Conceptually interesting generalized Heisenberg inequality

Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond

Attention is drawn to the significance and interest of the covariance and correlation coefficient for two physical properties of a quantum system. The generalized Heisenberg inequality between two such properties, in terms of their commutator and anticommutator, is interpreted as setting an upper bound, of quantum nature, on their correlation coefficient.

Michael Cowling, John Price

Ian T. Durham

This article explores a relationship between the generalized form of Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations and Bell-type inequalities in the context of their associated algebras. I begin by exploring the algebraic and logical background for each, drawing parallels and a noticeable symmetry. In addition I describe a thought experiment linking the conceptual foundation of one to a mathematical representation of the other. Finally, I explore the requirements for a more inscrutable relationship between the two pointing out the tantalizing questions this suggestion raises as well as potential answers. The purpose of this article is to show that there is more to this relationship than meets the eye and suggests that a very general Bell-like theorem can be interpreted as a limiting case of the broader generalized uncertainty principle.

Gao Mingzhe

Rom Harr

THE conceptual problems raised by the discovery of quantum effects have not been fully resolved after half a century. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly to be found in the mutual ignorance which prevails between physicists and philosophers. In his book Heisenberg brings together a philosophically inclined temperament with an unrivalled knowledge of physics. The result is a book of very great interest, however much one might disagree with his conclusions. The collection of essays of which the other book is made up is intended to bring crucial conceptual problems in physics especially to the notice of philosophers. The design and intention of the collection is admirable for this is the proper way to overcome the departmentalization of interest that has left the deep conceptual problems still unresolved. Men like Heisenberg who combine philosophical temperament with scientic knowledge of great distinction are rare, and yet the difficulties can only be cleared up by the application of philosophical techniques of analysis to problems which are an intimate and difficult part of physics. A great deal of the interest of Heisenberg's book lies in the very comprehensive account he gives of the origin and growth of the Copenhagen school, and the way the new phenomena forced a largely unwelcome picture of nature upon Bohr and his friends. The most important chapter from a philosophical point of view is that in which Heisenberg defends this interpretation against the attacks to which it has been subjected. The essence of his argument for the interpretation can be summed up in two propositions. (i) The Copenhagen interpretation of physical theory, which depends upon the acceptance of the so-called Principle of Complementarity, is an inevitable and final interpretation. The reason for this is that there are only two possible general models for understanding given physical phenomena; a particle model or a wave model. These are exhaustive and exclusive because the former depends upon discontinuous and the latter upon continuous (using substance here in the traditional philosophical sense). If we find, as we do, that the two fundamental constituents of the universe, matter and radiation, each exhibit two classes of phenomena, one explainable only on a particle model and one on a wave model, then we are compelled to adopt a complementarity hypothesis and give up the idea of finding a single and uniform model for the understanding of phenomena. There are only two kinds of models; they are mutually exclusive; both are required; hence we either despair before an insoluble problem or adopt the Copenhagen interpretation. (2) Any serious criticism of this interpretation must offer an alternative

Masao Nagasawa