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International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Security (CIS)

Provably Secure Certificateless Two-Party Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol without Pairing

Manman Geng, Futai Zhang

Published Jan 1, 2009• 45 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Key agreement is one of the fundamental cryptographic primitives in public key cryptography. So far several certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement (CL-T-AKA) protocols have been proposed. However, all these protocols are based on bilinear map and most of them are without formal security proof. In this paper, we present a new formal security model of CL-T-AKA protocols and bring forward the first two-party key agreement protocol without the computation of expensive bilinear map. Our protocol is secure under the security model assuming the Gap-DH problem is intractable. With respect to efficiency, our protocol requires a single round of communication in which each party sends only one group element, and needs only five modular exponentiation computations. In addition, we point out that an existing certificateless two-party key agreement protocol cannot resist man-in-the-middle attack.

DOI
10.1109/cis.2009.152

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Key agreement is one of the fundamental cryptographic primitives in public key cryptography. So far several certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement (CL-T-AKA) protocols have been proposed. However, all these protocols are based on bilinear map and most of them are without formal security proof. In this paper, we present a new formal security model of CL-T-AKA protocols and bring forward the first two-party key agreement protocol without the computation of expensive bilinear map. Our protocol is secure under the security model assuming the Gap-DH problem is intractable. With respect to efficiency, our protocol requires a single round of communication in which each party sends only one group element, and needs only five modular exponentiation computations. In addition, we point out that an existing certificateless two-party key agreement protocol cannot resist man-in-the-middle attack.
Key agreement is one of the fundamental cryptographic primitives in public key cryptography. It plays an important role for securing systems in practice. In this paper, we present the first certificateless one-way authenticated two-party key agreement protocol. The security of the proposed protocol is analyzed based on the intractability of the standard discrete logarithm (DL) and bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problems. For efficiency, our protocol enjoys low complexity in both communication and computation.
Authenticated key agreement (AK) protocol is crucial in providing data confidentiality and integrity for subsequent communications among two or more parties over a public network. Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) combines the advantage of the identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) and the traditional public key cryptography (PKC). Unfortunately, construction of CL-PKC and AK protocols has so far depended on the use of identity-based encryption, which results in the bilinear pairing-based schemes that need costly operations. We present a secure certificateless authenticated key agreement protocol without paring, based on the certificateless encryption scheme proposed by J. Baek et al. It shows that the newly proposed scheme is of nice efficiency and practical. Moreover, it provides perfect forward secrecy, PKG forward secrecy and almost all the other known security attributes, such as known-key secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience, known session-specific temporary information security, message independence and no key control.
Authenticated key agreement protocol is one of the important cryptographic primitives to ensure secure communication in an open network. Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) represents an interesting and potentially useful balance between public key cryptography based on certificates and identity-based cryptography. The topic of CL-PKC has undergone quite rapid development with schemes being proposed for encryption and signatures, while certificateless authenticated key agreement protocols are seldom discussed. In this paper, we present a secure two-party authenticated key agreement protocol based on an efficient certificateless public key encryption with pairing. Such a scheme achieves almost all of the security attributes, including known-key secrecy, perfect forward secrecy, PKG forward secrecy, key-compromise impersonation resilience, unknown key-share resilience, known session-specific temporary information security, message independence and no key control. Meanwhile, it is also practical with nice efficiency.
A few of certificateless key agreement schemes have been proposed in recent years,all of them need pairing operations,what's more,most of them are vulnerable to the key compromise impersonation attack and resistance to leakage of ephemeral keys.The provably secure certificateless key agreement protocol was proposed by Lippold in 2009,but their protocol suffered from computation burden.In order to solve the above-mentioned problem,this paper proposed a new pairing-free certificateless two party key agreement scheme (CL-KA) and presened its security properties.The new scheme was secure as long as each party had at least one uncompromised secret.Thus,the new scheme was secure even if the key generation centre learned the ephemeral secrets of both parties.The new scheme achieves efficiency in computational cost when compared with Lippold's protocol.
Certificateless cryptography aims at combining the advantages of identity based and public key cryptography in order to avoid the key escrow problem inherent in the identity based cryptography and cumbersome certificate management in the traditional public key infrastructure. The provably secure certificateless key agreement protocol is proposed by Lippold et al. in 2009, but their protocol suffers from computation burden. Owing to the above-mentioned situations, a new certificateless two party key agreement protocol (CL-KA) is proposed and the security attributes are analyzed in the extended Canetti-Krawzcyk(eCK) security model. Our protocol only requires each entity to compute two pairings, up to now, it turns out to be the most efficient one of all the previously known security CL-KA schemes.
Certificateless public key cryptography has appealing features,namely it does not require the use of certificates and does not have a private key escrow feature.This paper describes a certificateless key agreement protocol based on bilinear pairings.The identity authentication in the protocol depends on a digital signature scheme.This paper proves the security of the signature scheme.The results show that in the random oracle model with the discrete logarithm assumption,the signature scheme resists existential forgeries against adaptive chosen-message attacks.The results farther show that the protocol preserves the desired security properties,including known-key security,unknown key-share resilience,perfect forward secrecy,key-compromise impersonation resilience and leakage of ephemeral private key resilience.The protocol requires much lower computation overhead than related protocols,since it uses fewer bilinear pairing operations and no modular exponentiation.