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IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics

An efficient and secure fault-tolerant conference-key distribution scheme

Yuanbo Guo, Jianfeng Ma

Published May 1, 2004• 8 citations
Publisher

Abstract

An original approach to establish a computationally secure and robust conference key between multiple users is presented, which is built on known secret sharing schemes and requires the authenticated and encrypted point-to-point channels between servers and users. By running of the protocol, every honest user of a given conference can get a common key, even if a minority of the servers malfunction or misbehave. This scheme does not rely on any unproven cryptographic assumptions or on the availability of any tamper-proof hardware. By using zero knowledge proof, any corrupted information and incorrect results can be detected. And by distributing the sensitive security information across several servers and never reconstructing any key at a single location, the compromise of a few servers will not compromise the privacy of any key. Analysis shows that under the assumption of a Diffie-Hellman decisional problem, a passive adversary gets zero knowledge about the conference key, and in the random oracle model, an active adversary cannot impersonate successfully. We have implemented the scheme in a distributed environment. By conducting a number of experiments in the fault-free case and various fault scenarios, we show that it has an acceptable performance of practicability.

DOI
10.1109/tce.2004.1309426

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An original approach to establish a computationally secure and robust conference key between multiple users is presented, which is built on known secret sharing schemes and requires the authenticated and encrypted point-to-point channels between servers and users. By running of the protocol, every honest user of a given conference can get a common key, even if a minority of the servers malfunction or misbehave. This scheme does not rely on any unproven cryptographic assumptions or on the availability of any tamper-proof hardware. By using zero knowledge proof, any corrupted information and incorrect results can be detected. And by distributing the sensitive security information across several servers and never reconstructing any key at a single location, the compromise of a few servers will not compromise the privacy of any key. Analysis shows that under the assumption of a Diffie-Hellman decisional problem, a passive adversary gets zero knowledge about the conference key, and in the random oracle model, an active adversary cannot impersonate successfully. We have implemented the scheme in a distributed environment. By conducting a number of experiments in the fault-free case and various fault scenarios, we show that it has an acceptable performance of practicability.
This paper proposes a computationally secure and fault-tolerant conference key distribution scheme, which only requires the authenticated and encrypted point-to-point channels between each server and each user. By the combined use of knowledge proof and verifiable secret sharing, the scheme has the properties of simple structure and high security. Analysis shows that every honest user of a conference can get a common key after the running of the protocol, even if a minority of the servers malfunction or misbehave. We also show that on the assumption of a Diffie-Hellman decisional problem, a passive adversary gets zero knowledge about the conference key, and the active adversary cannot impersonate someone successfully. Because the knowledge proof method we adopt is non-interactive, both operation and communication overheads are reduced, thus making the schemes very efficient.
A computationally secure and robust conference key distribution scheme is presented, which requires only the authenticated and encrypted point-to-point channels between each server and each user. By using it, every honest user of a conference can get a common key after running of the protocol, even if some minority of the servers malfunction or misbehave. Analysis shows that a passive adversary gets zero knowledge about the conference key, and the active adversary cannot impersonate successfully. Because this scheme is noninteractive, both operation and communication overhead are reduced, this make it very efficient.
When a group of people want to communicate securely over an open network, they run a conference-key protocol to establish a common conference key K such that all their communications thereafter are encrypted with the key K. In this paper, we propose a provably secure fault-tolerant conference-key agreement protocol under the authenticated broadcast channel model. We show that a passive adversary gets zero knowledge about the conference key established by the honest participants under the assumption of a variant Diffie-Hellman (1976) decision problem. We also show that the honest participants can agree on a common conference key no matter how many participants are malicious. Furthermore, we show that even if the broadcast channel is not authenticated, our protocol is secure against impersonators under the random oracle model.
Byzantine fault model will be increasingly important in the future because malicious attacks and component failures are increasingly common and can cause faulty nodes to exhibit arbitrary behavior. This paper describes an efficient fault-tolerant conference-key agreement schme based on this model under the authenticated channel model. For distributing conference keys, the scheme based on commit-challenge-response framework requires only 2t+1 active servers. So it is efficient and optimal. It is shown that the passive or active adversaries neither gain information about the conference keys established by the honest participants nor disrupt conference keys establishment.
Recently, Tzeng proposed a provably secure and fault-tolerant conference-key agreement protocol. It requires only a constant number of rounds to establish a conference key among all honest participants. This article will show that Tzeng’s protocol does not offer forward secrecy. We say that a conference-key agreement protocol offers forward secrecy if the long-term secret key of any participant is compromised and will not result in the compromise of the previously established conference keys. This property is important and has been included in most key agreement protocols and standards. In this paper, an improvement based on Tzeng’s protocol is proposed and it achieves forward secrecy. Under the Diffie–Hellman decision problem assumption and the random oracle model, we show that the proposed protocol can withstand passive attacks and is secure against impersonator’s attacks. The improved protocol requires a constant number of rounds to compute a conference key. The improved protocol provides fault-tolerance.
Conference key agreement is one of the important issues in cryptography. In this paper, we propose a novel conference key agreement scheme. Without adopting the authenticated broadcasting channel model, we use an intermediary node to ensure the correctness of the transmitted messages. A passive adversary or an active adversary obtains zero knowledge about the common conference key established by the all honest participants who follow the proposed scheme. Keywords: conference key, Diffie-Hellman, passive adversary, active adversary, cryptography