Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Boston studies in the philosophy of science

Did They Just Misunderstood Each Other? Logical Empiricists and Bohr’s Complementarity Argument

Ulrich Röseberg

Published Jan 1, 1995• 4 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-94-017-2658-0_6

Related papers

Bohr's Early Complementarity Argument

Makoto Katumori

Historia scientiarum. Second series : international journal of the History of Science Society of Japan•Aug 28, 1998•0 citations

Bohr’s Como Argument: Complementarity and the Problem of Causality

Arkady Plotnitsky

Springer eBooks•Aug 3, 2009•2 citations

Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, an Empiricist Approach

Willem M. de Muynck

xi 4.5.24.5.3The double-slit experiment The microscope 4.6 Meaning of the 'complementarity' concept 4.6.1 4.6.24.6.34.6.44.6.5 4.6.6 4.6.7 Two meanings of 'to determine' Heisenberg's disturbance theory of measurement Complementarity according to Bohr Particle-wave duality Parallel and circular complementarity Complementarity and the projection postulate Complementarity and consciousness 4.7 Critique of the complementarity principle Einstein Margenau Ballentine Recent developments Complementarity and empiricist interpretation The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen problem 6 Individual-particle and ensemble interpretations of quantum mechanics 275 6.

•Jan 1, 2004•111 citations

Bohr’s Framework of Complementarity and the Realism Debate

Henry J. Folse

Boston studies in the philosophy of science•Jan 1, 1994•18 citations

From Como to Copenhagen: The Beginnings and Ends of Complementarity

Arkady Plotnitsky, Guillaume Adenier, Andrei Yu. Khrennikov +3 more

This paper examines the transformation of Bohr's interpretation of quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, known as complementarity, from the version presented in his famous Como lecture (1927), which introduced complementarity, to a new version that was developed by Bohr shortly thereafter, in part under the impact of his intervening exchanges with Einstein. While the existence of more than one version of Bohr's complementarity (and of still different versions of the Copenhagen interpretation by others) has been noted, Bohr's rethinking itself of complementarity has rarely been adequately addressed. Apart from refining and indeed correcting the Como argument, the transformation in question was, I argue, defined by a shift from a more philosophical to a more experimental argument. My aim is to explore both this shift and the complexity of the relationships between physics and philosophy in Bohr's thinking in order to understand better the beginnings and the ends, also in the sense of aims, of Bohr's complementarity.

AIP conference proceedings•Jan 1, 2007•0 citations

Bohr’s Complementarity and Kant’s Epistemology

Michel Bitbol, S. Osnaghi

Progress in mathematical physics•Jan 1, 2016•18 citations
xi 4.5.24.5.3The double-slit experiment The microscope 4.6 Meaning of the 'complementarity' concept 4.6.1 4.6.24.6.34.6.44.6.5 4.6.6 4.6.7 Two meanings of 'to determine' Heisenberg's disturbance theory of measurement Complementarity according to Bohr Particle-wave duality Parallel and circular complementarity Complementarity and the projection postulate Complementarity and consciousness 4.7 Critique of the complementarity principle Einstein Margenau Ballentine Recent developments Complementarity and empiricist interpretation The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen problem 6 Individual-particle and ensemble interpretations of quantum mechanics 275 6.
This paper examines the transformation of Bohr's interpretation of quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, known as complementarity, from the version presented in his famous Como lecture (1927), which introduced complementarity, to a new version that was developed by Bohr shortly thereafter, in part under the impact of his intervening exchanges with Einstein. While the existence of more than one version of Bohr's complementarity (and of still different versions of the Copenhagen interpretation by others) has been noted, Bohr's rethinking itself of complementarity has rarely been adequately addressed. Apart from refining and indeed correcting the Como argument, the transformation in question was, I argue, defined by a shift from a more philosophical to a more experimental argument. My aim is to explore both this shift and the complexity of the relationships between physics and philosophy in Bohr's thinking in order to understand better the beginnings and the ends, also in the sense of aims, of Bohr's complementarity.