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International Journal of Security and Networks

On security proof of McCullagh Barreto's key agreement protocol and its variants

Zhaohui Cheng, Liqun Chen

Published Jan 1, 2007• 34 citations
Publisher

Abstract

McCullagh and Barreto presented an identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol in CT-RSA 2005. Their protocol was found to be vulnerable to a key-compromise impersonation attack. In order to recover the weakness, McCullagh and Barreto and Xie proposed two variants of the protocol respectively. In each of these works, a security proof of the proposed protocol was presented. In this paper, we revisit these three security proofs and show that all the reductions in these proofs are invalid, because the property of indistinguishability between their simulation and the real world was not held. As a replacement, we slightly modify the McCullagh and Barreto's second protocol and then formally analyse the security of the modified scheme in the BellareRogaway key agreement model.

DOI
10.1504/ijsn.2007.013178

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McCullagh and Barreto presented an identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol in CT-RSA 2005. Their protocol was found to be vulnerable to a key-compromise impersonation attack. In order to recover the weakness, McCullagh and Barreto and Xie proposed two variants of the protocol respectively. In each of these works, a security proof of the proposed protocol was presented. In this paper, we revisit these three security proofs and show that all the reductions in these proofs are invalid, because the property of indistinguishability between their simulation and the real world was not held. As a replacement, we slightly modify the McCullagh and Barreto's second protocol and then formally analyse the security of the modified scheme in the BellareRogaway key agreement model.
McCullagh and Barreto presented an identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol in CT-RSA 2005. Their protocol was found to be vulnerable to a key-compromise impersonation attack. In order to recover the weakness, McCullagh and Barreto, and Xie proposed two variants of the protocol respectively. In each of these works, a security proof of the proposed protocol was presented. In this paper, we revisit these three security proofs and show that all the reductions in these proofs are invalid, because the property of indistinguishability between their simulation and the real world was not held. As a replacement, we slightly modify the McCullagh and Barreto’s second protocol and then formally analyse the security of the modified scheme in the Bellare-Rogaway key agreement model.
We revisit the two-party identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol (2P-IDAKA) and its variant resistant to key-compromise impersonation due to McCullagh & Barreto (2005). Protocol 2P-IDAKA carries a proof of security in the Bellare & Rogaway (1993) model. In this paper, we demonstrated why both the protocol and its variant are not secure if the adversary is allowed to send a Reveal query to reveal non-partner players who had accepted the same session key (i.e., termed key-replicating attack in recent work of Krawczyk (2005)). We also demonstrate that both protocols do not achieve the key integrity property, first discussed by Janson & Tsudik (1995).
Master key forward security is an important property for identity-based key exchange protocols. Unfortunately, most of existing identity-based key exchange protocols do not satisfy this property. In this paper, we firstly analyse Xie's modified protocol to show that signature is undesirable for an identity-based key agreement protocol with the master key forward secrecy. Then we present two improved protocols from McCullagh-Barreto identity-based key agreement protocol to capture the master key forward security. Our first protocol is efficient and its security can be proved with the help of a decisional oracle, while the second one achieves stronger security and its security can be reduced to a computational problem in the random oracle model. The master key forward secrecy is proved under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Authenticated key agreement protocol allows a group of users in an open network environment to identify each other and share a security session key.This article proposed a new scheme of ID-based authenticated multi-party key agreement based on McCullagh-Barreto scheme.Key seed was introduced to update temporary public/private key pairs.The new scheme is able to realize the authentication,improve the security,resist Reveal query attack and the key compromise impersonation attack successfully,and it has many properties such as non-key control and equal contribution.