In the so-called "Spin-Echo Experiments" the behaviour of a spin's system seems to violate the second law of thermodynamics. For this reason the "Spin-Echo Experiments" are considered of particular interest for the Foundations of Physics. Interventionists have provided a classical explanation (Blatt, 1959; Ridderbos & Redhead, 1998) and a quantum-based explanation (Hemmo & Shenker, 2005) of these experiments. Here both interventionist explanations are assessed by means of the Manipulability Theory of Causal Explanation (Woodward, 2003). It is argued that interventionism would gain explanatory depth by providing functional relations and predicting relaxation times.
In the so-called "Spin-Echo Experiments" the behaviour of a spin's system seems to violate the second law of thermodynamics. For this reason the "Spin-Echo Experiments" are considered of particular interest for the Foundations of Physics. Interventionists have provided a classical explanation (Blatt, 1959; Ridderbos & Redhead, 1998) and a quantum-based explanation (Hemmo & Shenker, 2005) of these experiments. Here both interventionist explanations are assessed by means of the Manipulability Theory of Causal Explanation (Woodward, 2003). It is argued that interventionism would gain explanatory depth by providing functional relations and predicting relaxation times.
Identifying causal relations plays an indispensable role in science, economics, medicine and everyday life. Interventionist causation associates the discovery of such relations with the possibility of manipulation or intervention. A causes B, if manipulating A in the right way can bring about changes in B. The main technical tool, the causal model, can be seen as a device for telling us how and why certain actions are more effective than others. Such models have found application in almost every scientific discipline. However, despite several decades of sophisticated analysis and a wealth of technical results, interventionist causal methods are known to fail in the quantum case. The quantum domain, with its peculiar, counterintuitive features, is widely considered an inhospitable environment in which to apply our usual causal discovery tools. This causal skepticism presents us with a puzzle. Physicists are now able to manipulate and control quantum systems, and the design and construction of quantum technology relies on an ability to identify when one strategy will work and another will fail. From the perspective of interventionist causation, it seems that a formal account of quantum causal modelling ought to be possible. The main contribution of this thesis is to provide an extension of interventionist methodology to the quantum case. In Chapter 1, I introduce interventionist causation from the perspective of two giants of the field: Judea Pearl and James Woodward. The Causal Markov Condition (CMC) and Faithfulness assumptions are presented, and I draw particular attention to the discovery of casual structure. I touch on some of the well-known problems with interventionist causation per se. In Chapter 2, I put this methodology to work in a quantum mechanical context. Following tradition, we examine one of the Bell experiments in order to determine how the classical interventionist framework fails. Noting that the usual response is to demand that one drops either the CMC or Faithfulness, I suggest that neither approach is particularly satisfactory and argue for an alternative. I discuss some reasons why the interventionist is forced to pursue this different path. In Chapter 3, I motivate the possibility of an interventionist account of quantum causation. I first look at how physicists represent quantum technology in order to make interventionist and counterfactual inferences: via the use of quantum circuit diagrams. Using three examples I demonstrate the manner in which these diagrams can be used to facilitate causal inference. In Chapter 4, I examine some recent attempts at characterising quantum causal models due to work from the quantum foundations community. I present three such accounts and explain why I endorse a fourth, the focus of the next chapter. In Chapter 5, I present a new framework that allows for the discovery of interventionist quantum causal structure. I finish the thesis with a summary and some suggestions for further work.
Since all experiments are subjected to the laws of quantum mechanics, the invalidity of the law of causality is definitively proved by quantum mechanics. (Heisenberg, 1927, p. 197, trans. in Stern, 1969, p. 132) THE PROBLEM OF INDETERMINISM If quantum mechanics is correct, on whatever interpretation, there are experimental setups such that no amount of observational knowledge of the initial system could possibly predict the outcome. An electron goes through a magnetic field in the Stern-Gerlach experiment in a superposed spin state | up > + | down >. It will take an upward or downward path through the magnetic field, and if quantum mechanics is correct, no observation of its physical configuration prior to the performance of this kind of experiment can possibly reveal which it will be. The standard indeterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics has it that not only can no observation of the prior physical properties of the system, including of the electron, allow us to predict the outcome of the experiment, but that the system lacks any physical properties, observable or not, such that were they known ahead of time, we would know what the outcome is. In other words, on this interpretation, two quantum mechanical systems that start with exactly the same intrinsic properties can behave in different ways. This is indeterminism. It is seen as challenging the PSR for exactly the reason libertarian free will is, but more deeply because the defender of libertarian free will can allow for indeterministic explanations involving the reasons for one action rather than another.
Inferring causal relations from empirical data is a central task in any scientific inquiry. To that aim, a mathematical theory of causality has been developed, not only stating under which conditions such inference becomes possible but also offering a formal framework to reason about cause and effect within quantum theory. This perspective article provides an overview of the latest results in the growing field of quantum causality, with a special focus on experimental implementations and concepts that only recently have entered in the quantum information dictionary. Ideas like bilocality, instrumental variables and interventions will be discussed from both a fundamental and an experimental perspective.
One of the recurrent problems in the foundations of physics is to explain why we rarely observe certain phenomena that are allowed by our theories and laws. In thermodynamics, for example, the spontaneous approach towards equilibrium is ubiquitous yet the time-reversal-invariant laws that presumably govern thermal behaviour in the microscopic level equally allow spontaneous approach away from equilibrium to occur. Why are the former processes frequently observed while the latter are almost never reported? Another example comes from quantum mechanics where the formalism, if considered complete and universally applicable, predicts the existence of macroscopic superpositions—monstrous Schrodinger cats—and these are never observed: while electrons and atoms enjoy the cloudiness of waves, macroscopic objects are always localized to definite positions. A well-known explanatory framework due to Ludwig Boltzmann traces the rarity of " abnormal" thermodynamic phenomena to the scarcity of the initial conditions that lead to it. After all, physical laws are no more than algorithms and these are expected to generate different results according to different initial conditions, hence Boltzmann's insight that violations of thermodynamic laws are possible but highly improbable. Yet Boltzmann introduces probabilities into this explanatory scheme, and since the latter is couched in terms of classical mechanics, these probabilities must be interpreted as a result of ignorance of the exact state the system is in. Quantum mechanics has taught us otherwise. Here the attempts to explain why we never observe macroscopic superpositions have led to different interpretations of the formalism and to different solutions to the quantum measurement problem. These solutions introduce additional interpretations to the meaning of probability over and above ignorance of the definite state of the physical system: quantum probabilities may result from pure chance. Notwithstanding the success of the Boltzmannian framework in explaining the thermodynamic arrow in time it leaves us with a foundational puzzle: how can ignorance play a role in scientific explanation of objective reality? In turns out that two opposing solutions to the quantum measurement problem in which probabilities arise from the stochastic character of the underlying dynamics may scratch this explanatory itch. By offering a dynamical justification to the probabilities employed in classical statistical mechanics these two interpretations complete the Boltzmannian explanatory scheme and allow us to exorcize ignorance from scientific explanations of unobserved phenomena. In this thesis I argue that the puzzle of the thermodynamic arrow in time is closely related to the problem of interpreting quantum mechanics, i.e., to the measurement problem. We may solve one by fiat and thus solve the other, but it seems unwise to try solving them independently. I substantiate this claim by presenting two possible interpretations to non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Differing as they do on the meaning of the probabilities they introduce into the otherwise deterministic dynamics, these interpretations offer alternative explanatory schemes to the standard Boltzmannian statistical mechanical explanation of thermodynamic approach to equilibrium. I then show how notwithstanding their current empirical equivalence, the two approaches diverge at the continental divide between scientific realism and anti-realism.