IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics Communications and Computer Sciences

Generic Construction of Two-Party Round-Optimal Attribute-Based Authenticated Key Exchange without Random Oracles

Kazuki Yoneyama

Published Jan 1, 2013• 11 citations

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a generic construction of one-round attribute-based (implicitly) authenticated key exchange (ABAKE). The construction is based on a chosen-ciphertext (CCA) secure attribute-based KEM and the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. If an underlying attribute-based KEM scheme allows expressive access controls and is secure in the standard model (StdM), an instantiated ABAKE scheme also achieves them. Our scheme enjoys the best of both worlds: efficiency and security. The number of rounds is one (optimal) while the known secure scheme in the StdM is not one-round protocol. Our scheme is comparable in communication complexity with the most efficient known scheme that is not proved in the StdM. Also, our scheme is proved to satisfy security against advanced attacks like key compromise impersonation.

DOI: 10.1587/transfun.e96.a.1112

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