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Physical Review A

Generic framework for the secure Yuen 2000 quantum-encryption protocol employing the wire-tap channel approach

Miodrag J. Mihaljević

Published May 24, 2007• 19 citations
Publisher

Abstract

It is shown that the security, against known-plaintext attacks, of the Yuen 2000 (Y00) quantum-encryption protocol can be considered via the wire-tap channel model assuming that the heterodyne measurement yields the sample for security evaluation. Employing the results reported on the wire-tap channel, a generic framework is proposed for developing secure Y00 instantiations. The proposed framework employs a dedicated encoding which together with inherent quantum noise at the attacker's side provides Y00 security.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.75.052334

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It is shown that the security, against known-plaintext attacks, of the Yuen 2000 (Y00) quantum-encryption protocol can be considered via the wire-tap channel model assuming that the heterodyne measurement yields the sample for security evaluation. Employing the results reported on the wire-tap channel, a generic framework is proposed for developing secure Y00 instantiations. The proposed framework employs a dedicated encoding which together with inherent quantum noise at the attacker's side provides Y00 security.
There exists a great gap between one-time pad with perfect secrecy and conventional mathematical encryption. The Yuen 2000 (Y00) protocol or $\ensuremath{\alpha}\ensuremath{\eta}$ scheme may provide a protocol which covers from the conventional security to the ultimate one, depending on implementations. This paper presents the complexity-theoretic security analysis on some models of the Y00 protocol with nonlinear pseudo-random-number-generator and quantum noise diffusion mapping (QDM). Algebraic attacks and fast correlation attacks are applied with a model of the Y00 protocol with nonlinear filtering like the Toyocrypt stream cipher as the running key generator, and it is shown that these attacks in principle do not work on such models even when the mapping between running key and quantum state signal is fixed. In addition, a security property of the Y00 protocol with QDM is clarified. Consequently, we show that the Y00 protocol has a potential which cannot be realized by conventional cryptography and that it goes beyond mathematical encryption with physical encryption.
The physical-layer security of a quantum-noise randomized cipher (QNRC) system is, for the first time, quantitatively evaluated with secrecy capacity employed as the performance metric. Considering quantum noise as a channel advantage for legitimate parties over eavesdroppers, the specific wire-tap models for both channels of the key and data are built with channel outputs yielded by quantum heterodyne measurement; the general expressions of secrecy capacities for both channels are derived, where the matching codes are proved to be uniformly distributed. The maximal achievable secrecy rate of the system is proposed, under which secrecy of both the key and data is guaranteed. The influences of various system parameters on secrecy capacities are assessed in detail. The results indicate that QNRC combined with proper channel codes is a promising framework of secure communication for long distance with high speed, which can be orders of magnitude higher than the perfect secrecy rates of other encryption systems. Even if the eavesdropper intercepts more signal power than the legitimate receiver, secure communication (up to Gb/s) can still be achievable. Moreover, the secrecy of running key is found to be the main constraint to the systemic maximal secrecy rate.
Abstract As past works have shown, information‐theoretically secure implementations transmitters of Y00 quantum noise randomised cypher are possible. An advance to the provably secure Y00 protocol by bridging gaps between experimental results and theoretical analyses under so‐called quantum collective measurement attacks with known plaintexts is aimed. It would be the strongest attack on the Y00 protocol in the context of quantum key distribution protocols. However, recently proposed security evaluations under the attacks were too abstract to apply to experiments. Therefore, security analyses directly evaluable with the equipped Y00 transmitters under attack are offered. Thus, new security indices are proposed instead of ordinary security measures, such as the bit‐error‐rate guarantee between optical signals or a masking size. Contrarily, unsolved problems are also listed.
We investigate the Yuen 2000 (so-called Y-00)-protocol, which can realize a randomized stream cipher with high bit rate (Gbit/s) for long distances (several hundreds km). The randomized stream cipher with randomization by quantum noise based on the Y-00 protocol is called a quantum stream cipher in this paper, and it may have security against known plaintext attacks which has no analog with any conventional symmetric key ciphers. We present a simple cryptanalysis based on an attacker's heterodyne measurement and a quantum unambiguous measurement to make clear the strength of the Y-00 protocol in real communication. In addition, we give a design for the implementation of an intensity-modulation scheme and report an experimental demonstration of 1Gbit∕s1\phantom{\rule{0.3em}{0ex}}\mathrm{Gbit}∕\mathrm{s}1Gbit∕s quantum stream cipher through a $20\text{\ensuremath{-}}\mathrm{km}$-long transmission line.