) in the noisy storage model. This primitive has obvious important applications as it can be used to implement a secure identification scheme provably secure in a quantum scenario. Such a scheme could one day be used, for example, to authenticate a user over short distances, such as at ATM machines, which have proven to be particularly vulnerable to hacking and fraud. Over a four hour experiment, Alice and Bob measure 405,642,088 entangled photon pairs with an average QBER of 0.93% allowing them to create a secure OT key of 8,939,150 bits. As a first implementer, I examine many of the pressing issues currently preventing the scheme from being more widely adopted such as the need to relax the dependance of the OT rate on the loss of the system and the need to extend the security proof to cover a wider range of quantum communication channels and memories. It is important to note that OT is fundamentally different than QKD for security as the information is never physically exchanged over the communication line but rather the joint equality function f(x) = f(y) is evaluated. Thus, security in QKD does not imply security for OT. \n \nFinally, this thesis concludes with the construction and initial alignment of a second generation free-space quantum receiver, useful for increasing the QKD key rates, but designed for a fundamental test of quantum theory namely a Svetlichny inequality violation. Svetlichny's inequality is a generalization of Bell's inequality to three particles where any two of the three particles maybe be non-locally correlated. Even so, a violation of Svetlichny's inequality shows that certain quantum mechanical states are incompatible with this restricted class of non-local yet realistic theories. Svetlichny's inequality is particularly important because while there has been an overwhelming number of Bell experiments performed testing two-body correlations, experiments on many-body systems have been few and far between. Experiments of this type are particularly valuable to explore since we live in a many-body world. The new receiver incorporates an active polarization analyzer capable of switching between measurement bases on a microsecond time-scale through the use of a Pockels cell while maintaining measurements of a high fidelity. Some of the initial alignment and analysis results are detailed including the final measured contrasts of 1:25.2 and 1:22.6 in the rectilinear and diagonal bases respectively.
The peculiar properties of quantum mechanics enable possibilities not allowed by classical physics. In particular, two parties can generate a random, secret key at a distance, even though an eavesdropper can do anything permitted by the laws of physics. Measuring the quantum properties of the signals generating the key, would ultimately change them, and thus reveal the eavesdropper’s presence. This exchange of a random, secret key is known as quantum cryptography.\n\nQuantum cryptography can be, and has been proven unconditionally secure using perfect devices. However, when quantum cryptography is implemented, one must use components available with current technology. These are usually imperfect. Although the security of quantum cryptography has been proven for components with certain imperfections, the question remains: can quantum cryptography be implemented in a provable, unconditionally secure way, using components available with current technology? This thesis contains both a theoretical, and an experimental contribution to the answer of this question. On the experimental side, components used in, and complete quantum cryptography systems have been carefully examined for security loopholes. In particular, it turned out that two commercial quantum cryptography systems contained loopholes, which would allow an eavesdropper to capture the full secret key, without exposing her presence. Furthermore, this detector control attack could be implemented with current technology. The attack is applicable against a variety of quantum cryptography implementations and protocols.\n\nThe theoretical contribution consists of security proofs for quantum cryptography in a very general setting. Precisely, the security is proven with arbitrary individual imperfections in the source and detectors. These proofs should make it possible to use a wide array of imperfect devices in implementations of quantum cryptography.\n\nFinally, a secure detection scheme is proposed, immune to the detector control attack and compatible with those security proofs. Therefore, if this scheme is implemented correctly, it offers provable security.
Modern information and communication technology (ICT), including internet, smart phones, cloud computing, global positioning system, e-commerce, e-Health, global communications and internet of things (IoT), all rely fundamentally - for identification, authentication, confidentiality and confidence - on cryptography. However, there is a high chance that most modern cryptography protocols will be annihilated upon the arrival of quantum computers. This necessitates taking steps for making the current ICT systems secure against quantum computers. The task is a huge and time-consuming task and there is a serious probability that quantum computers will arrive before it is complete. Hence, it is of utmost importance to understand the risk and start planning for the solution now. \n \nAt this moment, there are two potential paths that lead to solution. One is the path of post-quantum cryptography: inventing classical cryptographic algorithms that are secure against quantum attacks. Although they are hoped to provide security against quantum attacks for most situations in practice, there is no mathematical proof to guarantee unconditional security (`unconditional security' is a technical term that means security is not dependent on a computational hardness assumption). This has driven many to choose the second path: quantum cryptography (QC). \n \nQuantum cryptography - utilizing the power of quantum mechanics - can guarantee unconditional security in theory. However, in practice, device behavior varies from the modeled behavior, leading to side-channels that can be exploited by an adversary to compromise security. Thus, practical QC systems need to be security evaluated - i.e., scrutinized and tested for possible vulnerabilities - before they are sold to customers or deployed in large scale. Unfortunately, this task has become more and more demanding as QC systems are being built in various style, variants and forms at different parts of the globe. Hence, standardization and certification of security evaluation methods are necessary. Also, a number of compatibility, connectivity and interoperability issues among the QC systems require standardization and certification which makes it an issue of highest priority. \n \n \nIn this thesis, several areas of practical quantum communication systems were scrutinized and tested for the purpose of standardization and certification. At the source side, the calibration mechanism of the outgoing mean photon number - a critical parameter for security - was investigated. As a prototype, the pulse-energy-monitoring system (PEMS) implemented in a commercial quantum key distribution (QKD) machine was chosen and the design validity was tested. It was found that the security of PEMS was based on flawed design logic and conservative assumptions on Eve's ability. Our results pointed out the limitations of closed security standards developed inside a company and highlighted the need for developing - for security - open standards and testing methodologies in collaboration between research and industry. \n \nAs my second project, I evaluated the security of the free space QKD receiver prototype designed for long-distance satellite communication. The existence of spatial-mode-efficiency-mismatch side-channel was experimentally verified and the attack feasibility was tested. The work identified a methodology for checking the spatial-mode-detector-efficiency mismatch in these types of receivers and showed a simple, implementable countermeasure to block this side-channel. \n \nNext, the feasibility of laser damage as a potential tool for eavesdropping was investigated. After testing on two different quantum communication systems, it was confirmed that laser damage has a high chance of compromising the security of a QC system. This work showed that a characterized and side-channel free system does not always mean secure; as side-channels can be created on demand. The result pointed out that the standardization and certification process must consider laser-damage related security critical issues and ensure that it is prevented. \n \nFinally, the security proof assumptions of the detector-device-independent QKD (ddiQKD) protocol - that restricted the ability of an eavesdropper - was scrutinized. By introducing several eavesdropping schemes, we showed that ddiQKD security cannot be based on post selected entanglement. Our results pointed out that testing the validity of assumptions are equally important as testing hardware for the standardization and certification process. \n \nSeveral other projects were undertaken including security evaluation of a QKD system against long wavelength Trojan-horse attack, certifying a countermeasure against a particular attack, analyzing the effects of finite-key-size and imperfect state preparation in a commercial QKD system, and experimental demonstration of quantum fingerprinting. All of these works are parts of an iterative process for standardization and certification that a new technology - in this case, quantum cryptography- must go through before being able to supersede the old technology - classical cryptography. I expect that after few more iterations like the ones outlined in this thesis, security of practical QC will advance to a state to be called unconditional and the technology will truly be able to win the trust to be deployed on large scale.