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IEEE Transactions on Information Theory

Common randomness and secret key generation with a helper

Imre Csiszár, Prakash Narayan

Published Mar 1, 2000• 302 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We consider the generation of common randomness (CR), secret or not secret, by two user terminals with aid from a "helper" terminal. Each terminal observes a different component of a discrete memoryless multiple source. The helper aids the users by transmitting information to them over a noiseless public channel subject to a rate constraint. Furthermore, one of the users is allowed to transmit to the other user over a public channel under a similar rate constraint. We study the maximum rate of CR which can be thus generated, including under additional secrecy conditions when it must be concealed from a wiretapper. Lower bounds for the corresponding capacities are provided, and single-letter capacity formulas are obtained for several special cases of interest.

DOI
10.1109/18.825796

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We consider the generation of common randomness (CR), secret or not secret, by two user terminals with aid from a "helper" terminal. Each terminal observes a different component of a discrete memoryless multiple source. The helper aids the users by transmitting information to them over a noiseless public channel subject to a rate constraint. Furthermore, one of the users is allowed to transmit to the other user over a public channel under a similar rate constraint. We study the maximum rate of CR which can be thus generated, including under additional secrecy conditions when it must be concealed from a wiretapper. Lower bounds for the corresponding capacities are provided, and single-letter capacity formulas are obtained for several special cases of interest.
Ahlswede-Csiszar (1993) and Csiszar (see Problemy Peredacii Informatsii, 1996) have addressed problems of determining the common randomness (CR) capacity and the secret key (SK) capacity for a variety of models as they arise in information theory and cryptography. We study problems of common randomness and secret key generation by a pair of terminals called the "users" with help from a third terminal, called the "helper". Noiseless one-way communication from the helper to the users as also from one user to the other, subject to rate constraints, is permitted over public channels. A situation involving a wiretapper is also considered.
We derive single-letter characterizations of (strong) secrecy capacities for models in which a "helper" terminal is connected to an arbitrary number of "user" terminals by a discrete memoryless channel (DMC). The helper terminal governs the input of the DMC, over which it transmits to the user terminals that observe the corresponding outputs; transmissions over the DMC are secure. Additionally, following each transmission over the DMC, unrestricted and interactive public communication is permitted between all the terminals. A subset of the user terminals, and possibly the helper terminal, generate secrecy with the remaining user terminals acting as abettors. We distinguish between the cases in which the helper terminal may, or may not, randomize. Two kinds of secrecy capacity are considered, depending on the extent of an eavesdropper's knowledge: secret key (SK) and private key (PK) capacity. These secrecy capacities are shown to be achievable with noninteractive communication between the terminals and with no public transmission from the helper terminal. When the helper terminal is forbidden to randomize, the needed transmission over the DMC entails only that of a constant sequence. It is also shown that additional randomization at the user terminals does not serve to enhance the secrecy capacities
We study the generation of a secret key of maximum rate by a pair of terminals observing correlated sources and with the means to communicate over a noiseless public communication channel. Our main result establishes a structural equivalence between the generation of a maximum rate secret key and the generation of a common randomness that renders the observations of the two terminals conditionally independent. The minimum rate of such common randomness, termed interactive common information, is related to Wyner's notion of common information, and serves to characterize the minimum rate of interactive public communication required to generate an optimum rate secret key. This characterization yields a single-letter expression for the aforementioned communication rate when the number of rounds of interaction are bounded. An application of our results shows that interaction does not reduce this rate for binary symmetric sources. Further, we provide an example for which interaction does reduce the minimum rate of communication. Also, certain invariance properties of common information quantities are established that may be of independent interest.
Shannon theoretic shared secret key generation by multiple terminals is considered for a source model in which the components of a discrete memoryless multiple source and a noiseless public channel of unlimited capacity are available for accomplishing this goal. A shared secret key is generated for distinct coalitions of terminals, with all the terminals cooperating in this task through their public communication. A communication from a terminal can be a function of its observed source component and of all previous communication. Member terminals of a coalition unite in recovering the key. Secrecy is required from an eavesdropper that observes the public interterminal communication. A single-letter characterization of the shared secret key capacity is obtained. When the key must be concealed additionally from subsets of coalition members, we provide an upper bound for the strict shared secret key capacity.
We derive single-letter characterizations of (strong) secrecy capacities for models with an arbitrary number of terminals, each of which observes a distinct component of a discrete memoryless multiple source, with unrestricted and interactive public communication permitted between the terminals. A subset of these terminals can serve as helpers for the remaining terminals in generating secrecy. According to the extent of an eavesdropper's knowledge, three kinds of secrecy capacity are considered: secret key (SK), private key (PK), and wiretap secret key (WSK) capacity. The characterizations of the SK and PK capacities highlight the innate connections between secrecy generation and multiterminal source coding without secrecy requirements. A general upper bound for WSK capacity is derived which is tight in the case when the eavesdropper can wiretap noisy versions of the components of the underlying multiple source, provided randomization is permitted at the terminals. These secrecy capacities are seen to be achievable with noninteractive communication between the terminals. The achievability results are also shown to be universal.
We consider the problem of characterizing the secret key (SK)-capacity for an arbitrary number of terminals, each of which observes a distinct component of a discrete memoryless multiple source, with unconstrained public communication allowed between these terminals. Our main contribution is the determination of SK-capacity for an arbitrary subset of terminals with the remaining terminals serving as "helpers," when an eavesdropper observes the communication between the terminals but does not have access to any other information. We also determine the private key (PK)-capacity when the eavesdropper additionally wiretaps some of the helper terminals from which too the key must then be concealed.