The paper deals with the characterization of conditions able to decide whether some set of observed probabilities admits a representation within a classical Kolmogorovian model. The conditions proposed in the sixties by J. Bell, which are violated in quantum contexts, are discussed in more general frames.
Bell-type inequalities, used in mathematical physics as a criterion to check whether a physical situation allows description in terms of classical (Kolmogorovian) or quantum probability calculus are applied to various fuzzy probability models. It occurs that the standard set of Bell-type inequalities does not allow to distinguish Kolmogorovian probabilities from fuzzy probabilities based on the most frequently used Zadeh intersection or probabilistic intersection, but it allows to distinguish all these models from fuzzy probability models based on Giles (Łukasiewicz) intersection. It is proved that if we use fuzzy set intersections pointwisely generated by Frank's fundamental triangular norms Ts(x,y), then the borderline between fuzzy probability models that can be distinguished from Kolmogorovian ones and these fuzzy probability models that cannot be distinguished is for .
Bell-type inequalities, used in mathematical physics as a criterion to check whether a physical situation allows description in terms of classical (Kolmogorovian) or quantum probability calculus are applied to various fuzzy probability models. It occurs that the standard set of Bell-type inequalities does not allow to distinguish Kolmogorovian probabilities from fuzzy probabilities based on the most frequently used Zadeh intersection or probabilistic intersection, but it allows to distinguish all these models from fuzzy probability models based on Giles (Łukasiewicz) intersection. It is proved that if we use fuzzy set intersections pointwisely generated by Frank's fundamental triangular norms Ts(x,y), then the borderline between fuzzy probability models that can be distinguished from Kolmogorovian ones and these fuzzy probability models that cannot be distinguished is for [Formula: see text].
Most scholars maintain that quantum mechanics (QM) is a contextual theory and that quantum probability does not allow for an epistemic (ignorance) interpretation. By inquiring possible connections between contextuality and non-classical probabilities we show that a class TμMP of theories can be selected in which probabilities are introduced as classical averages of Kolmogorovian probabilities over sets of (microscopic) contexts, which endows them with an epistemic interpretation. The conditions characterizing TμMP are compatible with classical mechanics (CM), statistical mechanics (SM), and QM, hence we assume that these theories belong to TμMP. In the case of CM and SM, this assumption is irrelevant, as all of the notions introduced in them as members of TμMP reduce to standard notions. In the case of QM, it leads to interpret quantum probability as a derived notion in a Kolmogorovian framework, explains why it is non-Kolmogorovian, and provides it with an epistemic interpretation. These results were anticipated in a previous paper, but they are obtained here in a general framework without referring to individual objects, which shows that they hold, even if only a minimal (statistical) interpretation of QM is adopted in order to avoid the problems following from the standard quantum theory of measurement.