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Reviews in Mathematical Physics

MACROSCOPIC OBSERVABLES AND THE BORN RULE, I: LONG RUN FREQUENCIES

Nicolaas P. Landsman

Published Nov 1, 2008• 12 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We clarify the role of the Born rule in the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics by deriving it from Bohr's doctrine of classical concepts, translated into the following mathematical statement: a quantum system described by a noncommutative C*-algebra of observables is empirically accessible only through associated commutative C*-algebras. The Born probabilities emerge as the relative frequencies of outcomes in long runs of measurements on a quantum system; it is not necessary to adopt the frequency interpretation of single-case probabilities (which will be the subject of a sequel paper). Our derivation of the Born rule uses ideas from a program begun by Finkelstein [17] and Hartle [21], intending to remove the Born rule as a separate postulate of quantum mechanics. Mathematically speaking, our approach refines previous elaborations of this program — notably the one due to Farhi, Goldstone, and Gutmann [15] as completed by Van Wesep [50] — in replacing infinite tensor products of Hilbert spaces by continuous fields of C*-algebras. Furthermore, instead of relying on the controversial eigenstate-eigenvalue link in quantum theory, our derivation just assumes that pure states in classical physics have the usual interpretation as truthmakers that assign sharp values to observables.

DOI
10.1142/s0129055x08003511

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We clarify the role of the Born rule in the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics by deriving it from Bohr's doctrine of classical concepts, translated into the following mathematical statement: a quantum system described by a noncommutative C*-algebra of observables is empirically accessible only through associated commutative C*-algebras. The Born probabilities emerge as the relative frequencies of outcomes in long runs of measurements on a quantum system; it is not necessary to adopt the frequency interpretation of single-case probabilities (which will be the subject of a sequel paper). Our derivation of the Born rule uses ideas from a program begun by Finkelstein [17] and Hartle [21], intending to remove the Born rule as a separate postulate of quantum mechanics. Mathematically speaking, our approach refines previous elaborations of this program — notably the one due to Farhi, Goldstone, and Gutmann [15] as completed by Van Wesep [50] — in replacing infinite tensor products of Hilbert spaces by continuous fields of C*-algebras. Furthermore, instead of relying on the controversial eigenstate-eigenvalue link in quantum theory, our derivation just assumes that pure states in classical physics have the usual interpretation as truthmakers that assign sharp values to observables.
We clarify the role of the Born rule in the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics by deriving it from Bohr's doctrine of classical concepts, translated into the following mathematical statement: a quantum system described by a noncommutative C*-algebra of observables is empirically accessible only through associated commutative C*-algebras. The Born probabilities emerge as the relative frequencies of outcomes in long runs of measurements on a quantum system; it is not necessary to adopt the frequency interpretation of single-case probabilities (which will be the subject of a sequel paper). Our derivation of the Born rule uses ideas from a program begun by Finkelstein (1965) and Hartle (1968), intending to remove the Born rule as a separate postulate of quantum mechanics. Mathematically speaking, our approach refines previous elaborations of this program - notably the one due to Farhi, Goldstone, and Gutmann (1989) as completed by Van Wesep (2006) - in replacing infinite tensor products of Hilbert spaces by continuous fields of C*-algebras. In combination with our interpretational context, this technical improvement circumvents valid criticisms that earlier derivations of the Born rule have provoked, especially to the effect that such derivations were mathematically flawed as well as circular. Furthermore, instead of relying on the controversial eigenvector-eigenvalue link in quantum theory, our derivation just assumes that pure states in classical physics have the usual interpretation as truthmakers that assign sharp values to observables.
In a quantum-Bayesian take on quantum mechanics, the Born Rule cannot be interpreted as a rule for setting measurement-outcome probabilities from an objective quantum state. But if not, what is the role of the rule? In this paper, we argue that it should be seen as an empirical addition to Bayesian reasoning itself. Particularly, we show how to view the Born Rule as a normative rule in addition to usual Dutch-book coherence. It is a rule that takes into account how one should assign probabilities to the consequences of various intended measurements on a physical system, but explicitly in terms of prior probabilities for and conditional probabilities consequent upon the imagined outcomes of a special counterfactual reference measurement. This interpretation is seen particularly clearly by representing quantum states in terms of probabilities for the outcomes of a fixed, fiducial symmetric informationally complete (SIC) measurement. We further explore the extent to which the general form of the new normative rule implies the full state-space structure of quantum mechanics. It seems to get quite far.
The Born rule governs the probability of outcomes of measurements of quantum systems. Many attempts have been made to derive the Born rule from other postulates. We perform such an analysis in an Everett interpretation without any measurement postulates at all. We explain that probability is an ill defined concept and that an agent who nevertheless wishes to make approximate predictions will have no alternative measure to weigh the alternatives without subjecting herself to a dutch book. Our demonstration is complete for projective measurements of pure states in a finite dimensional Hilbert space and we discuss how it might be applied to generalized measurements. A similar demonstration is impossible for mixed states. Nevertheless, following the standard convention, probability for mixed states has the same validity and issues as it does in classical physics.
In the quantum-Bayesian interpretation of quantum theory (or QBism), the Born rule cannot be interpreted as a rule for setting measurement-outcome probabilities from an objective quantum state. But if not, what is the role of the rule? In this paper, the argument is given that it should be seen as an empirical addition to Bayesian reasoning itself. Particularly, it is shown how to view the Born rule as a normative rule in addition to usual Dutch-book coherence. It is a rule that takes into account how one should assign probabilities to the consequences of various intended measurements on a physical system, but explicitly in terms of prior probabilities for and conditional probabilities consequent upon the imagined outcomes of a special counterfactual reference measurement. This interpretation is exemplified by representing quantum states in terms of probabilities for the outcomes of a fixed, fiducial symmetric informationally complete measurement. The extent to which the general form of the new normative rule implies the full state-space structure of quantum mechanics is explored.
Abstract Logical inference leads to one of the major interpretations of probability theory called logical interpretation, in which the probability is seen as a measure of the plausibility of a logical statement under incomplete information. Assuming that our usual inference procedure is working rationally for every set of logical propositions represented in terms of commuting projectors on a given Hilbert space, we extend the logical interpretation to quantum mechanics and derive the Born rule. Our result implies that, from epistemological viewpoints, we can regard quantum mechanics as a natural extension of classical probability theory.
In a quantum-Bayesian take on quantum mechanics, the Born Rule cannot be interpreted as a rule for setting measurement-outcome probabilities from an objective quantum state. But if not, what is the role of the rule? In this paper, we argue that it should be seen as an empirical addition to Bayesian reasoning itself. Particularly, we show how to view the Born Rule as a normative rule in addition to usual Dutch-book coherence. It is a rule that takes into account how one should assign probabilities to the consequences of various intended measurements on a physical system, but explicitly in terms of prior probabilities for and conditional probabilities consequent upon the imagined outcomes of a special counterfactual reference measurement. This interpretation is seen particularly clearly by representing quantum states in terms of probabilities for the outcomes of a fixed, fiducial symmetric informationally complete (SIC) measurement. We further explore the extent to which the general form of the new normative rule implies the